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‘Smart development’. An essay on a new political 
economy of the environment 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this book, we present a first empirical reflection on ‘smart development’, its measurement 
and its possible ‘drivers’ and ‘bottlenecks’. The very idea of ‘smart development’ was first 
proposed by Meadows (1992) and has not been really followed up to now in social science 
ever since. We first provide cross-national data, how much ecological footprint is used in the 
nations of the world system to ‘deliver’ a given amount of democracy, economic growth, 
gender equality, human development, research and development, and social cohesion. To this 
end, we first developed UNDP-type performance indicators from current standard 
international comparative, cross-national social science data on these six main dimensions of 
development and on the combined performance on the six dimensions (a UNDP type ‘human 
development index plus’). We then show the non-linear standard OLS regression trade-offs 
between ecological footprints per capita and their square on these six components of 
development and the overall super-UNDP development performance index, derived from 
them. The residuals from these regressions are our new measures of smart development: a 
country experiences smart development, if it achieves a maximum of democracy, economic 
growth, gender equality, human development, research and development, and social 
cohesion, and the combination of them with a minimum of ecological footprint.  
 
We then look at the cross-national drivers and bottlenecks of this ‘smart development’, using 
standard comparative cross-national data, which operationalize standard economic, 
sociological and political science knowledge in international development accounting. We 
compare the predictive power of these standard predictors, using standard OLS stepwise 
regression procedures, based on IBM SPSS XXII. Apart from important variables and 
indicators, derived from sociological dependency and world systems theories, we also test the 
predictive power of other predictors as well, ranging from geography and achieved 
development levels to the clash of civilization models, feminist theories, migration theories, 
and the ‘small is beautiful paradigm’ in the tradition of Schumacher. Our estimates underline 
the enormous importance of the transfer of resources from the centre to the periphery, 
brought about by migration, with huge statistical observed positive effects of received worker 
remittances on smart human development, Happy Life Years, smart gender justice, smart 
R&D, and both formulations of the smart development index. 
 
Finally, we take up an issue, which has been very prominent in recent global public health 
debate. Following the path-breaking articles by Wilkinson and associates, income inequality 
has a very detrimental effect on life quality. But life quality also depends in a non-linear 
fashion from environmental data. Thus, the Wilkinson research agenda finds its proper place 
also in debates about ‘smart development’, but certainly, the weight of other variables, such 
as  
 
• Membership in the Islamic Conference 
• military expenditures per GDP 
• Muslim population share per total population 
• public education expenditure per GNP 
• UNDP education index 
• worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
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also has to be properly taken into account. 
 
JEL classification: 
 
C43 - Index Numbers and Aggregation  
Q56 - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental 
Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth  
F22 - International Migration 
F-24 – Remittances 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In this book, we present a first empirical reflection on ‘smart development’, and its 
measurement and its possible ‘drivers’ and ‘bottlenecks’. The very idea of ‘smart 
development’ was first proposed by Meadows (1992) and has not been really followed up 
to now in social science ever since. In the face of the huge usage of this term in the 
international media, such a statement is perhaps surprising, but our verdict corresponds to the 
clear bibliographical evidence on the base of such indices as ‘ISI Web of Knowledge’ or 
‘Cambridge Scientific Abstracts (nowadays taken over by PROQUEST)’. 
 
The basic idea, proposed by Meadows two decades ago in his single pioneering article on the 
issue was that we should relate our whole concept of development, and not just economic 
growth, to the natural resources needed to sustain it. In a similar vein, the Happy Planet 
Organization presented the so-called ‘Happy Planet Index’ (HPI), which is, as it is perhaps 
known to the readership of this publication, an index of measuring the trade-off between 
ecological footprint data and life quality (Happy Life Years, HLYE). Arguably, ecological 
footprint today is the best single international yardstick for environmental destruction in a 
nation (see also York, Rosa, and Dietz, 2003).  
 
Economic theory, for sure, is conscious about the non-linearity of the trade-off between 
income and happiness, with rising income levels not necessarily increasing the happiness of 
all. This phenomenon has become widely known in the economic research literature as the 
‘Easterlin paradoxon’ (Easterlin, 1995, 2001; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Oswald, 1997; 
Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). But here, we provide the first cross-national data, how much 
ecological footprint is used in the nations of the world system to ‘deliver’ a given amount of 
democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human development, research and 
development, and social cohesion.  
 
To this end, we first developed UNDP-type performance indicators from current standard 
international comparative, cross-national social science data on the six main dimensions of 
development (democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human development, research 
and development, and social cohesion) and on the combined performance on these six 
dimensions (a kind of super-UNDP ‘human development index’). We then show the non-
linear standard OLS regression trade-offs between ecological footprints per capita and their 
square on these six components of development and the overall super-UNDP development 
performance index, derived from them. The residuals from these regressions are our new 
measures of smart development: a country experiences smart development, if it achieves 
a maximum of democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human development, 
research and development, and social cohesion, and the combination of them with a 
minimum of ecological footprint.  
 
We then look at the cross-national drivers and bottlenecks of this ‘smart development’, using 
standard comparative cross-national data, which operationalize standard economic, 
sociological and political science knowledge in international development accounting. We 
compare the predictive power of these standard predictors, using standard OLS stepwise 
regression procedures, based on IBM SPSS XXII. Apart from important variables and 
indicators, derived from sociological dependency and world systems theories, we also test the 
predictive power of other predictors as well, ranging from geography and achieved 
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development levels to the clash of civilization models, feminist theories, migration theories, 
and the ‘small is beautiful paradigm’ in the tradition of Schumacher.  
 
In Chapter 2 we sketch a possible theoretical background. Chapter 3 will introduce the 
measurement concepts and the methodology of this essay. Chapter 4 will be dedicated to the 
presentation of the results on the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart development’, while 
Chapter 5 will discuss the results in the framework of earlier theories and hitherto existing 
research, relevant for our subject. Chapter 6 looks into the trade-off between inequality and 
smart development. Chapter 7 presents our preliminary conclusions. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background and earlier studies 
 
 
To present a theory or competing theories of ‘smart development’ is virtually impossible, 
because there has been no measurement, let alone accounting of its cross-national successes 
and failures in the literature up to now. We are really had to start research into this issue from 
‘scratch’.  
 
At a time of a profound global economic crisis, which began in 2008, it might be permitted to 
look therefore at some of the more radical paradigms, challenging the wisdom of neo-liberal 
mainstream economic theory. Acemoglu, in his 2009 paper reflecting the lessons of the 2008 
crisis, and certainly himself being a leading ‘mainstream’ and not a ‘radical’ and 
‘globalization critical’ economist, went on the record of admitting that 
 
‘There is another sense in which the myth of the end of the business cycle is at odds with 
fundamental properties of the capitalist system. As Schumpeter argued long ago, the workings 
of the market system and the innovation dynamics that constitute its essence involve a heavy 
dose of creative destruction, where existing … firms, procedures and products are replaced by 
new ones’. (Acemoglu, 2009: 3) 
 
and later on saying:  
 
‘Economic growth will only take place if the society creates the institutions and policies that 
encourage innovation, reallocation, investment, and education. But such institutions should 
not be taken for granted. Because of the reallocation and creative destruction brought about 
by economic growth, there will always be parties, often strong parties, opposed to certain 
aspects of economic growth. In many less-developed economies, the key aspect of the political 
economy of growth is to ensure that incumbent producers, elites and politicians do not hijack 
the political agenda and create an environment inimical to economic progress and growth. 
Another threat to the institutional foundations of economic growth comes from its ultimate 
beneficiaries. Creative destruction and reallocation not only harm established businesses but 
also their workers and suppliers, sometimes even destroying the livelihood of millions of 
workers and peasants. It is then easy for impoverished populations suffering from adverse 
shocks and economic crises, — particularly in societies where the political economy never 
generated an effective safety net — to turn against the market system and support populist 
policies that will create barriers against economic growth. These threats are as important for 
advanced economies as they are for less-developed countries, particularly in the midst of the 
current economic crisis.’ (Acemoglu, 2009: 9-10) 
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Arguably, the leading flagship article of the economics profession on the issue of the possible 
general drivers and bottlenecks of economic growth is Levine and Renelt, 1992, which 
maintains that empirical linkages between long-run growth rates and a variety of economic 
policy, political, and institutional indicators are fragile to small changes in the conditioning 
information set. But there is a positive, robust correlation between growth and the share of 
investment in GDP and between the investment share and the ratio of international trade to 
GDP. The variety of relationships, tested in multiple regression analysis, is truly amazing and 
includes the following non-exhaustive list of variables, which we reproduce here to give our 
readers, who are not economists, a glimpse of the startling variety of growth predictors, used 
in economic theory today: 
 
 
Average inflation of GDP deflator 
Black-market exchange-rate premium 
Central-government gross capital formation 
Dummy for OECD countries 
Dummy for OPEC countries 
Dummy for outward orientation 
Dummy for socialist economy 
Dummy sub-Saharan Africa 
Dummy variable for Latin American countries 
Dummy variable for mixed government 
Export share of GDP  
Government consumption less defense and 
education share of GDP 
Government consumption share of gross domestic 
product 
Growth of export share of GDP 
Growth of exports 
Growth of government consumption expenditures 
Growth of import share 
Growth of imports 
Growth of population 
Growth of the share of government consumption 
Growth rate of domestic credit 
Import share of GDP 
Index of civil liberties 
Investment share of gross domestic product 
Land area (in thousands of square kilometers) 
Literacy rate in 1960 
Measure of openness based on import penetration 
Measure of overall trade intervention 
Measure of overall trade openness 
Number of revolutions and coups per year 
Population in 1970 
Primary-school enrolment rate in 1960, 1970 
Ratio of central-government defense expenditure 
Ratio of central-government deficit to GDP 
Ratio of central-government export-tax revenue to 
exports 
Ratio of central-government tax revenue to GDP 
Ratio of central-government to corporate income-
tax revenue to GDP 
Ratio of government educational expenditures 
Ratio of import taxes to imports 
Ratio of social-security tax revenue to GDP 
Ratio of total government expenditure to GDP 
Ratio of total trade (exports+imports) to GDP 
Real exchange-rate distortion 
Real government capital formation 
Real government consumption share of GDP 
Real investment share of GDP 
Secondary-school enrolment rate in 1960, 1970 
Share of real government consumption 
expenditures minus defense and education 
Standard deviation of GDC (growth of domestic 
credit) 
Standard deviation of PI (inflation) 
 
 
As the result of their exercise, Levine and Renelt arrive at the following conclusions, which 
initiated an amazing and unparalleled more than 1.000 follow-up studies in global social 
science literature to this date: 
 
‘(i) We found a positive and robust correlation between average growth rates and the average 
share of investment in GDP.  
(ii) We found a positive and robust correlation between the share of investment in GDP and 
the average share of trade in GDP. 
(iii) We found that all findings using the share of exports in GDP could be obtained almost 
identically using the total trade or import share. Thus, studies that use export indicators 
should not be interpreted as studying the relationship between growth and exports per se but 
rather as studying the relationship between growth and trade defined more broadly. 
(iv) We found that a large variety of trade policy measures were not robustly correlated with 
growth when the equation included the investment share. 
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(v) We found qualified support for the conditional-convergence hypothesis: we find a robust, 
negative correlation between the initial level income and growth over the 1960-1989 period 
when the equation includes a measure of the initial level of investment in human capital; but 
this result does not hold over the 1974-1989 period. 
(vi) We found that none of the broad array of fiscal indicators that we studied is robustly 
correlated with growth or the investment share. 
(vii) We found that a large assortment of other economic and political indicators are not 
robustly correlated with growth or the investment share. 
 
We have tried to distinguish partial growth correlations that seem robust from those that are 
fragile. We find that, although there are many econometric specifications in which 
macroeconomic policy indicators- taken individually or in groups are significantly correlated 
with growth, the cross-country statistical relationship between long-run average growth rates 
and almost every particular macroeconomic indicator is fragile. National policies appear to 
be a complex package, and future researchers may wish to focus on macroeconomic policy 
regimes and interactions among policies as opposed to the independent influence of any 
particular policy.’ (Levine and Renelt, 1992: 959-960) 
 
In this presentation of possible theories explaining ‘smart development’, we now should deal 
with the notion of ‘openness’ or ‘world economic openness’. Globalization critical audiences 
around the globe might largely disregard the evidence, provided by studies, suggesting that 
world market integration, not dissociation from the global markets would be the key to long-
run economic growth and well-being, but this approach is especially popular in standard 
economic science, dealing with the issues of international growth accounting over the last 
decades. The amount and the empirical, i.e. econometric quality of these studies is at first 
sight overwhelming: Cambridge Scientific Abstracts, nowadays taken over by PROQUEST 
(CSA) listed, by end-October 2011, around 500+ articles on the issue of ‘openness’ and 
‘economic growth’, and likewise, the list of scholars, mentioned in the CSA/COS ‘Scholar 
Universe’, dealing with this subject, is 500+. Some of the world’s leading and bestselling 
economists are among them1. Among the studies, listed in international online-bibliographies 
as especially often being referred to, we find, among others, Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 
2000; Dollar, 1992a and 1992b; Edwards, 1993; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Rodrik, 2006; 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004; and World Bank, 2005. While Dollar’s writings, 
widely disseminated around the globe, were especially straightforward in suggesting that a 
high share of exports and imports per GDP, and hence, an outward orientation of the society 
in question, is especially beneficial for economic growth and works in favour of the poorest 
strata of the population, the equally widely disseminated and received study by Frankel and 
Romer, 1999, comes to a more cautious conclusion: examining the correlation between trade 
and income one really cannot identify the direction of causation between the two. According 
to that study, countries' geographic characteristics, however, have important effects on trade, 
and are plausibly uncorrelated with other determinants of income. Frankel and Romer then 
construct measures of the geographic component of countries' trade, and use those measures 
to obtain instrumental variables estimating the effect of trade on income. Frankel and Romer 
suggest that trade has a quantitatively large and robust, though only moderately statistically 
significant positive effect on income. Edwards, 1993, publishing a year after the two 
influential Dollar studies, comes to the conclusion that economists often ask too much of their 
data sets, and try to extract information that simply is not there. In that sense, cross-country 
aggregate data sets have little information regarding the relationship between trade policy and 
                                                          
1 This can be checked easily by looking at the download figures or more complex ranking data, available from 
the open-access scientific archives like IDEAS/REPEC from the University of Connecticut or the Social Science 
Research Network, SSRN, in New York, N. Y. 
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growth. By contrast he maintains that theoretical developments in growth theory have 
suggested that microeconomic analysis could shed some light on the growth process. Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004 further shattered the optimistic assumptions about the 
beneficial effects of world economic openness on development outcomes in their study about 
the respective contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income levels 
around the world, using recently developed instrumental variables for institutions and trade. 
Their results indicate that ‘the quality of institutions "trumps" everything else’ (Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004). Once institutions are controlled for, conventional measures 
of geography have at best weak direct effects on incomes, although they have a strong indirect 
effect by influencing the quality of institutions. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, 
trade is almost always insignificant, and often enters the income equation with the "wrong" 
(i.e., negative) sign. In his influential study, 2006, Rodrik even went so far as to 
fundamentally question the ‘Washington Consensus’ based on open markets, which featured 
so prominently in Dollar, 1992a and 1992b: 
 
 
Table 1: Deconstructing the Washington Consensus of liberalization and openness 
 
 
 Original Washington 
Consensus 
 Augmented Washington 
Consensus 
1 Fiscal Discipline 11 Corporate governance 
2 Reorientation of public 
expenditures 
12 Anti-corruption 
3 Tax reform 13 Flexible labor markets 
4 Financial liberalization 14 WTO agreements 
5 Unified and competitive 
exchange rates 
15 Financial codes and 
standards 
6 Trade liberalization 16 "Prudent"  capital accounting 
7 Openness to Direct Foreign 
Investment 
17 Non-intermediate exchange 
rate regimes 
8 Privatization 18 Independent central 
banks/inflation targeting 
9 Deregulation 19 Social safety nets 
10 Secure Property Rights 20 Targeted poverty reduction 
 
Source: Rodrik, 2006, based on World Bank, 2005 
 
The divisive issue of migration equally divides opinions around the globe, and it also divides 
opinions among the global social science research community. Also, it must be mentioned in 
our theoretical survey. As it is well-known, migration is part and parcel of the ‘four 
freedoms’ of capitalism, besides the freedom of goods, services, and capital. It is only 
logical to treat its possible influence on ‘smart development’ immediately after dealing with 
the possible effects of ‘openness’. Migration might have a very big effect on ‘smart 
development’. Migration, after all, assures continued production and hence also pollution in 
the migration recipient countries, while worker remittances, sent from there to the migration 
sending countries, might contribute to overall consumption, well-being and investment in 
environmentally more sustainable housing and heating systems in the migration sending 
nations. 
 
A flagship survey of the hitherto existing migration theories (Masey et al., 1993) came to the 
pessimistic conclusion that migration theories up to that time were either advanced to explain 
the initiation of international migration or put forth to account for the persistence of migration 
 10 
across space and time. Masey et al. suggested that, because they are specified at such different 
levels of analysis, the theories are not inherently logically inconsistent.  
 
As Taylor pointed out in his summarizing policy statement on the state of migration theory 
for the United Nations in 2006, indeed it would be foolish to exclude migration from any 
future discourse about global development: The number of international migrants has 
increased more or less linearly over the past 40 years, from an estimated 76 million in 1965 to 
188 million in 2005. The flow of international migrant remittances has increased more rapidly 
than the number of international migrants, from an estimated US$2 billion in 1970 to US$216 
in 2004. Nearly 70% of all remittances go to LDCs. Remittances were equivalent to 78% of 
the total value of exports in El Salvador and 108% in Nicaragua. Taylor is absolutely correct 
in further highlighting also the fact that international migration is playing an increasingly 
important role in developing country economies. As Taylor also pointed out in a number of 
other studies, especially in 1999, worker remittances are especially affecting the less 
developed sending countries by the multiplier effect, well-known in economics since the 
days of John Maynard Keynes:  
 
Since the famous work of John Maynard Keynes, governments have recognized that public 
spending creates income multipliers. So do migrant remittances. Studies show that $1 of 
remittances from international migrants may create $2-$3 or more of new income in migrant-
sending areas. This is partly because of the multiplier within the migrant-sending household, 
discussed earlier. However, it is mostly because the households that receive remittances 
spend their income on goods and services supplied by others in the local economy. One 
person’s spending is another person’s income. For example, if a village household receives 
$100 in remittances, its income increases, in the first instance, by $100. Suppose that it 
spends $10 of this new income on meat from a local butcher, another $40 paying a bricklayer 
for a home improvement project, and the rest on building materials purchased in a nearby 
town. Now the incomes of the village butcher and bricklayer also increase. The butcher and 
bricklayer, in turn, spend part of their new incomes at the village store, creating income for 
the storekeeper, and so on. In this way, the $100 of remittances creates a local income 
multiplier, similar to a Keynesian fiscal multiplier, in the migrant-sending economy. 
 
The money spent in the city is a leakage; it does not contribute to the village income 
multiplier. However, it may create an income and employment multiplier in the city. The more 
closely integrated the village is with outside markets, the more the multiplier becomes 
diffused to other parts of the national economy. 
 
It can easily be shown that if 50 cents out of every dollar are spent on goods and services 
purchased in the local economy, the local remittance income multiplier will be $2. Even if all 
income in remittance-receiving households is spent on consumption, remittances may 
stimulate investments by the other households whose incomes go up. (Taylor, 2006: 9) 
 
The optimistic view about worker remittances is also supported in the well-received 
comparative international study by Ziesemer, 2009: in this analysis, the author shows with 
pooled data for four different samples of countries receiving remittances in 2003 that the 
countries with per capita income below $ 1200 benefit most from remittances in the long run 
because they have the largest impact of remittances on savings. Their changes in remittances 
account for about 2 % of the steady-state level of GDP per capita when compared to the 
counterfactual of having no changes of remittances. Their ratio of the steady-state growth 
rates with and without changes of remittances is 1.39. As savings react much more strongly 
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than investment, an important benefit of remittances is that less debt is incurred and less debt 
service is paid than without remittances. All effects are much weaker for the richer countries. 
 
Jeffrey Williamson, 2002, the great liberal economic historian of global economics and the 
migration process, analyzed the basic facts of international migration in the following way: 
what he calls North-North migrations2 between Europe and the New World involved the 
movement of something like 60 million individuals. Historically, South-North migrations 
were only a trickle: like today, poor migrants from the periphery were kept out of the centre 
by restrictive policy, by the high cost of the move, and by their lack of education. World 
labour markets were segmented then just as they are now. Real wages and living standards 
converged among the currently-industrialized countries. Emigration may contribute to labour 
scarcity, but it also lowers the GDP. Convergence was driven primarily by the erosion of the 
gap between the New World and the Old. In addition, many poor European countries were 
catching up with the industrial leaders. How much of this convergence in the Atlantic 
economy was due to North-North mass migration? The labour force impact of these 
migrations on each member of the Atlantic economy in 1910 varied greatly. Among receiving 
countries, Argentina's labour force was augmented most by immigration (86 per cent), Brazil's 
the least (4 per cent), with the United States in between (24 per cent). Among sending 
countries, Ireland's labour force was diminished most by emigration (45 per cent), France the 
least (1 per cent), with Britain in between (11 per cent). At the same time, the economic gaps 
between rich and poor countries diminished. Real wage dispersion in the Atlantic economy 
declined between 1870 and 1910 by 28 per cent, GDP per capita dispersion declined by 18 per 
cent and GDP per worker dispersion declined by 29 per cent. Migration affects equilibrium 
output, wages and living standards by influencing aggregate labour supply. According to 
Williamson, in the absence of the mass migration, wages and labour productivity would have 
been a lot higher in the New World and a lot lower in the Old. In the absence of the mass 
migration, income per capita would have been a bit higher in the New World and a bit lower 
in the Old World. Not surprisingly, the biggest impact was on those countries that 
experienced the biggest migrations. Emigration is estimated to have raised Irish wages by 32 
per cent, Italian by 28 per cent and Norwegian by 10 per cent. Immigration is estimated to 
have lowered Argentine wages by 22 per cent, Australian by 15 per cent, Canadian by 16 per 
cent and American by 8 per cent (Williamson, J., 2002). 
 
Most liberal and left of centre-oriented global political discourse would expect that worker 
remittances have very beneficial effects for the sending countries, and that they amount to a 
very huge transfer machine of wealth from the rich, migration recipient countries to the poor, 
migration sending countries. Migration is thus seen in many approaches, most notably by 
the UNDP, as a win-win situation. One has to distinguish carefully between migration 
stocks and migration flow data, and in addition, one has to assess the effects of worker 
remittances per GDP. In migration recipient countries, migration stocks and migration flow 
data will be highly positive, while in the migration sending countries, these values will be low 
or – in the case of migration flow data – negative. Worker remittances will be a high 
percentage of the GDP of the sending countries, and they will be low in most migration 
recipient countries, but also in the countries not participating substantially in international 
migration flows. The available UNDP data, unfortunately, are not based on the concept of net 
worker remittance balances as a percentage of GDP. The ten countries, whose economies are 
least dependent on worker remittances are Burundi, Chile, Japan, Laos, Malawi, United 
States, Gabon, Korea (Republic of), Madagascar, and Mauritania. In the following 16 
                                                          
2 Correctly speaking, Williamson would have to deduce from the number of 60 million individuals the number of 
migrants, who emigrated from Europe to Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, the main countries of destination 
of European migration in Latin America in the 19th Century. 
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countries, worker remittances make up more than 10 per cent of the current GDP each year: 
Tajikistan, Moldova, Lesotho, Honduras, Lebanon, Guyana, Jordan, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Kyrgyzstan, El Salvador, Nepal, Nicaragua, Philippines, Guatemala, and Albania. These 
nations are a real testing case for the hypothesis that outward migration remittances are a 
driver of development in sending countries. 
 
The UNDP Human Development Report, 2009 (UNDP, 2009) devoted to the issue of 
international migration, quite correctly emphasizes that at the peak of Iberian rule in the 
Americas, more than half a million Spaniards and Portuguese and about 700,000 British 
subjects went to the colonies in the Americas. Through the brutal use of force, 11–12 million 
Africans were sent as slaves across the Atlantic between the 15th and late 19th centuries. 
Between 1842 and 1900, some 2.3 million Chinese and 1.3 million Indians travelled as 
contract labourers to South-East Asia, Africa and North America. At the end of the 19th 
century the fraction of foreign-born residents in many countries was higher than today (UNDP 
HDR, 2009: 28). 
 
For several observers, among them Hatton and Williamson, 2009, the ‘current hysteria’ about 
inward migration in many industrialized countries has no real basis. For them, the Third 
World has been undergoing an emigration life cycle since the 1960s, and, except for Africa, 
emigration rates have been level or even declining since a peak in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. The current economic crisis will serve only to accelerate those trends. They estimate 
the economic and demographic fundamentals, which are driving these Third World 
emigration life cycles to the United States since 1970 – the income gap between the US and 
the sending country, the education gap between the US and the sending country, the poverty 
trap, the size of the cohort at risk, and migrant stock dynamics. Their projections imply that 
pressure on Third World emigration over the next two decades will not increase. In looking at 
the issue of the drivers of the international migration process, Hatton and Williamson, 2009, 
also cautiously argue on the basis of their econometric evidence, available from 62 countries 
for the period from 1970 to 2000, that the income ratio [the relationship between income 
levels in the migration sending and in the migration recipient country] and the education ratio 
[the relationship between education levels in the migration sending and in the migration 
recipient country] are strongly significant.  
 
Hatton and Williamson maintain that the effect of poverty is negative as predicted, but it is 
attenuated by an increase in the emigrant stock. There is a chain migration effect in the US 
where for every 1,000 of the stock of previous migrants a further 90 arrive in the following 
five-year period, or 18 each year. Their study also shows interesting details about the effect of 
source country poverty. Excluding the interaction with the migrant stock, a doubling of per 
capita income from US$1,000 to $2,000 (about equivalent to the East and Southeast Asian per 
capita income level in 1960 and its growth rate between 1960 and 1985, 3.4 per cent) 
increases the emigration rate by 12 per cent. In contrast, an increase for today’s middle 
income country from $10,000 to $11,000 has a negligible effect on the emigration rate (0.03 
per cent). Without the migrant stock, economic fundamentals matter much more since 
migrants tend to be driven by job opportunities rather than family ties. 
 
The UNDP HDR 2009 edition maintains that financial remittances are vital in improving the 
livelihoods of millions of people in developing countries. There is a positive contribution of 
international remittances to household welfare, nutrition, food, health and living conditions in 
places of origin. Even those whose movement was driven by conflict can be net remitters, as 
illustrated in history by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Tajikistan and 
Uganda, where remittances helped entire war-affected communities to survive. In some 
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international migration corridors, money transfer costs have tended to fall over time, with 
obvious benefits for those sending and receiving remittances. Recent innovations have also 
seen significant falls in costs at the national level. With the reduction in money transfer costs, 
families who once relied on relatives and close family friends or who used informal avenues 
such as the local bus driver to remit are now opting to send money through banks, money 
transfer companies and even via cell-phones. An important function of remittances is to 
diversify sources of income and to cushion families against setbacks such as illness or larger 
shocks caused by economic downturns, political conflicts or climatic vagaries (UNDP HDR, 
2009: 72).  
 
Similarly, the UNDP also maintains that there should be significant aggregate gains from 
movement, both to movers and to destination countries. The destination countries will capture 
about one-fifth of the gains from a 5 per cent increase in the number of migrants in developed 
countries, amounting to US$ 190 billion dollars. Immigration increases employment, with no 
evidence of crowding out of locals, and investment also responds vigorously to immigration. 
Population growth due to migration increases real GDP per capita in the short run, one-for-
one (meaning that a 1 per cent increase in population due to migration increases GDP by 1 per 
cent).  
 
Migrants bring broader economic benefits, including higher rates of innovation. Data from the 
United States show that between 1950 and 2000, skilled migrants boosted innovation: a 1.3 
per cent increase in the share of migrant university graduates increased the number of patents 
issued per capita by a massive 15 per cent, with marked contributions from science and 
engineering graduates and without any adverse effects on the innovative activity of local 
people. The United States, in particular, has been able to attract migrant talent through the 
quality of its universities and research infrastructure and its favourable patenting rules. In 
Ireland and the United Kingdom the share of migrants with tertiary education exceeds 30 per 
cent, while in Austria, Italy and Poland it is below 15 per cent. Countries offering more 
flexible entry regimes and more promising long-term opportunities have done better in 
attracting skilled people, whereas restrictions on duration of stay, visa conditions and career 
development, as in Germany for example, limit uptake. The aggregate effect of immigration 
on the wages of local workers may be positive or negative but is fairly small in the short and 
long run. In Europe, both multi- and single-country studies find little or no impact of 
migration on the average wages of local people (UNDP, HDR, 2009: 84-85). 
 
Summing up the debate, we again should quote from the findings of Jeffrey Williamson, 
2002: mass migration made an important contribution to late nineteenth century convergence 
in the 'North.' In the absence of mass migration, real wage dispersion would have increased by 
7 per cent, rather than decreased by 28 per cent, as it did in fact. GDP per capita dispersion 
would also have decreased by only 9 per cent, rather than by 18 per cent as it did in fact. 
Wage gaps between New World and Old would have risen to 128 per cent in 1910 when in 
fact they declined from 108 to 85 per cent. Real wage convergence before World War I was 
attributable to migration, about two-thirds of the GDP per worker convergence, and perhaps 
one half of the GDP per capita convergence. There was an additional and even more powerful 
effect of the mass migrations on global income distribution. The 60 million European 
migrants before World War I came from countries whose average real wages and average 
GDP per worker were perhaps only half of those in the receiving countries. These migrant 
gains were an important part of the net equalizing effect on world incomes of the mass 
migrations. North-North mass migrations had a strong levelling influence in the world 
economy up to 1913. They made it possible for poor migrants to improve the living standards 
for themselves and their children. It also lowered the scarcity of resident New World labour 
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which competed with the immigrants, while it raised the scarcity of the poor European labour 
that stayed home (whose incomes were augmented still further by emigrant remittances). 
South-South migrations were about the same size as the North-North flows. 
 
‘Until new research tells us otherwise, I think it is safe to assume that South-South migrations 
put powerful downward pressure on real wages and labor productivity in Ceylon, Burma, 
Malaysia, Thailand, East Africa, Manchuria and other labor scarce regions that received so 
many Indian and Chinese immigrants. Since the sending labor surplus areas were so huge, it 
is less likely that the emigrations served to raise labor scarcity there by much.’ (Williamson, 
J., 2002) 
 
Sanderson, 2010, was one of the first consistent research attempts to bring in migration as a 
determining variable of social well-being. Contemporary levels of international migration in 
less-developed countries are raising new and important questions regarding the consequences 
of immigration for human welfare and well-being. However, there is little systematic cross-
national evidence of how international migration affects human development levels in 
migrant-receiving countries in the less-developed world. The Sanderson paper addresses this 
gap in the literature by assessing the impact of cumulative international migration flows on 
the human development index, the composite, well-known UNDP measure of aggregate well-
being. A series of panel data models are estimated using a sample of less-developed countries 
for the period, 1970-2005. The results indicate that higher levels of international migration are 
associated with lower scores on the human development index, net of controls, but that the 
effect of international migration is relatively small. 
 
What are the counter-theories to the dominant neo-liberal development paradigm? For one, 
the ‘Keynesian’ legacy should not be under-estimated. ‘Keynesians’ would expect positive 
trade-offs to hold between ‘government intervention’ and the human condition, and not 
the other way around. The most consistent counter-perspective to the dominant neo-liberal 
consensus, often being referred to also as the ‚Washington Consensus’ is the Kalecki/Steindl-
paradigm. The Steindl-Kalecki growth policy implications are:   
 
 
Table 2: the radical counter-perspective of the Kalecki-Steindl-paradigm 
 
 
Differences in growth strategies  
Steindl–Kaleckian growth policy  Current mainstream on growth 
 
Full employment as main political concerns Price stability and budget consolidation as main 
political concerns 
Demand as growth driver Supply as growth driver 
Higher effective demand to raise employment Higher labour market flexibility to raise economic 
growth 
Technology and educational policy  Deregulation and privatization 
Lower household savings Higher savings (for investment) 
Stable or rising wage share Falling wage share (real unit labour costs) 
Anticyclical policy (cycle and trend have the same 
determinants) 
No active anticyclical policy (irrelevant for growth 
path) 
Rise of public sector promotes growth (through 
effective demand) 
Decline and restructuring of the public sector 
(efficiency) 
Tax coordination International tax competition 
International cooperation International competition (location) 
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Source: Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, 2004 and Tausch, 2010 
 
The contribution of the Austrian political economist Josef Steindl (1912--1993), whose work 
nowadays enjoys a renaissance (see also: Lavoie, 1996) is perceived by many as the most 
consistent policy alternative to the current, dominant Brussels/Paris neo-liberal consensus of 
the European Commission and the OECD. In Steindl (1946), the author analyzed the process 
of increasing concentration of capital and the oligopoly of the market. The change in the 
secular trend of income distribution since the end of the Second World War in the world’s 
most advanced economies, observed by Steindl, has to be especially noted: since the early 
1980s, income distribution has changed in favour of classes with high savings propensities; 
i.e. in most industrial countries the share of wages and salaries in national income has been 
declining, while non-wage income, in particular property income, has risen sharply, and 
income inequality between the rich and the poor has increased considerably.  
 
According to Steindl, the burden of taxation has shifted from profits to wages - a process 
which reduced the expansionary effects of the public sector (Steindl, 1979, p. 5). Assuming 
that tax revenues are immediately spent, higher profit taxes are paid out of increasing profits 
(before taxation) due to higher capital utilization, while an increase in wage taxation reduces 
consumption. The following aspects of Steindl’s analysis especially caught the attention of the 
empirical researchers from the Austrian Institute of Economic Research 
(Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, 2006): what Steindl calls a ‘policy of stagnation’ will 
continue, since governments are preoccupied with inflation and the public debt (Steindl, 1979, 
p. 9). Thus the Steindl paper on ‘Stagnation Theory and Stagnation Policy’ (Steindl, 1979, 
especially p. 13) must be regarded, as one of the first key documents against the current Euro-
monetarist stagnation policy, which – according to this Kaleckian viewpoint – is the cause of 
stagnation, unemployment and rising inequality in Europe. The new political and economic 
landscape, which began to take shape in the late 1970s and 1980s, was characterized by: 
 
• macroeconomic policy being oriented primarily towards price stability and budget 
consolidation  
• declining international cooperation regarding economic policy (breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system and the establishment of a flexible exchange rate system in the early 1970s) 
• increasing environmental and energy problems  
• a political trend against full employment (with Kalecki, 1943). Steindl believed in the 
‘political aspects of full employment’. This hypothesis, first published by Kalecki in 1943, 
argued that in the long run the entrepreneurs will be losing interest in full employment 
because of the increasing power of trade unions and employees as a consequence of full 
employment. As predicted by Kalecki in 1943, the end of the period of full employment, 
which came about in the late 1960s, was politically motivated. 
 
This new set-up was called by Steindl the ‘return of the Bourbons’. The Bourbons’ return 
resulted in a restrictive bias in economic policy, particularly in the EU. For 
Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, one of the main consequences for our analysis of the 
European Union today is the following: 
 
‘Steindl identified a persistent and lasting mood against growth and very clearly spoke about 
a deliberate ‘policy of stagnation’. This characterization seems to be even more appropriate 
for the current development. In the EU a macroeconomic policy framework has been 
established that has a restrictive bias—it may even be characterized as a ‘policy of 
stagnation’—although it promised stability and growth. In the current macroeconomic policy 
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framework of the EU, institutions to guarantee price stability and sound public finance are 
extensively developed. However, institutions responsible for aggregate demand and full 
employment are missing.’ (Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, 2006) 
 
In terms of thoroughly tested scientific knowledge, based on large-scale, cross-national 
empirical evidence, the next possible alternative theoretical tradition to fill the explanatory 
gap for ‘smart development’ accounting, coming to one’s mind, would be dependency and 
world systems theory. Although its effect on the mainstream economic scholarly journals has 
been marginal, it had a very wide impact on the leading international sociological and 
political journals3.  
 
Reasons of space do not permit us to debate at greater length this very vast sociological, 
political science and economic theory literature, centred on the subject of MNC (multinational 
corporation) penetration and economic and social development. We should rather concentrate, 
first of all, on what was actually predicted in the Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson study, 
1978, which must be regarded as the most often quoted flagship study of empirical 
dependency theory, analyzing the effects of MNC penetration on economic growth and 
income inequality4: 
 
‘(1) The effect of direct foreign investment and aid has been to increase economic inequality 
within countries. (2) Flows of direct foreign investment and aid have had a short-term effect 
of increasing the relative rate of economic growth of countries. (3) Stocks of direct foreign 
investment and aid have had the cumulative, long-term effect of decreasing the relative rate of 
economic growth of countries. (4) This relationship has been conditional on the level of 
development of countries. The stocks of foreign investment and aid have had negative effects 
in both richer and poorer developing countries, but the effect is much stronger within the 
richer than the poorer ones. (5) These relationships hold independently of geographical 
area.’ (Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson, 1978: 651) 
 
Important later tests of these hypotheses, taking into account the most important control 
variables, like initial income levels5, could nothing but support and refine the original 
argument, independently from the research design for different indicators and different time 
periods and different samples and different methods (see inter alia and to mention but a few 
studies: Beer, 1999; Bornschier, 1982, 2002; Dutt, 1997; Heshmati, 2006b; Kentor, 1998; 
Klitgaard and Fedderke, 1995; Tausch, 2003; Tausch and Prager, 1993; Tsai 1995).  
 
Centre-periphery models in the tradition of Prebisch, 1950, 1983, 1988, and the proper 
‘dependency theories’ in the tradition of such authors as Cardoso, 1977, 1979, 
Cardoso/Faletto, 1971, Furtado, 1963, 1964, 1976, 1983, Sunkel, 1966, 1973, 1978, and the 
quantitative research inspired by these theories, namely by Galtung, 1971, Sunkel, 1973 and 
later Chase-Dunn, 1975, Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson, 1978 and Bornschier/Ballmer-
                                                          
3 International quantitative bibliometrical data on the impact of scholarly journals, i.e. the frequency and 
structure of the references in the international literature, are now available from such indices as SCIMAGO 
(http://www.scimagojr.com/, based on SCIVERSE-SCOPUS), ISI Web of Knowledge (Reuters/Thomson 
http://www.isiwebofknowledge.com/) and SCIVERSE-SCOPUS (Elsevier 
http://www.hub.sciverse.com/action/home/proceed), which are available on-line at major Universities and 
research centres around the globe.  
4 International quotation figures, based on ISI Web of Knowledge (Reuters/Thomson 
http://www.isiwebofknowledge.com/).  
5 Also conventional economic theory growth accounting and income inequality accounting practices such 
controls. To treat properly what economists tend to call the convergence effects of poor countries growing faster 
than richer ones, see, among others, Barro, 2003.  
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Cao, 1979 all can be important elements in the debate about ‘smart development’. All these 
theories claimed that the relations of dependency block long-run economic growth and bring 
about a socially unbalanced development, short spurts of economic growth notwithstanding. 
In what seems to be now a prophetic statement compared to today’s realities around the globe, 
dependency and ‘world systems’ scholar Linda Beer stated more than ten years ago in 1999: 
 
‘In the World-System/Dependency perspective there are three mechanisms that are 
hypothesized to link foreign investment and social inequality […] First, foreign investment in 
developing countries generates large sectoral disparities in the national economy, creates 
labor aristocracies and results in the underutilization of indigenous labor. Second, 
transnational corporations operating in developing nations accrue a disproportionate share 
of local sources of credit and repatriate profits rather than reinvesting them in the local 
economy. Finally, the governments of these nations, motivated by the necessity (generated by 
their incorporation into the capitalist world economy) of attracting and maintaining foreign 
investment, implement policies and strategies that decrease the power of labor and inhibit 
vertical mobility. These include tax concessions, guarantees of profit repatriation, and labor 
laws unfavorable to workers.’ (Beer, 1999: 4-7) 
 
At this stage at the latest, critics of the dependency theory/world systems theory will argue 
that today, intensive globalization led to the spectacular take-off of growth in the two most 
populous nations of the world, China and India, over the last decades, bringing about a large-
scale redistribution of the world’s production and incomes to far more than two thousand 
million of human beings. Andre Gunder Frank, already in 1998, predicted a general pattern 
of ‘Re-Orient’ away from the Northern-Euro-Atlantic region of our globe towards the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans, where, according to Frank, the future centre of the world economy will be 
situated again and – where according to Frank – it always was situated from the very 
beginning of the world economy to around the year 1750. Thus the period of European and 
later American dominance in the international system from 1750 to around 1995 is but an 
interlude in world history, always centred on China. 
 
In view of the recent advances of international social science research on long economic 
cycles (the so-called Kondratiev economic cycles of around 50 years duration, see Bornschier, 
1996, for the theoretical foundations and Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010 for the latest 
econometric evidence), we should briefly mention the possibility that the ‘logic’ of 
international development might change from cycle to cycle, and even from cycle phase to 
cycle phase (the A-phase of ascent, and the B-phase of decline), a phenomenon, which should 
be taken into account when analyzing different results about the effects of MNC penetration 
from different time periods. Let us thus look for a moment at the conclusions, drawn already 
in the Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson essay in 1978 (emphasis is our own): 
 
‘Foreign investment leads to increasing income inequality, early monopolization, and 
structural underemployment, thus favoring early saturation of effective demand and lowering 
the rate of capital formation in a country. And since capital formation is a major cause of 
increasing growth, this reduction in capital formation is another mechanism by which foreign 
investment reduces growth. […] One of the ways in which foreign investment reduces growth 
is by reducing state power, and hence the ability of the state to undertake a policy of growth, 
independent of the class interests created by foreign capital. […] We note that the empirical 
relationships we have found occurred during a specific time period, from 1950 to 1970. It is 
possible that these relationships are conditional on features of the world economy at that 
time. It seems possible that the effects of foreign investment and aid on growth and 
inequality may be conditional on whether the world economy is in a period of relative 
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expansion or contraction. […] The negative effects of foreign investment on economic 
growth are significantly greater from 1965 to 1975 than from 1955 to 1965. Since the earlier 
period was one of worldwide economic expansion and the later period has been one of 
worldwide relative economic contraction, […] foreign investment may have more negative 
effects in periods of economic contraction. (Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson, 1978)6 
 
Later world system analyses tended to confirm and expand the dependency argument 
(Wallerstein, 2000). Capitalism in the periphery, like in the centres, is characterized by strong 
cyclical fluctuations, and there are centres, semi-peripheries and peripheries. The rise of one 
group of semi-peripheries tends to be at the cost of another group, but the unequal structure of 
the world economy based on unequal transfer tends to remain stable.  
 
There was a real ‘growth industry’ of blossoming and booming dependency - and world-
system oriented studies of environmental problems during the last years. It has become really 
fashionable in many traditions of sociology and political science to blame the lack of 
‘sustainable development’ on globalization and the workings of global capitalism, perceived 
as a centre-periphery system. Table 3 presents the main literature trends. Only one of the 34 
studies in the major peer-reviewed journals of international social science surveyed could 
contradict the globalization critical approach. It has to be emphasized, however, that these 
studies relate the environmental situation of a given country to achieved development levels, 
without taking into account the relationship between development results and the natural 
resources needed to sustain them. The central question, posed by Meadows, 1992, and by the 
Happy Planet Index methodology is not how much deforestation, ecological destruction etc. 
we face in the world system at given levels of development, but how much footprint was 
consumed in the nations of the world system to ‘deliver’ a given amount of development 
[democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human development, research and 
development, and social cohesion].  
 
 
                                                          
6 Thus, dependency and world systems theory today would be inclined to distinguish between the societal logic 
of the A-phase and the B-phase of the Kondratiev cycles. In the case of our empirical analysis, we would have to 
start from the assumption that the period under empirical scrutiny here, i.e. 1990 – 2010 is rather the B-phase of 
the Kondratiev cycle 1973 – 2008, thus resembling the B-phase of the earlier Kondratiev cycle, 1929 – 1973. As 
Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson already stipulated in our quoted passage, it cannot be excluded out of hand 
that the empirical relationships between, say, multinational corporation penetration (MNC penetration) and 
economic growth are different in the A-phase of a cycle (say 1929 to the beginnings of the 1960s; and during the 
A-phase from 1973 to, say, 1990) and in the B-phase of an economic cycle (the beginnings of the 1960s to 1973; 
and 1990 – 2010). 
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Table 3: The major globalization critical studies about dependency and the environment 
 
Author Year Title Source Research design 
focused on 
Anti-globalization 
approach 
 
Dick, Ch. and Jorgenson, 
A. K.  
2010 Sectoral Foreign Investment and Nitrous Oxide 
Emissions: A Quantitative Investigation 
Society and Natural 
Resources, vol. 23(1), 71-
82, 2010 
nitrous oxide emissions Confirmed 
Ehrhardt-Martinez, Karen; 
Crenshaw, Edward M.; 
Jenkins, J. Craig   
2002 Deforestation and the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve: A Cross-National Investigation of 
Intervening Mechanisms   
Social Science Quarterly, 
vol. 83(1), 226-243, Mar 
2002   
deforestation Rejected 
Jorgenson, A. K. 2003 Consumption and environmental degradation: 
A cross-national analysis of the ecological 
footprint 
Social Probems, 50, 3, 
374-394 
ecological footprint Confirmed 
Jorgenson, A. K.  2007 Does foreign investment harm the air we 
breathe and the water we drink? A cross-
national study of carbon dioxide emissions and 
organic water pollution in less-developed 
countries, 1975 to 2000 
Organization & 
Environment, 20, 2, 135-
157, 2007 
carbon dioxide 
emissions;  emission of 
organic water pollutants 
Confirmed 
Jorgenson, A. K.  2006 Unequal ecological exchange and 
environmental degradation: A theoretical 
proposition and cross-national study of 
deforestation, 1990-2000 
Rural Sociology, 71, 4, 
685-712, 2006 
deforestation Confirmed 
Jorgenson, A. K. and  
Burns, T. J. 
2007 The political-economic causes of change in the 
ecological footprints of nations, 1991-2001: A 
quantitative investigation 
Social Science Research, 
36, 2, 834-853 
growth of ecological 
footprint 
Confirmed 
Jorgenson, A. K., Dick, 
C., and Mahutga, M. C.  
2007 Foreign investment dependence and the 
environment: An ecostructural approach 
Social Problems, 54, 3, 
371-394 
nitrogen oxides, volatile 
organic compounds, 
carbon monoxide, and 
carbon dioxide gas 
Confirmed 
Jorgenson, Andrew K   2008 Structural Integration and the Trees: An 
Analysis of Deforestation in Less-Developed 
Countries, 1990-2005   
The Sociological 
Quarterly, vol. 49(3), 503-
527, Summer 2008   
deforestation Confirmed 
Jorgenson, Andrew K.   2004 Uneven Processes and Environmental 
Degradation in the World-Economy   
Human Ecology Review, 
vol. 11(2), 103-117, 
summer 2004   
ecological footprint Confirmed 
Jorgenson, Andrew K.   2005 Unpacking International Power and the 
Ecological Footprints of Nations: A 
Sociological Perspectives, 
vol. 48(3), 383-402, fall 
ecological footprint Confirmed 
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Quantitative Cross-National Study   2005   
Jorgenson, Andrew K.   2006 Global Warming and the Neglected 
Greenhouse Gas: A Cross-National Study of 
the Social Causes of Methane Emissions 
Intensity, 1995   
Social Forces, vol. 84(3), 
1779-1798, Mar 2006   
greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Confirmed 
Jorgenson, Andrew K.   2009 Political-Economic Integration, Industrial 
Pollution and Human Health: A Panel Study of 
Less-Developed Countries, 1980--2000   
International Sociology, 
vol. 24(1), 115-143, Jan 
2009   
industrial organic water 
pollution, infant 
mortality 
Confirmed 
Jorgenson, Andrew K.   2007 Foreign Direct Investment and Pesticide Use 
Intensity in Less-Developed Countries: A 
Quantitative Investigation   
Society and Natural 
Resources, vol. 20(1), 73-
83, Jan 2007   
pesticide consumption Confirmed 
Jorgenson, Andrew K.   2009 The Transnational Organization of Production, 
the Scale of Degradation, and Ecoefficiency: A 
Study of Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Less-
Developed Countries   
Human Ecology Review, 
vol. 16(1), 64-74, 
Summer 2009   
total carbon dioxide 
emissions and emissions 
per unit of production 
Confirmed 
Jorgenson, Andrew K.   2004 Global Inequality, Water Pollution, and Infant 
Mortality   
The Social Science 
Journal, vol. 41(2), 279-
288, 2004   
water pollution, infant 
mortality 
Confirmed 
Jorgenson, Andrew K.; 
Burns, Thomas J.   
2004 Globalization, the Environment, and Infant 
Mortality: A Cross National Study   
Humboldt Journal of 
Social Relations, vol. 
28(1), 7-52, 2004   
water pollution, infant 
mortality 
Confirmed 
Jorgenson, Andrew K.; 
Kuykendall, Kennon A.   
2008 Globalization, Foreign Investment Dependence 
and Agriculture Production: Pesticide and 
Fertilizer Use in Less-developed Countries, 
1990-2000   
Social Forces, vol. 87(1), 
529-560, Sept 2008   
pesticide and fertilizer 
use 
Confirmed 
Lawrence, Kirk S   2009 The Thermodynamics of Unequal Exchange   International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology, 
vol. 50(3)-4, 335-359, 
June/Aug 2009   
energy use Confirmed 
Longo, Stefano; York, 
Richard   
2008 Agricultural Exports and the Environment: A 
Cross-National Study of Fertilizer and 
Pesticide Consumption   
Rural Sociology, vol. 
73(1), 82-104, Mar. 2008   
fertilizer and pesticide 
consumption 
Confirmed 
Mostafa, M. M.  2010 A Bayesian approach to analyzing the 
ecological footprint of 140 nations 
Ecological Indicators, 10, 
4, 808-817, 2010 
ecological footprint Confirmed 
Mostafa, M. M.  2010 Clustering the ecological footprint of nations 
using Kohonen's self-organizing maps 
Expert Systems with 
Applications, 37, 4, 2747-
2755 
ecological footprint per 
capita 
Confirmed 
Mostafa, M. M. and 2009 A neuro-computational intelligence analysis of Computational Statistics ecological footprint Confirmed 
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Nataraajan, R. the ecological footprint of nations and Data Analysis, 53, 9, 
3516-3531, 2009 
Nugent, Colleen and 
Shandra, John M. 
2009 State Environmental Protection Efforts, 
Women's Status, and World Polity A Cross-
National Analysis 
Organization & 
Environment, 22, 3, 293-
310, 2009 
environmental 
protection efforts 
Confirmed 
Shandra, J. M., Leckband, 
C., McKinney, L. A, and 
London, B. 
2009 Ecologically Unequal Exchange, World Polity, 
and Biodiversity Loss A Cross-National 
Analysis of Threatened Mammals  
International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology, 
50, 3-4, 285-310, 2009 
threatened mammal 
species 
Confirmed 
Shandra, John M. 2007 Economic dependency, repression, and 
deforestation: A quantitative, cross-national 
analysis 
Sociological Inquiry, 77, 
4, 543-571, 2007 
deforestation Confirmed 
Shandra, John M. 2007 International nongovernmental organizations 
and deforestation: Good, bad, or irrelevant? 
Social Science Quarterly, 
88, 3, 665-689, 2007 
deforestation Confirmed 
Shandra, John M. 
Leckband, Christopher 
London, Bruce 
2009 Ecologically Unequal Exchange and 
Deforestation: A Cross-National Analysis of 
Forestry Export Flows 
Organization & 
Environment, 22, 2, 208-
229, 2009 
deforestation Confirmed 
Shandra, John M. 
Shandra, Carrie L. 
London, Bruce 
2008 Women, non-governmental organizations, and 
deforestation: a cross-national study 
Population and 
Environment, 30, 1-2, 48-
72, 2008 
deforestation Confirmed 
Shandra, John M. Shor, 
Eran London, Bruce 
2009 World Polity, Unequal Ecological Exchange, 
and Organic Water Pollution: A Cross-National 
Analysis of Developing Nations  
Human Ecology Review, 
16, 1, 53-63, 2009 
organic water pollution Confirmed 
Shandra, John M.; 
London, Bruce; Whooley, 
Owen P.; Williamson, 
John B.   
2004 International Nongovernmental Organizations 
and Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the 
Developing World: A Quantitative, Cross-
National Analysis   
Sociological Inquiry, vol. 
74(4), 520-545, Nov 2004   
carbon dioxide 
emissions 
Confirmed 
Shandra, John M; Shor, 
Eran; London, Bruce   
2008 Debt, Structural Adjustment, and Organic 
Water Pollution   
Organization & 
Environment, vol. 21(1), 
38-55, Mar. 2008   
organic water pollution Confirmed 
Tausch, Arno   2007 Quantitative World System Studies Contradict 
Current Islamophobia: World Political Cycles, 
Global Terrorism, and World Development   
Alternatives: Turkish 
Journal of International 
Relations, vol. 6(1)-2, 15-
81, spring-summer 2007   
11 indicators of 
development, including 
environmental 
indicators 
Confirmed 
Tausch, Arno   2005 Is Islam really a development blockade?   Insight Turkey, vol. 7(1), 
124-135, Jan-Mar 2005   
14 indicators of 
development, including 
environmental 
indicators 
Confirmed 
Tausch, Arno   2003 Social Cohesion, Sustainable Development and Alternatives. Turkish 14 indicators of Confirmed 
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Turkey's Accession to the European Union: 
Implications from a Global Model  
Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 2(1), 2003  
development, including 
environmental 
indicators 
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Notably enough, only three of these 34 studies (Tausch, 2003, 2005, 2007) used the combined 
Yale/Columbia indices of the environmental situation, the ‘Environmental Sustainability 
Index (ESI)’ and the ‘Environmental Performance Index (EPI)’, already available since the 
middle of the first decade of the third Millennium for a very wide range of countries. These 
studies relied instead on a startling variety of approximately eighteen major environmental 
indicators, ranging from carbon dioxide emissions; deforestation; ecological footprint; 
emission of organic water pollutants; energy use; environmental protection efforts; fertilizer 
and pesticide consumption; greenhouse gas emissions; growth of ecological footprint; 
industrial organic water pollution, infant mortality; nitrogen oxides, volatile organic 
compounds, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide gas; nitrous oxide emissions; organic water 
pollution; pesticide consumption; pesticide and fertilizer use; threatened mammal species; 
total carbon dioxide emissions and emissions per unit of production to water pollution, and 
infant mortality, often available for only a limited number of developing nations, and often 
excluding the experience of the countries of East and Central Europe and the former USSR, 
and other post-communist nations. Nevertheless, the relatively coherent tendency of these 
studies, most notably Dick and Jorgenson, 2010; Jorgenson and Burns, 2007; Jorgenson, 
2003; 2004a, 2004b; 2005; 2006a, 2006b; 2007a, 2007b; 2008; 2009a, 2009b; Jorgenson, and 
Burns, 2004; Jorgenson, Dick, and Mahutga, 2007; Jorgenson, Kuykendall, and Kennon 
2008; Lawrence, 2009; Longo and York, 2008; Mostafa and Nataraajan, 2009; Mostafa, 
2010a, 2010b; Nugent, and Shandra, 2009; Shandra, 2007a, 2007b; Shandra, and London, 
2008; Shandra, Leckband, and London, 2009; Shandra, Leckband, McKinney, and London 
2009; Shandra, London, Whooley, and Williamson, 2004; and finally Shandra, Shor, and 
London, 2008, 2009 suggests that there seems to be a strong causal interaction between 
transnational capitalist penetration and environmental degradation, especially in third world 
countries. To date, the most important counter-study to this fledging scientific tradition was 
the essay by Ehrhardt-Martinez, Crenshaw, and Jenkins, 2002, which analysed deforestation 
rates 1980-1995 in the developing countries, using ordinary least squares regression. Net of 
controls for initial forest stock and the quality of deforestation estimates, the authors find 
strong evidence for an ‘environmental Kuznets’ curve7 driven by (1) agglomeration effects 
linked to the level of urbanization, (2) rural-to-urban migration that partially offsets rural 
population pressure, (3) the growth of services-dominated urban economies, and (4) strong 
democratic states. The authors find little evidence that foreign debt or export dependence 
influence the deforestation rate. Although deforestation continues to pose pressing and 
potentially irreversible environmental risks, there is evidence of self-corrective ecological and 
modernization processes inherent in development that act to mitigate these risks.  
 
One of the most consistent attempts to present a dependency/world system paradigm of the 
environment was presented over the last years by A. K. Jorgenson. Jorgenson, 2003 already 
argued that the environmental problems are embedded within the context of hierarchical inter-
state relationships and intra-national characteristics in the modern world-system. Using cross-
national comparisons among 208 countries, Jorgenson constructs a recursive indirect effects 
model to estimate the direct, indirect, and total effects of world-system position, domestic 
inequality, urbanization, and literacy rates on the ecological footprint. Jorgenson finds that 
world-system position has the strongest positive total effect on per capita consumption, 
followed by urbanization and literacy rates. Domestic inequality, by contrast, has a strong 
negative total effect on per capita footprint consumption.  
 
Jorgenson, 2005 again analyses the determinants of ecological footprints. Findings indicate 
that economic power in the form of capital intensity, military technological power, and overall 
                                                          
7 Put in easily understandable everyday language, the Kuznets curve rests on the idea, proposed by Kuznets, 
1955, that developmental outcomes (like inequality) are a non-linear function of development levels 
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export dependence are the structural driving forces of per-capita footprint consumption. The 
effects of military technological power and export dependence on per-capita footprints are 
primarily direct, whereas the effect of capital intensity is both direct and indirect, partly 
mediated by its effects on levels of secondary education and domestic income inequality, both 
of which impact levels of per-capita consumption.  
 
In 2006, Jorgenson, proposed a structural theory of unequal ecological exchange. His theory 
posits that more-developed countries externalize their consumption-based environmental costs 
to less-developed countries, which increase forms of environmental degradation within the 
latter. To test a key assertion of the theory, a weighted index of vertical trade is created that 
quantifies the relative extent to which exports are sent to more-developed countries. Using the 
index, cross-national panel analyses of deforestation, 1990-2000, are conducted to test the 
hypothesis that less-developed countries with higher levels of exports sent to more-developed 
countries experience greater rates of deforestation, net of other factors. Results of the analyses 
confirm the hypothesis, providing support for the theory of uneven ecological exchange.  
 
World-Bank-centred development research, meanwhile concedes that economic liberalization 
and adjustment policies to foreign debt and deficit policies of the past may increase pressure 
on forests, but that population growth and other variables have to be taken into account and 
that weak methodology and poor quality data make the results of generalized models 
questionable (Agelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999).  
 
Nugent and Shandra, 2009 examined how women's status in economic, political, educational, 
and health spheres affect state environmental protection efforts in the form of protected land 
area. Hypotheses derived from eco-feminism and the empirical literature of gendered 
differences in individual-level attitudes and behaviours are tested using multiple regression 
models with a cross-national sample. The article finds no support for broader eco-feminist 
claims that the overall oppression of women and environmental degradation are linked by a 
common source. However, they find strong support for the idea that increasing women's 
political status in particular through representation in national government has a positive 
effect on state environmental protection efforts. They also find no evidence that connection to 
a world polity has a significant effect on nation-state designation of protected land area. 
 
Interesting, as these theoretical currents from dependency theory may be, they would not 
provide us with a theoretical apparatus showing the negative consequences of a dependency 
situation and the lack of economic freedom/market distortions at the same time. Since the 
explorative empirical results of this essay, built on standard stepwise regression from many 
possible predictors, precisely suggest the need to have such a theory, which combines an 
explanation of these phenomena at the same time, we now present the relevance of the work 
of Samir Amin in our context. 
 
The Arab scholar Samir Amin – who was born in Egypt (1931) – is to our knowledge the 
only social scientist from the globalization critical traditions, whose theoretical predictions 
best correspond with the empirical results, achieved in this essay – combining the negative 
results of ‘world economic openness’ with a deep understanding of the detrimental role of the 
monopolies of powerful and big countries in the international system, a critical debate about 
Islamism in world society and a non-neo-liberal critique of rent-seeking, and the transfers of 
international resources, brought about by large-scale migration from the periphery to the 
centre of the world system in benefit of the countries of the periphery. All these factors, i.e. 
the absence of openness, the monopolies of powerful and big countries, outward migration 
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and the absence of rent-seeking (economic freedom) are the drivers of ‘smart development’8. 
No single other social scientific theory combines these elements, and thus we start our 
theoretical presentation with a sketch of Amin’s development theory. 
 
Amin himself recalls in his intellectual itinerary, published in 1994, that the transition from 
mercantilist capitalism to the era of the Industrial Revolution, and the widening wage gap and 
the fall in the terms of trade of the periphery since around 1880 serve as starting points for his 
political economy. He shares many theoretical assumptions of fellow Marxist political 
economists but, on other points, his theory of global capitalist development is indeed very 
different from the mainstream of contemporary neo- Marxist political economy.  
 
For one, he shares with some neo-conservatives the belief that the abolition of the gold 
standard by the United Kingdom in 1914 formed the true beginning of the period of inflation 
and facilitated the new forms of competition between capitalist monopolies. Economic cycles 
are the periodic expression of the imbalance between consumption and production. Amin also 
focuses quite extensively on the equilibrium in the balance of payments. Amin offers – in 
development of his theory of the effects of the abolition of the gold standard – a concept of a 
dominant exchange rate ensuring a distribution of returns consistent with the structural 
adjustment of the weakest nations to the worldwide expansion of capitalism. This ‘structural 
adjustment of the weakest to the strongest’ opens up the debate on a theory of unequal power 
relationships in world capitalism and a critique of contemporary theories of equilibrium 
exchange rates.  
 
Apart from this debate of exchange rates and what Amin terms the problem of ‘banking 
integration’ of the periphery, the author deals extensively with the role of the peripheries in 
global capitalist crises. The peripheries play a significant role in the worldwide expansion of 
capital. They allow the recovery of exports from the centres by speeding the break-up of the 
non-capitalist or pre-capitalist environments. There are various phases in the globalization 
process, ranging from the classic models of raw material exporting economies to the semi-
industrialization of the periphery, and the re-incorporation of the countries of Eastern Europe. 
There is a persistent tendency at the periphery for a deficit in the external balance of 
payments. Pressure on the external balance of payments always follows the continual 
progression of absolute advantage benefiting the centres; the limited range of products 
available in the periphery; the pressure for repatriation of profits; and the social impact of the 
worldwide polarization in urbanization, inequalities of income distribution, increase in 
administrative costs, and so on. Amin mentions in this context what he calls the transfer of the 
multiplier effect of investment from the peripheries to the centres of the system, produced by 
the strong marginal propensity of the peripheries to import, and export the profits of foreign 
capital. The underdeveloped economy is not a backward economy, but a limb of the dominant 
economy. Several other aspects of his theory can only be sketched in a rudimentary way: the 
observation that in 9 out of 10 cases, devaluation leads to price increases that cancel it out; the 
necessity of what Amin terms the distinction between the balance on real account and the 
balance of bank capital movements. The structural deficits in the periphery are accompanied 
by the monetarization of sectors of the subsistence economy, the ruination of craftsmanship, 
the flows of foreign investment into the mining and export cash crop sectors; peripheral 
growth, under such conditions, Amin says, leads to ‘miraculous hopes suddenly dashed’. The 
overall dynamic of accumulation of the periphery is governed by exports, whereas in the 
                                                          
8 The positive effects of Muslim population share on smart economic growth are perfectly compatible with the 
transfer of world economic resources, described in Andre Gunder Frank’s theory above, while the negative 
effects on smart gender equality are well compatible with Samir Amin’s observations, sketched below. 
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centres production of the means of production is linked to the production of goods for local 
consumption.  
 
In addition, there is according to the theory a strong causal link between this export 
orientation and the increasing inequality of income distribution in the periphery. 
Impoverishment of the peasants, enhancement of the position of the landowners, preference 
for investment in light industries, markedly low wages in relation to productivity, 
disarticulation of the economy and the juxtaposition of ‘miracles’ with large areas of social 
devastation are the final consequence of this structure. In the final analysis, which leads Amin 
also to state that the bourgeoisie in the periphery is a ‘comprador class’, the polarization 
between the centres and the peripheries is the most important feature of the capitalist world 
economy. Rewards for labour are lower in the periphery than in the centre for equal 
productivity. Secondly, capitalist self-reliance means the interlinkage between the production 
of capital goods and consumer goods; while in the peripheral social formation, the basic 
linkage is between exports and luxury consumption at home. For Samir Amin (1997), ascent 
and decline in the one and single capitalist world economy is largely being determined in our 
age by the following ‘five monopolies’  
 
1) the monopoly of technology, supported by military expenditures of the dominant nations 
2) the monopoly of control over global finances and a strong position in the hierarchy of 
current account balances 
3) the monopoly of access to natural resources 
4) the monopoly over international communication and the media 
5) the monopoly of the military means of mass destruction 
 
Let also recall that for Amin (1975), there are four main characteristics of the peripheral 
societal formation 
 
a) the predominance of agrarian capitalism in the ‘national’ sector 
b) the formation of a local bourgeoisie, which is dependent from foreign capital, especially 
in the trading sector 
c) the tendency of bureaucratization 
d) specific and incomplete forms of proletarization of the labour force 
 
In partial accordance with liberal thought, (i) and (iii) explain the tendency towards low 
savings; thus there will be 
 
1) huge state sector deficits and, in addition, their ‘twin’ 
2) chronic current account balance deficits 
 
in the peripheral countries.  
 
High imports of the periphery, and hence, in the long run, capital imports, are the 
consequence of the already existing structural deformations of the role of peripheries in 
the world system, namely by 
 
a) rapid urbanization, combined with an insufficient local production of food 
b) excessive expenditures of the local bureaucracies 
c) changes in income distribution to the benefit of the local elites (demonstration effects) 
d) insufficient growth of and structural imbalances in the industrial sector 
e) and the following reliance on foreign assistance 
 27 
 
As we already hinted at above, the history of periphery capitalism, Amin argues, is full of 
short-term ‘miracles’ and long-term blocks, stagnation and even regression. Dependency has, 
according to Amin, a commercial, financial and technological aspect. ‘Rent seeking’ - 
originally a neo-liberal concept, interpreted from the viewpoint of dependency theory, has its 
basis in big landholding, which throughout the periphery was introduced in the Orient and 
elsewhere, supported and upheld by colonial and postcolonial structures. Profitable 
investments in many periphery countries are - in part - constrained by the (emerging) unequal 
income distribution, which again determines that the local ‘surplus’ is being squandered by 
luxurious consumption, transferred abroad in the form of capital flight, or being used for 
speculation. Past and present foreign domination and colonialism cause long-term structural 
imbalances. Countries as far apart as large parts of Africa and Asia were no national state 
during the important era of the Industrial Revolution. Their economies were geared to the 
needs of others, i. e. their colonizers. The structural heterogeneity between the different 
economic sectors on the one hand and the ‘modern’, export oriented sector, the medium sector 
and the ‘traditional sector’ in agriculture, industry and services became the main reason for 
the unequal income distribution in the countries of the periphery. Colonial trade, foreign 
investment in the 19th Century, import substitution in the first half of the 20th Century, and 
the new international division of labour that we observe from the middle of the 1960s 
onwards did not really change the structures of inequality in the world system. While mass 
demand and agricultural structures were responsible for the transition from the tributary mode 
of production in Western Europe to capitalism from the Long 16th Century onwards, 
periphery capitalism was and is characterized by the following main tendencies (Amin, 1973 - 
1997):  
 
1) regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the period after the 
onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism 
2) unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the concentration of 
activities in export oriented agriculture and or mining. Some industrialization of the 
periphery is possible under the condition of low wages, which, together with rising 
productivity, determine that unequal exchange sets in (double factorial terms of trade < 1. 0; 
see Raffer, 1987) 
3) these structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector with hidden 
unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall social and economic system 
4) the development blocks of peripheral capitalism (chronic current account balance deficits, 
re-exported profits of foreign investments, deficient business cycles of the periphery that 
provide important markets for the centres during world economic upswings) 
5) structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a strong 
‘comprador’ element and the rising importance of state capitalism and an indebted state class. 
 
Amin also does not exclude the issue of political Islam from his analysis, which were widely 
popularized on the Internet9. At one point, Amin says: 
 
If Political Islam is only a version of neoliberalism, extolling the virtues of the market – 
completely unregulated, naturally – it is also an absolute refusal of democracy. According to 
Political Islam, religious law (the Shari'a) has already given the answer to every question, 
thereby relieving humanity of the difficulty of inventing laws – a basic definition of democracy 
– and allows us at most to interpret the nuances of divine law. This kind of ideological talk 
                                                          
9 Apart from his statements in Amin 1994, we find, among others, his following freely available statements on 
the subject: http://www.loompanics.com/Articles/PoliticalIslam.html and 
http://monthlyreview.org/2007/12/01/political-islam-in-the-service-of-imperialism  
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ignores reality, ignores the actual history of Muslim societies, in which it has obviously been 
necessary to invent laws, although this was done without saying so. It meant that only the 
governing class had the right, and the power to interpret the Shari'a. The extreme example of 
this kind of autocracy is Saudi Arabia, a country without a constitution, whose rulers claim 
that the Qur'an is a satisfactory substitute. In actual practice, the House of Saud has the 
power of an absolute monarchy or tribal chiefdom. Contemporary Political Islam is not the 
outcome of a reaction to the so-called abuses of secularism, as often purported, unfortunately. 
No Muslim society of modern times, except in the former Soviet Union, has ever been truly 
secular, let alone offended by the daring innovations of any atheistic and aggressive power. 
The semi-modern States of Kemal's Turkey, Nasser's Egypt, Baathist Syria and Iraq, merely 
subjugated the men of religion (as often happened in former times) to impose on them 
concepts aimed solely at legitimizing the State's political options. Western support for 
Political Islam has thus gone to grotesque extreme of furnishing weapons, financial backing 
and military training to the agents of Political Islam. The combination of neoliberal economy 
and political autocracy is perfectly suited to the dominant comprador class charged with 
management of societies at the contemporary capitalist periphery. The Islamist parties are all 
instruments of this class. This is true not only of the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
organizations considered moderate, and whose close ties to the bourgeoisie are well known. 
It is equally true of the small clandestine organizations which practice “terrorism.” Both are 
useful tools of Political Islam, and the division of labour is highly complementary between 
those using violence and those infiltrating state institutions (especially education, the 
judiciary, the mass media and, if possible, the police and military). For all such groups and 
activities, there is one objective: seizure of state power, although on the morning after the 
anticipated victory, the “moderates” will put an end to the excesses of the “radicals.” 
Immediately after the Iranian revolution, the Mullahs massacred the left-wing militants 
(Fedayin and Mojahedin) who had attempted to make common cause between their populist, 
revolutionary aims inspired by Socialism and the deeper mobilization of Political Islam. 
Without the Fedayin and Mojahedin, the triumph of the “Islamic” revolution would not have 
been possible. Since then, the Mullahs have recruited and trained millions of political 
terrorists from among the lumpen proletariat in order to enforce its rule. 10 
 
For Amin, political Islam is not interested in the religion which it invokes, and does not 
propose any theological or social critique:  
 
‘It is not a “liberation theology” analogous to what has happened in Latin America. Political 
Islam is the adversary of liberation theology. It advocates submission, not emancipation. 
Mahmoud Taha of Sudan […] attempted to emphasize the element of emancipation in his 
interpretation of Islam. Condemned to death by the authorities of Khartoum for his ideas, 
Taha's execution was not protested by any Islamic group, “radical” or “moderate.” Nor was 
he defended by any of the intellectuals identifying themselves with “Islamic Renaissance” or 
even by those merely willing to “dialogue” with such movements. It was not even reported in 
the Western media’. 11 
 
For Amin, political Islam is not only ‘reactionary’ on certain questions (notably concerning 
the status of women) and perhaps even responsible for fanatic excesses directed against non-
Muslim citizens (such as the Copts in Egypt)—it is fundamentally reactionary and 
therefore obviously cannot participate in the progress of peoples’ liberation. Amin also 
attacks at great length the arguments, forwarded by Western liberal political circles to enter 
                                                          
10 http://www.loompanics.com/Articles/PoliticalIslam.html  
11 http://www.loompanics.com/Articles/PoliticalIslam.html  
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into a dialogue with ‘moderate Islamists’12. The first argument, according to Amin, is that 
political Islam mobilizes numerous popular masses, which cannot be ignored or scorned. 
Numerous images certainly reinforce this claim. But the power of the Islamist street is, in 
large part, for Amin simply the reverse side of the weaknesses of the organized left, which is 
absent from the spheres in which current social conflicts are occurring. Amin also attacks 
what he calls the second reason put forward by the partisans of “dialogue” that ‘political 
Islam, even if it is reactionary in terms of social proposals, is “anti-imperialist”’. The third 
argument, mentioned by Amin, rests on the perceived necessity of combating ‘Islamophobia’. 
‘Islamophobia’ according to Amin provides a valuable service to ‘reactionary political 
Islam’, giving credibility to its anti-Western discourse13.  
 
For Samir Amin, successive waves of immigration have also helped to strengthen what he 
calls ‘the American ideology’. Immigrants are certainly not responsible for the misery and 
oppression that caused their departure. They left their lands as victims. However, emigration 
also meant renouncing the collective struggle to change the conditions in their country of 
origin; they exchanged their suffering for the host country's ideology of individualism and 
‘pulling oneself up by one's boot straps’. This ideological shift also serves to delay the 
emergence of class-consciousness, which hardly has the time to develop before a new wave of 
immigrants arrives to help abort its political expression. Migration inevitably weakens class 
consciousness and active citizenship in the migration recipient countries. American cities 
provided the stage for a series of murderous wars between gangs formed by successive 
generations of poor immigrants (Irish, Italian, etc.) and cynically manipulated by the ruling 
class. Thus, the workers' unions are apolitical, in every sense of the term. They have no links 
with a party that might share and express their concerns; nor have they ever been able to 
articulate a socialist vision of their own. Instead they subscribe, along with everyone else, to 
what Amin calls the ‘dominant liberal ideology’14, which thus remains unchallenged (Samir 
Amin: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3681.htm ). 
 
Mass migration is for Amin (1997) part and parcel of the process of transnational capitalism. 
Migration is even part of the five pillars of international inequality (Amin, 1997): 
 
a) unequal exchange: the gaps in wages are much greater than the gaps in productivities 
b) capital flight from the peripheries to the centres 
c) selective migration from the peripheries into the centres 
d) the monopoly position of the centres in the international division of labour 
e) the control of the centres over the earth’s natural resources 
 
In a similar vein, the fellow world system scholar Immanuel Wallerstein is implicitly highly 
critical of the migration optimism of large sectors of the European Left. People migrate, 
legally or illegally, for obvious reasons. Economic betterment and escape from persecution 
are the two principal ones. They migrate where they can, and where economic and political 
prospects for them are best. The recipient areas/countries have always been ambivalent about 
these migrants. Those in favour of stringent state action against migrants (and not only against 
illegal migrants) express themselves in xenophobic language, and get support based on a 
generalized sense of economic and social insecurity in the working and middle classes. This 
group, in the language of Immanuel Wallerstein, tends to favour building walls and 
                                                          
12 http://monthlyreview.org/2007/12/01/political-islam-in-the-service-of-imperialism  
13 http://monthlyreview.org/2007/12/01/political-islam-in-the-service-of-imperialism  
14 Samir Amin uses the term ‘liberalism’ in a European, not in a U.S. tradition, i.e. he refers to ‘liberalism’ as an 
ideology, believing in market forces. In North America, unlike in Europe, the word liberalism often refers to 
‘social liberalism’ in the tradition of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and the New Deal.  
 30 
expulsions of various kinds. They usually are located in more conservative political forces but 
attract support from some groups that normally support parties more on the left. Those 
opposed to stringent state action are in fact two quite different groups. There are the business 
elites who welcome migrants in the belief that this enables them to keep wage rates down. 
And to some extent they are right. They thus want migrants to have the right to enter and to 
work. But they are not anxious that migrants have political rights, which would enable them 
to fight for higher remuneration. The second group is quite the opposite. It is composed of the 
targeted groups plus those on the left who favour increasing, not decreasing, social and 
political rights for the migrants (Immanuel Wallerstein: 
http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/182en.htm ).  
 
The critique of the political economy in Arab countries, which Amin offers, is radical 
and even harsh. His earlier prognosis that ‘Arab socialism’ will one day lead – just as in the 
former Soviet Union – towards a general opening towards capitalism, has come true; his 
predictions about the results of this opening sound very pessimistic. Amin, who is not only a 
theoretician of political economy, but also a development planer, an academic teacher and a 
political activist, combines in his more recent writings a rather Gaullist analysis of an 
alternative European project that is a critical force against the driving mechanisms of 
globalization and a Europe that serves as a model in terms of food-self-sufficiency and as a 
model of relative ‘delinking’ from the forces of global capitalism to the third world. 
 
It is now time to present also some thoughts on the other control variables. A number of 
high-profile studies in economics have used such control variables, while the sociological 
profession seems to be more cautious about their use15. The Kuznets curve of economic 
inequality (Barro, 2000) or environmental degradation (Selden and Song, 1994; Stern, 
2004; Stern, Common and Barboer, 1996) must be just as mentioned in this context as the 
study by Biswas and Ram, 1986 on military expenditures; Ram, 1997 on tropical climate; 
the sociological study by Crenshaw and Robison, on population, demography, pre-
industrial heritage and socio-linguistic integration as factors of economic growth (see also 
the essays on demography, the economic size of nations, and geography (absolute latitude) 
into account - see also Easterly, 2000; Poe and Tate, 1994); Ram, 1986 on government 
expenditures; and the sociological essay by Scanlan, 2004, on women in government on 
food security and social development (see also UNDP, HDR, 1995; furthermore, from the 
ever more growing important perspective of feminism and good governance: Holmberg, 
Rothstein and Nasiritousi, 2009; Logo, 2008; Matt, 2010; McDowell, 1992; Rankin, 2002; 
Rothstein and Teorell; as well as the survey on women in government and the welfare state in 
Orloff, 1996). We also should mention culture (membership of a country in the Islamic 
Conference; see the vast social science debate following Huntington, 1993; by contrast: 
Amin, 1997). 
 
Recent investigations in the economics profession highlighted the critical importance of such 
variables as institutions, historical mortality trends, population and world economic openness 
on economic behaviour, while the sociological traditions, highlighted in Table 3 of this book, 
hardly ever used these variables as control variables in their cross-national development 
pattern accounting. Leading economic contributions on democracy, economic growth, and 
income inequality include Acemoglu, 2003, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Acemoglu and Dell; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2006, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002, 
2005; Ram, 1997. In Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, we find among the possible 
drivers and bottlenecks of ‘good’ institutions and hence long-run economic growth even such 
                                                          
15 Interested readers are also referred to Easterly, 2000, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Heshmati and Tausch, 
2007 for further reference. 
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variables as ethno-linguistic fractionalization; percent of population Catholic, Protestant, 
Muslim and ‘others’; French legal dummy; colonial past (dummies for British, French, 
Spanish, Italian, Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese rule); temperature; humidity; soil quality; natural 
resources; dummy landlocked; malaria; geographical latitude; historical European settler 
mortality; yellow fever; and distance of the country from the coast.  
 
Ever since the writings of Coleman (1965), education should be mentioned among the 
determining variables of the development performance of a country (see also Glomm and 
Ravikumar, 1997). Education and human capital formation figure prominently in the 
‘Human Development Reports’ of the United Nations Development Programme as variables, 
which determine positively the development outcome. For the UNDP it has been self-evident 
over the last decade that gender empowerment and the re-direction of public expenditures 
away from defence will positively contribute to a positive development outcome. However, 
neo-liberal thought would caution against such premature conclusions. Erich Weede (2002) 
has shown that standard indicators of human capital endowment - like literacy, school 
enrolment ratios, or years of schooling - suffer from a number of defects. They are crude. 
Mostly, they refer to input rather than output measures of human capital formation. 
Occasionally, Weede and Kaempf believe, these indicators produce implausible effects. They 
are not robustly significant determinants of growth. They replaced them by average 
intelligence. This variable consistently outperforms the other human capital indicators in spite 
of suffering from severe defects of its own.  
 
Weede and his associates maintain that the immediate impact of institutional improvements, 
i.e., more government tolerance of private enterprise or economic freedom, on growth is in 
the same order of magnitude as intelligence effects. Public education expenditure is still 
public expenditure, and it is entirely conceivable that in the end public education expenditure 
might negatively affect the development chances of a society, not because it is education 
expenditure, but because it is still public expenditure. For such a theoretical understanding, 
university reform and university privatization would be important political steps to 
achieve a more viable development. The UNDP has devoted considerable energies into 
developing its own kind of human capital and human development approach that quoted large 
amounts of statistics on how much different countries devoted to their ‘unproductive’ military 
efforts and how little they devoted to the ‘good’ public education expenditures. Such number 
games suffered from a major scientific handicap by evading the vital question of the 
comparison of the effects of different types of government expenditures, among them public 
education expenditures and military expenditures, on indicators of economic growth, human 
rights, social justice, gender empowerment and ecological well-being [see United Nations 
Development Programme HDR 1998, 2004, 2005]. 
 
Recent empirical evidence, published in the transnational journals of social science, supports 
our argument: Blankenau and Simpson, 2004, investigated the public education expenditure-
growth relationship in the context of an endogenous growth model in which private and 
public investment are inputs to human capital accumulation. The positive direct effect of 
public education spending on growth can be diminished or even negated when other 
determinants of growth are negatively affected by general equilibrium adjustments. 
Blankenau and Simpson showed that the response of growth to public education expenditures 
may be nonmonotonic. The relationship depends on the level of government spending, the tax 
structure and the parameters of production technologies. Sylwester, 2000, starts from the 
assumption that income inequality raises expenditures for public education as a fraction of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Although public education expenditures are positively 
associated with future economic growth, the contemporaneous effect upon growth is negative. 
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Given this cost upon current growth, these findings may help to explain the lack of a large, 
positive effect from the growth of human capital upon economic growth as reported in the 
literature.  
 
As we already mentioned, we also included the well-documented ‘butter versus guns’ 
dimension of militarization as a possible development blockade into our research design. 
In our analysis, militarization is considered to be part and parcel of the syndrome of the 
dependent insertion of the countries of the periphery into the world economy. Especially 
German inspired peace research underlined this fatal connection, and a number of such 
studies are available in English on the issue.16 With some justification, it can be claimed that 
the highlighting of this point was one of the genuine contributions of peace research in West 
Germany in the 1970s and 1980s to the international debate on dependency and the world 
system. 
 
In addition, recent macro-quantitative comparative research again highlighted the ‘peace 
dividend’ and the old ‘butter versus guns’ alternative (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1999; Heo, 
1998; Mintz and Stevenson, 1995). These influential studies all highlight the fact that in only 
10% of the 103 countries surveyed, military expenditures had a positive effect on economic 
growth (Mintz and Stevenson, 1995); and that of 80 countries surveyed in the Heo study 
1998, 2/3 might expect a peace dividend. In addition, high military expenditures contribute to 
humanitarian emergencies in conjunction with a tradition of violent conflict, high income 
inequality and slow growth in average food production (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1999). 
 
Military personnel rates were also featured quite frequently in the literature as a possible 
driver or bottleneck of development. The neoliberal German sociologist Erich Weede – 
challenging the mainstream of international and German peace research, critical of high 
military efforts of a given country - has been among those to state that high military personnel 
ratios are good for economic growth and income redistribution, reflecting a high external 
world political threat against a given country, mobilizing the internal resources. The evidence, 
provided by Weede against the basic assumptions of peace research and dependency research, 
claiming that multinational corporation penetration and other measures of the dependent 
insertion of countries into the global economy has no detrimental effect on economic and 
social development, has been impressive, and suggests at least the dire need of further 
empirical studies on the subject (Weede, 1980, 1981a, 1981b, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1993; Weede 
and Jagodzinski, 1980; Weede and Tiefenbach, 1980a, 1980b, 1981). While some researchers 
think that military expenditures improve domestic economic performance, others vehemently 
believe that they crowd out growth-inducing processes. Military expenditures could inhibit 
national development in part by slowing the expansion of the labour force. Labour-intensive 
militaries may provide a pathway for upward mobility, but comparatively capital-intensive 
military organizations limit entry opportunities for unskilled and under- or unemployed 
people. Deep investments in military hardware also may reduce the investment capital 
available for more economically productive opportunities. A forceful argument against high 
military personnel rates and against conscription has come however from a recent, widely 
circulated study by Keller, Poutvaara, and Wagener, 2010, which maintains that economic 
theory as such would predict that military conscription is associated with static inefficiencies 
as well as with dynamic distortions of the accumulation of human and physical capital. 
Relative to an economy with an all-volunteer force, the authors think that output levels and 
growth rates are expected to be lower in countries that rely on military draft to recruit their 
army personnel. Military conscription has a negative impact on GDP and on its growth is 
                                                          
16 Brzoska and Lock, 1992; Brzoska and Ohlson, 1986, 1987; Brzoska and Pearson, 1994 
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claimed to be robust. OECD countries would be ill-advised to rely on military drafting in their 
effort to achieve higher economic performance. 
 
The well-known, and above mentioned non-linear effects of development levels on 
development performance (what social sciences sometimes call the ‘acceleration and 
maturity effects’) have to be also qualified in an important way. Ever since the days of the 
Nobel laureate economist Simon Kuznets, development researchers have applied certain 
types of mathematical formulations (‘curve-linear formulations’) in order to capture these 
effects. One particular formulation, explaining economic growth by a non-linear function of 
development levels and their square (what is then called, in technical language, a ‘curve-linear 
function of economic growth’), are sometimes called the ‘Matthew effect’ following Matthew 
(chapter 13, verse 12): 
 
'For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but 
whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath' (The Holy Bible 
Containing the Old and New Testaments. London and New York: Collins’ Clear-Type Press, 
Ruby Text) 
 
Social scientists interpreted this effect mainly in view of an acceleration of economic growth 
in middle-income countries vis-à-vis the poor countries and in view of the still widening gap 
between the poorest periphery nations ('have-nots') and the 'haves' among the semi-periphery 
countries (Jackman, 1982), but they also applied a similar effect to income inequality and 
more recently, to an ‘environmental Kuznets curve’.  
 
We also should say some words here about population density. For Acemoglu and associates, 
the conditions found by European settlers under colonialism at the end of the day determine 
the quality of today’s institutions in large portions of the extra-European world. From the 
point of view of dependency theory, there is a strikingly parallel and competing explanation at 
hand. It is not so European settler mortality, but population density in general, which is the 
determining variable for the subsequent trajectories of development patterns. Already 
classical Latin American social science, in the works of the Peruvian Marxist and precursor of 
dependency theory, José Carlos Mariategui (1894-1930), whose name is hardly ever 
mentioned in the cross-national development debate, clearly foresaw what he saw as the 
devastating negative long-term development effects of a low population density on 
subsequent patterns of development. Mariategui, a very interesting Marxist scholar, who 
achieved unfortunately posthumous international celebrity by the high jacking of his name by 
the terrorist group ‘Sendero Luminoso’ five decades after his death, clearly distinguishes 
between what he sees as the extensive and wasteful Iberian heritance of colonialism, with its 
use of the ‘abundant production factors’ land and fresh, unqualified labour. His account of the 
rapidly growing labour force in scattered tiny settlements in the Sierra region of the Andes in 
conjunction with extensive land use and high land concentration make the inclusion of the 
population density variable in any macro-quantitative account of development performance 
important. At the other end of the scale of the views on population density and size, our 
readers should be reminded that these questions also play an important role in the works of 
the economists Ernst Friedrich ‘Fritz’ Schumacher (16 August 1911 – 4 September 1977) 
and Leopold Kohr (5 October 1909 – 26 February 1994.17 Their work is often being referred 
to today as ‘Buddhist economics’. We already drew our reader’s attention to the fact that on 
an international level, the Happy Planet Organization indicators18 – Ecological Footprint, 
                                                          
17 The most important ideas by Kohr and Schumacher were stated in Kohr, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1977, 1992 and 
Schumacher, 1973a, 1973b, 1976, 1977. 
18 http://www.happyplanetindex.org/  
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Happy Life Years, and the derived measure Happy Planet Index (HPI), which measures the 
ecological efficiency with which human well-being is delivered around the world, 
increasingly gained in importance. At first sight, the measure is of a compelling simplicity, 
capturing at the same time the growing global ecological concerns about the validity of our 
lifestyle, needing more and more energy to produce a stagnant or even shrinking rate of 
human happiness. Accordingly, the basic logic of the Happy Planet Index must be traced back 
especially to Schumacher’s writings. 19 Schumacher’s ‘Buddhist economics’ are based on an 
envisaged minimum material consumption in relation to life quality. Internationally, we 
observe a growing framework of what is being increasingly referred-to as ‘the environmental 
efficiency of well-being’ (EWEB, see also Dietz, Rosa and York, 2007 and 2009; Knight and 
Rosa, 2011). Schumacher’s critique of Western economies and his proposals for human-scale, 
decentralized and appropriate technologies led him to call for ‘Intermediate Size’ and 
‘Intermediate Technology’.20 Schumacher, in many ways, must be considered as one of the 
founders of contemporary thinking about ‘sustainable development’. Central for 
Schumacher’s concerns is the idea that in rich countries these developments can be partly 
compensated, as far as incomes are concerned, by an enormous and never ending expansion 
of welfare payments; in poor countries it produces ‘dual societies’ - great masses of destitute 
people on the one side - many of them without work and living in slums - and a small, rich 
elite on the other, who often ‘earn’ in an hour more than most of their compatriots earn in a 
month. A genuine middle class to connect the extremes does not exist; it has disappeared 
together with the ‘disappearing middle’ of technology. The loss of social structure is 
paralleled by the loss of a coherent structure as far as human settlements are concerned: hence 
the appearance of vast congestion in a few places and a vast (relative) emptiness in all other 
places. (Schumacher, 1973b; 1976). Schumacher’s alternative strategy is based on the factors 
of smallness, simplicity, capital-cheapness and non-violence. Schumacher was also among the 
first to highlight the enormous dependence of modern, industrialized agriculture on fossil 
fuels. Harvested crops capture solar energy and store it as food or some other useful product. 
Yet the energy captured is small compared to the energy we burn to capture it. Agriculture, as 
a result, has become a major consumer of our stores of energy, using more petroleum than any 
other single industry. If the world is facing a future with rising energy prices, the highly 
mechanized technology currently used in modern, industrialized agriculture may be 
inappropriate (Schumacher, 1973b).  
 
In Schumacher, 1973b, it is already being argued that government effort must be concentrated 
on sustainable development, because relatively minor improvements, for example, technology 
transfer to Third World countries, will not solve the underlying problem of an unsustainable 
economy. Schumacher indeed was one of the first economists to question the appropriateness 
of gross national product as a measure for human well being, emphasizing that ‘the aim ought 
to be to obtain the maximum amount of well being with the minimum amount of 
consumption’ (Schumacher, 1973b).  
 
For Kohr’s approach, the consequences are even more radical:21 there seems only one cause 
behind all forms of social misery: bigness. Whenever something is wrong, something is too 
big. Social problems have the tendency to grow at a geometric ratio with the growth of the 
organism of which they are part, while the ability of man to cope with them, if it can be 
extended at all, grows only at an arithmetic ratio. For Kohr it is clear that if a society grows 
beyond its optimum size, its problems must eventually outrun the growth of those human 
                                                          
19 see http://www.resurgence.org/education/schumacher-circle.html#ne  
20 For a very good overview of Schumacherian economics, see also 
http://www.resurgence.org/education/schumacher-circle.html#ne  
21 Kohr, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1977, 1992 
 35 
faculties which are necessary for dealing with them. A small-state world would not only solve 
the problems of social brutality and war; it would solve the problems of oppression and 
tyranny. It would solve all problems arising from power (Kohr, 1957): 
 
‘As regards the scale of socially committed or condoned atrocities, we have so far discovered 
one fact. Most nations, irrespective of their racial background, the stage of their civilization, 
their ideology, or their economic system, have managed to roll up an impressively similar 
record. Mass executions and related monstrosities were perpetrated in Germany under the 
nazis, in India under the British, in France under the Catholics, in Russia under some of the 
most savage, and in Italy under some of the most enlightened, princes. There could not have 
been a vaster difference of conditions. Yet, if similar excesses occurred everywhere and in all 
phases and periods of historic development, there must apparently be a common element 
transcending these differences. This common denominator, as we shall see, seems to be the 
simple ability, the power, to commit monstrosities. As a result, we arrive at what we might 
call a power theory of social misery. In part, the proposition seems self-evident. For no one 
could perpetrate atrocities without the power to do so. But this is not the point. The point is 
that the proposition operates also in the reverse. Everyone having the power will in the end 
commit the appropriate atrocities. This sounds somewhat extreme. Clearly, not everybody 
holding power must necessarily make evil use of it. Which is quite true, but it does not alter 
the proposition’. (Kohr, 1957, Chapter II) 
 
Confronted with all this startling variety of contradictory statements on the drivers and 
bottlenecks of international development, we now should present a survey of the empirical 
methods used in this study. 
 
 
3. Methods and measurement 
 
 
To start with, we have made our data for our calculations completely and freely available on 
the Internet, so that the global research community can have free access to the original data 
and the opportunity to check our results or to conduct new research 
(http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2017 ). This internet site offers not only the Microsoft 
EXCEL data (Table 1 of the EXCEL file) and a list of the sources (Table 2 of the EXCEL 
file), but also a codebook in PDF format. A brief description of the smart development data, 
calculated from that data source, is also contained in the Appendix of this work. 
 
Our investigation duly acknowledges many of the key determinants of economic growth, 
mentioned in the economic literature, like current shares of the country’s inhabitants in total 
world population, calculated from UNDP data; the famous Heritage Foundation 2000 
Economic Freedom Score; absolute geographical latitude, adapted from Easterly’s growth 
theory; the UNDP figures for long-term annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 ( per cent); 
the trade-off between development level and development performance, otherwise also known 
in economics as ‘conditional convergence’ (ln GDP per capita; ln GDP per capita ^2); the 
simple Huntingtonian fact of whether a country is a Muslim country, to be measured by the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Membership or by Muslim population share 
(Nationmaster); UNDP data on the simple geographical fact of population density (based on 
the CIA’s World Factbook); UNDP data on public education expenditure per GDP; and the 
UNDP education index, combining the enrolment rates at the primary, secondary and tertiary 
education levels. We also take into account UNDP figures on military expenditures per GDP 
and the openly available CIA data on military personnel rate, which are key variables of 
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contemporary political science international relations theory and peace research. In our 
analysis, we also show the theoretical and practical (political) potential of the following two 
drivers of development, which are somewhat a ‘terra incognita Australis’ in the hitherto 
existing macro-sociological debate, like migration and European (Monetary) Union 
membership. 
 
To gain a real empirical knowledge under scrutiny here, we first developed UNDP-type 
indicators from current standard international comparative, cross-national social science data 
on these six dimensions of development and on the combined performance on the six 
dimensions. We then show the non-linear standard OLS regression trade-off between 
ecological footprint per capita and its square and these six dimensions of development (and 
the overall development performance indices). The residuals from these regressions are our 
new measure of smart development: with a minimum of ecological footprint one has to 
achieve a maximum of democracy, or economic growth, or gender equality, or human 
development, or research and development, or social cohesion (and the combination of all of 
them). We then look in a very preliminary way at the drivers and bottlenecks of smart 
development. Can the accumulated knowledge of cross-national development research be 
applied to this new question writing? We use standard comparative cross-national 
‘development accounting’ data, which operationalize standard econometric drivers of 
economic growth, and compare their weight in explaining ‘smart development’ with the 
results for the clash of civilization models, political integration theories, feminist theories, 
migration theories, and peace research approaches to global development. We also analyze 
the possible explanatory weight of  sociological dependency and world systems theories and 
later globalization critical research, and also do not overlook in our choice of independent 
variables with a possible effect on the dependent variables – smart development - the ‘small is 
beautiful paradigm’ in the tradition of Schumacher. 
 
Instead of concentrating on the ever more complex modelling of the effects of ‘foreign capital 
dependence’, the economics profession, by contrast, developed its mathematical models of 
‘development accounting’ side by side with an ever growing amount of many different 
variables, which featured as ‘control variables’ in the literature. An attempt, like the one by 
Sala-i-Martin (1997), to filter out the most robust predictors of economic growth by applying 
Bayesian techniques and combining dozens of predictor variables in all mathematically 
possible different combinations is a very legitimate one from the viewpoint of the 
advancement of social science and statistical methodology. By contrast, sociologists used to 
the published articles in journals like the ‘American Sociological Review’ most probably 
would be shocked by Sala-i-Martin’s successful attempt to run two million regressions (in a 
scientific paper version of his 1997 essay, he even speaks about four million regressions). 
Availability of computer power, common databases and search engines with same on-line 
journal service may finally bring the three disciplines of sociology, politics and economics 
closer.  
 
The question of the geographic, demographic and other independent variables in development 
accounting found much more attention in the recent economic literature. According to this 
type of research, we currently are facing around 100 popular independent variables in the 
current econometric literature on the determinants of economic growth. Sala-i-Martin, 
Doppelhofer and Miller, 2004, arrived at the following list of robust growth predictors, which 
keep their significance after all possible relevant changes in the research design, applying 
their Bayesian estimation techniques: 
 
1. East Asian dummy 
2. Primary schooling 1960 
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3. Investment price 
4. GDP 1960 (log) 
5. Fraction tropical area 
6. Population density coastal 1960's 
7. Malaria prevalence in l960's 
8. Life expectancy in 1960 
9. Fraction Confucian 
10. African dummy 
11. Latin American dummy 
12. Fraction GDP in mining 
13. Spanish colony 
14. Years open 
15. Fraction Muslim 
16. Fraction Buddhist 
17. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
18. Government consumption share l960s 
 
In their American Economic Review article 2004, Sala-i-Martin and associates highlight the 
point that the strongest effects on growth are found for good primary schooling enrolment, the 
low price of investment goods and a low initial level of income where the latter reflects the 
concept of conditional convergence. Other important variables, according to this study, 
include regional dummies (such as East Asia, Sub- Saharan Africa, or Latin America), some 
measures of human capital and health (such as life expectancy, proportion of a country in the 
tropics, and malaria prevalence), religious dummies, and some sectoral variables such as 
mining. Interestingly enough, and in contrast to current contemporary Islamo-phobic 
reasoning, Sala-i-Martin and his team even found quite strong and positive effects of the 
predominance of the Islamic faith on economic growth, with a likewise positive effect of 
Buddhist and Confucian cultures on economic growth, while the initial income levels and 
government consumption levels also quite strongly affected the growth rate. 
 
Our investigation duly acknowledges many of the key determinants of economic growth, 
mentioned in the economic literature, like current shares of the country’s inhabitants in total 
world population, calculated from UNDP data; the famous Heritage Foundation 2000 
Economic Freedom Score; absolute geographical latitude, adapted from Easterly’s growth 
theory; the UNDP figures for long-term annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 ( per cent); 
the trade-off between development level and development performance, otherwise also known 
in economics as ‘conditional convergence’ (ln GDP per capita; ln GDP per capita ^2); the 
simple Huntingtonian fact of whether a country is a Muslim country, to be measured by the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Membership or by Muslim population share 
(Nationmaster); UNDP data on the simple geographical fact of population density (based on 
the CIA’s World Factbook); UNDP data on public education expenditure per GDP; and the 
UNDP education index, combining the enrolment rates at the primary, secondary and tertiary 
education levels. We also take into account UNDP figures on military expenditures per GDP 
and the openly available CIA data on military personnel rate, which are key variables of 
contemporary political science international relations theory and peace research. In our 
analysis, we also show the theoretical and practical (political) potential of the following two 
drivers of development, which are somewhat a ‘terra incognita Australis’ in the hitherto 
existing macro-sociological debate, like migration and European (Monetary) Union 
membership.  
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The choice of a country to be included in the final analysis (175 countries22) was determined 
by the availability of a fairly good data series for these independent variables (if not 
mentioned otherwise, UNDP data for the middle of the first decade of the new millennium). 
In the final regressions, we applied the ‘list wise deletion of missing values’ routine (i.e. only 
entering countries with complete data into the statistical analysis).  
 
For the interested readers, Box 1 summarizes this ‘dependency theory’/’world systems theory’ 
‘empirical logic’: 
 
 
Box 1: The logic of dependency and the capitalist world system, challenging neo-liberal orthodoxies 
 
MNC penetration (MNC PEN) measures the different degrees of weight that foreign capital investments have 
in the host countries, i.e. the UNCTAD percentages of the stocks of multinational corporation investments per 
total host country GDP. This research tradition has been especially developed, as mentioned earlier, by the Swiss 
sociologist Volker Bornschier and his school. Bornschier and his school predicted a strong negative 
determination of development by a high MNC penetration, due to the negative consequences that monopolies 
have on the long term development trajectory of countries. 
 
 We also ascertain the growth of MNC penetration over time (DYN MNC PEN), from 1995 to 2005. 
The Bornschier School expected short-term dynamic effects from such MNC penetration increases. 
 Equally, Bornschier and his school already developed a high theoretical and empirical awareness about 
the long-term consequences of the presence or absence of ‘MNC headquarter status’ (MNC 
HEADQU), measured in our analysis by the indicator MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP. 
Bornschier and his school expected that a high headquarter status mitigates against the long-term 
negative effects of MNC penetration. 
 FPZ (free production zones) employment as a per cent of total population is the indicator best suited 
to measure the so-called ‘NIDL’ (new international division of labour) school. Early on, Froebel, 
Heinrichs and Kreye (1980) already predicted the unfettered rise of the model of ‘export processing 
zones’, especially in China and Southeast Asia. This first major international study by 
Froebel/Heinrichs/Kreye, 1980 was followed, among others, by Ross, 2004; and Singa-Boyenge, 2007. 
Export Processing Zones (EPZ) – or ‘Free Production Zones’ today already account for some 80 per 
cent of the merchandise exports of countries like China, Kenya, the Philippines, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Senegal, Tunisia, and Vietnam. The 3500 EPZs in 130 countries of the world now employ 66 
million people, among these 40 million employees in China. The tendency, correctly foreseen by 
Froebel/Heinrichs/Kreye, 1980 towards this total global re-location of world industries continues 
unabated. In the present book, we try to determine the quantitative weights, which free production 
                                                          
22 Albania; Algeria; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; 
Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; 
Canada; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo; Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the); Costa Rica; Côte d'Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; 
Djibouti; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; 
Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Grenada; Guatemala; 
Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hong Kong, China (SAR); Hungary; Iceland; India; 
Indonesia; Iran (Islamic Republic of); Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea 
(Republic of); Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People's Democratic Republic; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia (TFYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Maldives; Mali; 
Malta; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; 
Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; 
Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and 
Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Samoa; Sao Tome and Principe; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; 
Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Solomon Islands; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; 
Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania (United 
Republic of); Thailand; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; 
Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of); Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia; and Zimbabwe. 
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zones have in the determination of development performance (per cent of the population working in 
export processing zones versus MNC penetration versus the other dependency/globalization indicators). 
 ‘low comparative price levels’ (for an exhaustive debate on the underlying issues from a dependency 
theory/world systems perspective, see Kohler/Tausch, 2003, furthermore Raffer, 1987, Yotopoulos, 
1996, and Yotopoulos/Sawada, 2005 from a dependency theory/world systems perspective, as well as 
Balassa, 1964 and Samuelson, 1964 from a more conventional economic theory framework) is 
operationalized here simply by ERD or ERDI, the exchange rate deviation index, which is calculated by 
the ratio between GDP at purchasing power parities, divided by GDP at current exchange rates (see also 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/structural_indicators/indicators/economic_reform ). 
Dependency theories and world systems theories assume that low comparative price levels are an 
indicator of ‘unequal exchange’ between the countries of the center and the periphery. 23 
 For dependency authors, foreign savings show the weight that foreign savings, mostly from the centres 
and richer semi-peripheries, have in the accumulation process of the host countries in the periphery and 
semi-periphery. It is calculated by the difference between the share of investments per GDP and the 
share of savings per GDP.  
 
 
The statistical design of our study is thus based on the usual, SPSS XVIII ordinary least 
square standard regression analysis of the ‘kitchen sink type’ (Durlauf et al., 2008; Hertz, 
Hebert, and Landon, 1994) of economic growth and economic, social and political 
performance in the research tradition of Barro, 2003.24 Surveying the vast econometric 
literature on the subject of the possible drivers and bottlenecks of the EU-2020 process and 
overall development performance of a given country, one indeed finds support for the 
inclusion of geographic and demographic variables in the comparative analysis of 
development success or failure. Our list is thus corresponding to international research 
standard praxis in the discipline of general ‘development accounting’ (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2003; Dixon, 1987; Dixon and Moon, 1986, 1989; Durlauf et al., 2008; Fain, 1997; 
Fosu, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Moon and Dixon, 1992; Shandra, 2007a, 2007b; Shandra et 
al., 2009; Tausch and Prager, 1993). Compared to a recent approach on the subject (Knight 
and Rosa, 2011), we do include globalization-oriented variables as well, and not just levels of 
GDP, winters, social trust, democracy, inequality, and Latin America, former USSR, Africa, 
and Asia as ‘dummy variables’ (Knight and Rosa, 2011). There is a wide and well-established 
research tradition in international comparative sociology to include globalization-related 
drivers of environmental decay (Jorgenson, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d). To exclude 
such variables and to introduce instead four geographically determined dummy variables 
(Latin America, former USSR, Africa, and Asia, as was done by Knight and Rosa, 2011) does 
not necessarily increase the theoretical and predictive power of analysis. Our main 
independent variables and their theoretical linkages are presented in Table 4: 
                                                          
23 For an easily readable and available survey of the available and often very complicated literature as well as the 
empirics of ‘unequal exchange’, see Kohler/Tausch, 2003 and 
http://wsarch.ucr.edu/archive/papers/kohlertoc.htm  
24 To our knowledge, the term ‘kitchen sink regression’, commonly used in econometrics of economic growth, 
was re-introduced in more recent standard social science journal vocabulary in Laver and Shepsle, 1999. 
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Table 4: the independent variables of our model and theories or earlier empirical 
studies, connected with these variables 
 
 
Independent variables, 
determinants  of smart 
development 
Theories or earlier empirical studies, connected with these 
variables 
% women in government, all levels Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi, 2009; Logo, 2008; Matt, 2010; 
McDowell, 1992; Orloff, 1996; Rankin, 2002; Rothstein and Teorell; 
UNDP, HDR, 1995 
% world population Acemoglu and Dell, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 
2006; Acemoglu, 2003, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001, 2002, 2005; Amin, 1997a, 1997b; Crenshaw and 
Robison, 2010; Kohr, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1977, 1992; Ram, 1997; 
Schumacher, 1973a, 1973b, 1976, 1977 
2000 Economic Freedom Score Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Helliwell, 1994; La Porta, Lopez de 
Silanes, Shleifer, 1999; York, Rosa and Dietz, 2003 
Absolute latitude Acemoglu and Dell, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 
2006; Acemoglu, 2003, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001, 2002, 2005; Easterly, 2000; Poe and Tate, 1994; 
Ram 1997 
Annual population growth rate, 
1975-2005 (%) 
Acemoglu and Dell, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 
2006; Acemoglu, 2003, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001, 2002, 2005; Crenshaw and Robison, 2010; Ram, 
1997 
Comparative price levels (US=1.00) Egert, Drine and Lommatzsch, 2003; Faria and Leon-Ledesma, 2003; 
Gould, 2002; Kohler and Tausch, 2003; Paya, Venetis and Peel, 2003; 
Raffer, 1987; Tausch and Ghymers, 2006; Yotopoulos and Sawada, 
2005; Yotopoulos, 1996 
Foreign savings rate Bovenberg and van Ewijk, 1997; Cook, 1995; Doucouliagos and 
Paldam, 2008; Easterly and Schmidthebbel, 1993; Feldstein, 1994; 
Gine and Townsend, 2004; Singh, 1985; Tausch and Ghymers, 2006; 
Tausch and Prager, 1993; Taylor, 1992 
FPZ (free production zones) 
employment as % of total 
population 
Chen, 1995; Rondinelli, 1987; Tausch and Ghymers, 2006; Tausch 
and Prager, 1993 
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As to the possible theoretical explanations, we have to state that we regard the openness 
indicator from a completely different angle as Dollar, 1992 and 1992b: First of all, we show 
the non-linear trade-off between n-log GDP per capita and economic freedom, showing that 
almost 45% of economic freedom is being determined by income levels: 
 
 
Graph 1: GDP per capita (n-log) and world economic openness 
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In Table 5 we show the residuals from a linear trade-off (since, as can be seen by our Graph 3, 
the curvilinear formulation of the function is not really necessary). Hong Kong, Singapore and 
El Salvador are – relative to their GDP per capita – the freest economies in the world, while 
Angola, Libya and Iran are the most unfree economies of the world relative to their GDP per 
capita. 
 
 
Table 5: n-log GDP per capita and ‘economic freedom’  
 
 
 ln GDP per 
capita 
2000 
Economic 
Freedom 
Score 
trend value residual 
Hong Kong, China (SAR) 10,34 89,53 69,37 20,16 
Singapore 10,24 87,67 68,78 18,88 
El Salvador 8,53 76,30 58,00 18,31 
Zambia 6,85 62,76 47,47 15,29 
New Zealand 10,06 80,89 67,64 13,25 
Benin 6,99 61,53 48,39 13,14 
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Mali 6,91 60,25 47,83 12,42 
Malawi 6,47 57,39 45,10 12,29 
Chile 9,29 74,68 62,83 11,86 
Panama 8,89 71,56 60,31 11,25 
Kenya 7,04 59,66 48,67 10,99 
Trinidad and Tobago 9,41 74,47 63,54 10,93 
Bolivia 7,91 65,03 54,13 10,91 
Tanzania 6,51 56,03 45,37 10,67 
Jordan 8,45 67,50 57,54 9,96 
Peru 8,64 68,67 58,75 9,92 
Bahrain 9,94 75,68 66,89 8,79 
Jamaica 8,33 65,54 56,80 8,75 
Moldova 7,46 59,57 51,28 8,29 
Bahamas 9,79 73,86 65,94 7,92 
United Kingdom 10,34 77,28 69,37 7,91 
Uganda 7,30 58,16 50,30 7,87 
Australia 10,32 77,12 69,27 7,85 
Senegal 7,45 58,87 51,22 7,65 
Madagascar 6,75 54,35 46,87 7,48 
Uruguay 9,15 69,33 61,93 7,40 
Guatemala 8,37 64,34 57,02 7,32 
Switzerland 10,41 76,76 69,80 6,96 
Burkina Faso 7,06 55,69 48,82 6,87 
United Arab Emirates 10,09 74,23 67,81 6,42 
Costa Rica 9,16 68,37 61,97 6,40 
Armenia 8,32 63,03 56,70 6,32 
Paraguay 8,48 64,01 57,71 6,30 
Namibia 8,91 66,73 60,42 6,30 
Morocco 8,37 63,25 57,01 6,24 
Mongolia 7,63 58,53 52,37 6,16 
Sri Lanka 8,39 63,18 57,13 6,04 
Argentina 9,50 70,04 64,09 5,95 
Cambodia 7,79 59,29 53,40 5,89 
Thailand 9,00 66,60 60,97 5,63 
United States 10,59 76,42 70,95 5,47 
Guinea 7,69 58,18 52,74 5,44 
Estonia 9,59 69,93 64,66 5,27 
Ireland 10,57 76,08 70,82 5,26 
Ghana 7,71 58,07 52,91 5,17 
Philippines 8,44 62,54 57,44 5,09 
Barbados 9,66 69,55 65,14 4,41 
Nigeria 7,05 53,13 48,74 4,39 
Iceland 10,41 73,97 69,81 4,16 
Ethiopia 6,63 50,19 46,09 4,10 
Swaziland 8,64 62,58 58,70 3,88 
Mauritius 9,39 67,20 63,46 3,74 
Kyrgyzstan 7,57 55,70 51,99 3,71 
Pakistan 7,71 56,38 52,86 3,52 
Malaysia 9,24 65,98 62,47 3,51 
Botswana 9,20 65,76 62,27 3,49 
Belize 8,82 63,27 59,83 3,44 
Ecuador 8,28 59,78 56,49 3,29 
Kuwait 9,87 69,71 66,46 3,26 
Honduras 7,96 57,62 54,48 3,14 
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Colombia 8,89 63,33 60,29 3,04 
Mozambique 7,12 52,21 49,18 3,03 
Korea (Republic of) 9,93 69,70 66,81 2,89 
Djibouti 7,60 55,06 52,17 2,88 
Turkey 8,96 63,42 60,70 2,72 
Saudi Arabia 9,53 66,53 64,33 2,20 
Czech Republic 9,87 68,64 66,46 2,17 
Samoa 8,63 60,81 58,67 2,14 
Papua New Guinea 7,84 55,80 53,70 2,10 
Luxembourg 11,16 76,44 74,51 1,92 
Japan 10,28 70,71 69,04 1,67 
Canada 10,35 70,48 69,46 1,03 
Nepal 7,31 51,30 50,35 0,95 
Nicaragua 8,20 56,86 55,94 0,91 
Netherlands 10,37 70,40 69,56 0,84 
South Africa 9,32 63,74 63,01 0,74 
Tunisia 8,96 61,35 60,71 0,63 
Gambia 7,60 52,71 52,17 0,55 
Latvia 9,36 63,38 63,26 0,12 
Brazil 9,01 61,10 61,05 0,05 
Sierra Leone 6,33 44,24 44,21 0,03 
Georgia 7,95 54,34 54,41 -0,07 
Myanmar 6,93 47,94 48,01 -0,07 
Cyprus 10,03 67,25 67,48 -0,23 
Niger 6,66 45,92 46,27 -0,36 
Côte d'Ivoire 7,35 50,18 50,60 -0,42 
Norway 10,56 70,07 70,76 -0,68 
Indonesia 8,19 55,17 55,90 -0,73 
Oman 9,63 64,14 64,95 -0,82 
Portugal 9,88 65,54 66,53 -0,99 
Hungary 9,73 64,38 65,56 -1,18 
Austria 10,38 68,40 69,66 -1,26 
Denmark 10,37 68,26 69,59 -1,32 
Fiji 8,71 57,80 59,16 -1,36 
Dominican Republic 8,92 59,03 60,45 -1,42 
Gabon 8,80 58,21 59,71 -1,50 
Venezuela 8,71 57,43 59,14 -1,71 
Lithuania 9,48 61,90 64,00 -2,10 
Spain 10,13 65,86 68,06 -2,21 
Israel 10,10 65,50 67,90 -2,39 
Yemen 6,78 44,50 47,03 -2,54 
China 8,68 56,37 58,98 -2,62 
Lebanon 8,67 56,13 58,92 -2,79 
Burundi 6,52 42,58 45,39 -2,82 
Bangladesh 7,53 48,95 51,77 -2,82 
Cameroon 7,68 49,89 52,72 -2,83 
Mexico 9,19 59,34 62,18 -2,83 
Algeria 8,80 56,84 59,69 -2,86 
Germany 10,25 65,74 68,83 -3,10 
Zimbabwe 7,63 48,67 52,40 -3,73 
Sweden 10,29 65,14 69,10 -3,96 
Poland 9,47 59,95 63,93 -3,98 
Togo 7,34 46,43 50,54 -4,10 
Tajikistan 7,09 44,83 49,00 -4,17 
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Albania 8,51 53,60 57,92 -4,32 
Qatar 9,90 62,03 66,60 -4,57 
Guyana 8,40 52,42 57,20 -4,78 
Finland 10,31 64,34 69,19 -4,85 
Sudan 7,58 47,16 52,03 -4,87 
Egypt 8,35 51,71 56,87 -5,16 
Lesotho 7,87 48,36 53,89 -5,53 
Chad 7,64 46,75 52,47 -5,72 
Belgium 10,34 63,53 69,42 -5,89 
Mauritania 7,57 45,98 52,00 -6,02 
Haiti 7,55 45,75 51,85 -6,10 
Greece 10,01 60,98 67,31 -6,33 
Cape Verde 8,65 51,89 58,80 -6,91 
Italy 10,25 61,89 68,80 -6,91 
Azerbaijan 8,33 49,83 56,78 -6,95 
Rwanda 7,14 42,31 49,31 -7,00 
Congo  6,89 40,57 47,70 -7,13 
India 8,05 47,44 55,03 -7,59 
Malta 9,85 58,28 66,29 -8,01 
Slovenia 9,95 58,32 66,94 -8,62 
Romania 9,05 52,08 61,26 -9,19 
Croatia 9,41 53,64 63,54 -9,90 
Kazakhstan 8,91 50,35 60,44 -10,09 
Russia 9,20 51,84 62,24 -10,40 
Vietnam 7,92 43,71 54,18 -10,48 
Congo (Democratic Republic of 
the) 
6,56 34,78 45,65 -10,87 
Slovakia 9,59 53,77 64,69 -10,92 
Guinea-Bissau 6,58 34,73 45,80 -11,07 
Ukraine 8,76 47,81 59,49 -11,69 
France 10,29 57,36 69,05 -11,69 
Bulgaria 9,00 47,34 60,96 -13,62 
Uzbekistan 7,53 38,13 51,77 -13,63 
Laos 7,58 36,78 52,05 -15,27 
Syria 8,19 37,16 55,90 -18,74 
Belarus 8,85 41,29 60,03 -18,75 
Turkmenistan 8,43 37,60 57,40 -19,80 
Equatorial Guinea 9,93 45,62 66,81 -21,19 
Iran 8,93 36,11 60,51 -24,40 
Libya 8,93 34,65 60,55 -25,90 
Angola 7,69 24,27 52,74 -28,47 
 
 
Table 6 now lists the main drivers and bottlenecks of ‘economic freedom’ on the basis of our 
independent variables. Our results were achieved with 145 countries of the world with 
complete data. Our regression explains 52.6% of the variance of ‘economic freedom’. 
Independent of the income effect on ‘economic freedom’, which, in numerical terms is quite 
strong and which is statistically highly significant, we find rather surprisingly no significant 
relationship with ‘world economic openness’ (as would have been to have to be expected by 
Dollar, 1992a, and 1992b, and all subsequent investigations of the ‘world economically open 
growth is good for the poor’ paradigm. By contrast, we have to propose a peace research 
paradigm of world economic openness because we find that military personnel ratios are the 
biggest bottleneck for economic freedom; and that institutional feminism is not an adversary, 
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but an ally of economic freedom! In addition, we also find that the demographic challenges, 
posed by population growth and population density are the healthiest impulses for a society to 
embrace economic freedom, independent of the level of incomes achieved, independent of the 
level of feminism in power, and independent of the military personnel ratio. All the ‘world 
economic variables’ and other possible drivers and bottlenecks of economic freedom wield 
only insignificant results. Among them are the following variables: 
 
 % world population 
 Absolute latitude 
 comparative price levels (US=1.00) 
 foreign savings rate 
 FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of total population 
 ln GDP per capita 
 Membership in the Islamic Conference 
 military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) 
 MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 
 MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP 
 MNC PEN: DYN MNC PEN 1995-2005 
 Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per GDP + import-share per GDP) 
 public education expenditure per GNP 
 UNDP education index 
 
 
Table 6: Determinants of economic freedom 
 
Variable       Coefficient  Std Error 
 
% women in government, all levels    0,286**  0,100 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%)  1,794**  0,634 
ln GDP per capita ^2     0,397*** 0,041 
military personnel rate ln (MPR+1)    -3,21*** 1,063 
population density     0,008**  0,003 
Constant      25,940*** 3,639 
 
N =       
Adj. R^2 =       
F-test =        33.001 
p-value =       0.000 
 
Significance level: *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001;  
 
 
The choice of a country to be included in the final analysis (175 countries) was determined by 
the availability of fairly good data series for these independent variables (if not mentioned 
otherwise, UNDP data for the middle of the first decade of the new millenium).  
 
The statistical design of our study is based on the usual, SPSS-PAWS XVIII25 ordinary least 
square standard regression of the ‘kitchen sink type’ (Durlauf et al., 2008; Hertz, Hebert, and 
Landon, 1994) of economic growth and economic, social and political performance in the 
research tradition of Barro, 2003. To our knowledge, the term ‘kitchen sink regression’, 
commonly used in econometrics of economic growth, was re-introduced in more recent 
standard social science journal vocabulary in Laver and Shepsle, 1999. Prior stepwise 
regression procedures selected the significant among the total list of 26 available predictors. 
Among the many international studies, applying such a research design, we find Hertz, 
                                                          
25 http://www-01.ibm.com/software/analytics/spss/products/statistics/  
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Hebert, and Landon, 1994. This study analysed the effects of independent variables including 
dietary factors, medical resource availability, gross national product (GNP/capita), literacy 
rates, growth in the labour force, and provision of sanitation facilities and safe water on infant 
and maternal mortality rates and life expectancy at birth. The study fitted a series of general 
linear models for each of the three dependent variables26.  
 
Since our book does not feature primarily on ecological footprint, but on a variety of 
measures of ‘smart development’, which are mathematically derived from the logic of the 
Happy Planet Index (see also Ng, 2008a and 2008b; Veenhoven, 1996), it suffices to say here 
that ecological footprint (g ha /cap)27, as it is universally well-known by now, is indeed a one-
catch all-indicator of ecological strain, caused by human activity. Ecological footprint and its 
measurement cannot be further debated in the framework of our book and at this stage must 
be regarded as a ‘given’ (for studies about the logic and determinants of footprint per capita 
see also Dietz et al., 2007 and 2009). It should be enough to state here that it is measure of the 
amount of land required to provide for all their resource requirements plus the amount of 
vegetated land required to sequester (absorb) all their CO2 emissions and the CO2 emissions 
embodied in the products individuals consume. This figure is expressed in units of ‘global 
hectares’. In 2005, the per capita footprint for the rich OECD nations was 6.0 global 
hectares28. The other variables are then compared to the footprint, which was used by a 
society to achieve a given standard of democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human 
development, research and development, and social cohesion. We should also remind our 
readers here of the fact that the Happy Planet Index Organization measures the Happy Planet 
Index on the basis of the global life satisfaction (Happy Life Years), which have to be 
maximized in relationship to the ‘ecological price’ of happiness, ecological footprint.  
 
It is then of course very tempting to calculate – in a Schumacherian tradition – the 
‘environmental price’ of different development processes, like democracy, economic growth, 
gender equality, human development, research and development, and social cohesion. The 
Happy Planet Organisation calculates the HPI in the following way: 
 
(1)     )/()( iii EFPCHLYEHPI  
 
where Happy Life Years (HLYE) is obtained as the product of life expectancy (LE) and 
average life satisfaction (LS) index. In its currently used formula, the Happy Planet 
Organization adds a constant (α) to ecological footprint. The result of the division: [Happy 
Life Years divided by Ecological Footprint plus the constant (α)] is then multiplied by 
another, equally arbitrarily chosen constant (β) to normalize the efficiency index. In the 
Happy Planet Organization formula, the constants have the following numerical values: (α) = 
3.35 and (β) = 6.42.   
 
The highest global HPI score is that of Costa Rica (76.1 out of 100). Of the 10 best 
performing countries of the world, nine are in Latin America.29 But unfortunately, the Happy 
Planet Organization’s straightforward and simple methodology overlooks advances in the 
social sciences, which long ago already developed appropriate methodologies to relate life 
quality variables – like life expectancy – to GDP per capita or energy consumption levels in 
empirical, and non-linear mathematical formulations, which capture much better than the 
                                                          
26 It emerged that the percent of households without sanitation facilities showed the strongest association with all 
three dependent variables: life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rate, and maternal mortality rate 
27 http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/  
28 http://www.happyplanetindex.org/ 
29 http://www.happyplanetindex.org/ 
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above simple equation the underlying non-linear tradeoffs between ‘energy consumption 
and/or environmental strain’ and ‘life quality’ (Goldstein, 1985). Goldstein’s empirically 
developed idea that basic human needs indicators – like life expectancy – are a non-linear 
function of development levels has been so widely received in the social science literature that 
is has become a real international standard nowadays (see Afxentiou, 1990a, 1990b; Anand 
and Ravillion, 1993; Anson, 1988, 1991; Cheng, 1989; Dixon, 1987; Dixon and Moon, 1986, 
1989; Fosu, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Kakwani, 1993, 1995; Khan, 1991; King, 1998; 
Knight and Rosa, 2011; Mazumdar, 1996, 2000; Moon and Dixon, 1992; Newman and 
Thomson, 1989; Rudra, 2009; Tausch and Prager, 1993). The neglect of such a basic non-
linear function (whatever its concrete mathematical formulation30) is a major shortcoming of 
the currently used Happy Planet Index calculation. The global public health research tradition, 
too, produced massive evidence on the cross-national determinants of life expectancy and 
other life quality variables (to quote but a few studies: Wilkinson, 1992; Wilkinson and 
Picket, 2006; Tausch, 2010). This growing methodological convergence of the social 
sciences, geography and earth sciences, and public health research on predictors of life quality 
at different stages of development should be taken into account in this book (Fain, et al. 1997; 
Mostafa, 2010a and 2010b; Mostafa and Nataraajan, 2009; Shandra, 2007a, 2007b, Shandra, 
Leckband, McKinney and London, 2009). Graph 2 depicts the trade-off between ecological 
footprint and happy life years; the (standardized) residuals in our graph are a reformulated 
Happy Planet Index: 
 
 
Graph 2: The non-linear relationship between Happy Life Years (HLYE, vertical Y) 
and ecological footprint (horizontal X), n=140 countries in 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable     Coefficient  Std Error 
Ecological Footprint per capita    
Ecological Footprint per capita^2    
Constant     
 
                                                          
30 The most often encountered formulation in the literature is a double logarithmic expression, based on the 
natural logarithm of development level/energy consumption and its square.  
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N =      
Adj. R^2 =      
F-test =       83.081 
p-value =      0.000 
Significance level: *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001;  
 
 
In a similar vein, we investigated the non-linear trade-offs between ecological footprint and 
the combined UNDP type indices for six dimensions of development, derived from freely 
available current cross-national, comparative data: 
 
Table 7: the combined six components, measuring development, and the overall 
indicators, combining 26 variables 
 
 
democracy Combined Failed States Index 
democracy Civil and Political Liberties violations 
democracy Corruption avoidance measure 
democracy Democracy measure 
democracy Global tolerance index 
democracy Rule of law 
economic growth Crisis Performance Factor 
economic growth economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2009 
economic growth economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2010 
economic growth economic growth in real terms pc. per annum, 1990-2005 
Gender equality closing economic gender gap 
Gender equality closing educational gender gap 
Gender equality closing health and survivial gender gap 
Gender equality closing of global gender gap overall score 2009 
Gender equality closing political gender gap 
Gender equality gender empowerment index value 
human development Infant mortality 2005 
human development female survival probability of surviving to age 65 female 
human development Human development index (HDI) value 
2004 
human development Life Expectancy (years) 
human development Life Satisfaction (0-10) 
R&D Country share in top world 500 Universities 
R&D per capita world class universities 
R&D tertiary enrollment 
social cohesion quintile share income difference between richest and poorest 
20% 
social cohesion unemployment rate 
nonparametric_26 
equal weights 
overall 26 development index 
nonparametric, 
weighting each 
dimension equally 
overall 26 development index, based on six dimensions 
 
Graphs 3a – 3g show the trade-off between ecological footprint and ‘smart development’, 
measured for the various dimensions (democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human 
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development, research and development, social cohesion, and the two differently combined 
overall measurement scales). Only the scatterplot for ecological footprint and ‘social 
cohesion’ suggests a weaker relationship, all the other relationships are considerable. The 
overall development performance, democracy, gender equality, human development, research 
and development are a clear non-linear, inverted U-shaped function of ecological footprint per 
capita, while economic growth and also social cohesion first decrease and then increase with 
rising levels of ecological footprint per capita.  
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Graph 3: ecological footprint and general development performance – the non-linear 
tradeoffs 
 
Graph 3a: ecological footprint and the general development performance index, based 
on an equal weighting of its 26 components 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3b: ecological footprint and the general development performance index, based 
on an equal weighting of the six dimensions, underlying the 26 components 
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Graph 3c: ecological footprint and democratic performance (6 components combined) 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3d: ecological footprint and economic growth performance (4 components 
combined) 
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Graph 3e: ecological footprint and gender equality performance (6 components 
combined) 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3f: ecological footprint and human development performance (5 components 
combined) 
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Graph 3g: ecological footprint and research and development performance (3 
components combined) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3h: ecological footprint and social cohesion performance (2 components 
combined) 
 
 
 
 
 
As we already explained, the hitherto existing calculations of the HPI31, provided by the 
Happy Planet Organization, are merely based on simple arithmetical principles.  
                                                          
31 Although we presume the main contemporary global environment indicators to be known, we refer our readers 
especially to the very comprehensive Yale/Columbia environmental data series, available at 
 55 
 
Following Heintz, 1972 we propose as an alternative method a residual method, and calculate 
our smart development indicators as the standardized residuals from Graph 3. The 
standardized residual values are computed as observed minus predicted development 
outcomes divided by the square root of the residual mean square (see Appendix, Table 1 and 
2): 
 
(2)  ˆ/)ˆ( iii EHLYHLYESDP   
 
High positive outlayers imply a very high smart development performance, while countries 
below the trend line are the countries with a low smart development performance. Having 
established a residual-based smart Development Indicator family, we now can look more 
realistically at the cross-national determinants of smart development performance.  
 
 
4. Results on the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart development’ 
 
 
The image of social realities suggested upon a very first inspection of smart development 
performance values around the globe would suggest a Friedrich August Hayek vision (Hayek, 
1945, 1989) of markets, inequality and a free society interacting with one another. There 
should be no blocks against inequalities in the name of whatever ‘social justice’, explaining 
then the phenomenal success of the unequal Latin American societies on the parameters of 
smart development (see especially, the global rankings of smart development in Table 3 of the 
Appendix). A the same time, the high-equality performers in global society (quintile share of 
less than 5.0) with a relatively high per-capita income are at the same time bad performers on 
the new  smart development scales. Notably enough, several of these countries are members 
of the European Union and traditional developed western welfare states. This very first glance 
at the data would suggest a complete turn-around from the ‘European social model’ (Tausch 
and Ghymers, 2006) in favour of a high-inequality, open to globalization ‘Latin American 
model’ or Philippine model as the best way to achieve a good ‘smart development’ 
performance. However, such a first glance completely overlooks the massive available 
evidence about world economic openness and the failure of ‘smart development’. 
 
As to multivariate analysis, first preliminary stepwise regression procedures with mean 
substitution of missing variables revealed a re-current pattern of the importance and predictive 
capability robustness of the chosen variables among the 26 independent variables with a 
theoretically well-plausible greater and significant effect on the dependent variables (the six 
component indicators of development and the overall development performance indicators. 
The final results were achieved by forward multiple regression based on list wise deletion of 
missing values, and based exclusively on the significant predictors from the prior preliminary 
stepwise regressions. We first present, variable by variable, and driver by driver, and 
bottleneck by bottleneck, the significant results of our multiple regression analyses 
(standardized regression coefficients and their significance): 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/ and http://epi.yale.edu/Home . The important new ‘grammar’ of the 
global footprint discourse can be found at http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/glossary/ . 
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Table 8: the significant drivers and bottlenecks of smart development 
 
 
Independent Variable dependent variable Beta error 
probability 
% women in government, all levels 
(feminist theory, stressing the need to 
feminize structures of government) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighted 
equally 
0,185 0,045 
% women in government, all levels 
(feminist theory, stressing the need to 
feminize structures of government) 
Smart democracy 0,196 0,007 
% women in government, all levels 
(feminist theory, stressing the need to 
feminize structures of government) 
Smart gender justice 0,300 0,001 
% world population (Amin’s five 
monopolies of power) 
Smart human development 0,152 0,061 
% world population (Amin’s five 
monopolies of power) 
Happy Life Years 0,161 0,060 
% world population (Amin’s five 
monopolies of power) 
Smart economic growth 0,261 0,002 
2000 Economic Freedom Score (its 
absence is explained either by Amin’s 
critique of rent-seeking seeking in the 
periphery versus conventional neo-liberal 
theories of economic growth) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighted 
equally 
0,336 0,002 
2000 Economic Freedom Score (its 
absence is explained either by Amin’s 
critique of rent-seeking seeking in the 
periphery versus conventional neo-liberal 
theories of economic growth) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighting 
equally the six component 
dimensions 
0,402 0,000 
2000 Economic Freedom Score (its 
absence is explained either by Amin’s 
critique of rent-seeking seeking in the 
periphery versus conventional neo-liberal 
theories of economic growth) 
Smart democracy 0,457 0,000 
Absolute latitude (Andre Gunder Frank’s 
‘Re-Orient’ model) 
Smart economic growth -0,234 0,006 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) (Paul Israel Singer’s dependency 
theory) 
Smart R&D -0,253 0,007 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) (Paul Israel Singer’s dependency 
theory) 
Smart social cohesion -0,248 0,006 
Immigration - Share of population 2005 
(%) (Amin’s theory about the role of 
migration) 
Smart democracy -0,348 0,000 
military expenditures per GDP 
(quantitative dependency and peace 
research approaches) 
Happy Life Years -0,245 0,004 
military expenditures per GDP 
(quantitative dependency and peace 
research approaches) 
Smart gender justice -0,204 0,018 
military expenditures per GDP 
(quantitative dependency and peace 
research approaches) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighted 
equally 
-0,191 0,021 
military expenditures per GDP 
(quantitative dependency and peace 
research approaches) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighting 
equally the six component 
dimensions 
-0,166 0,074 
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military personnel rate ln (quantitative 
dependency and peace research 
approaches) 
Smart democracy -0,221 0,002 
MNC outward investments (stock) per 
GDP (Bornschier’s dependency theory, 
stressing the importance of MNC 
headquarter status in international society) 
Smart R&D 0,479 0,000 
Muslim population share per total 
population (Amin’s critique of Islamism, 
implicitly expecting a negative trade-off 
with development performance versus 
Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘Re-Orient’ model, 
expecting a transfer of growth and 
productive activities to the global East and 
South) 
Smart gender justice -0,396 0,000 
Muslim population share per total 
population (Amin’s critique of Islamism, 
implicitly expecting a negative trade-off 
with development performance versus 
Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘Re-Orient’ model, 
expecting a transfer of growth and 
productive activities to the global East and 
South) 
Smart economic growth 0,313 0,000 
Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per 
GDP + import-share per GDP) (Amin’s 
conception of the role of the peripheries) 
Smart R&D -0,552 0,000 
Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per 
GDP + import-share per GDP) (Amin’s 
conception of the role of the peripheries) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighting 
equally the six component 
dimensions 
-0,222 0,019 
Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per 
GDP + import-share per GDP) (Amin’s 
conception of the role of the peripheries) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighted 
equally 
-0,170 0,048 
population density (José Carlos 
Mariategui’s dependency theory) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighted 
equally 
0,214 0,010 
public education expenditure per GNP 
(human capital approaches in the tradition 
of the UNDP versus Kalecki/Steindl 
paradigm versus neo-liberal approaches, 
featuring a ‘crowding out’ phenomenon) 
Smart social cohesion -0,270 0,003 
public education expenditure per GNP 
(human capital approaches in the tradition 
of the UNDP versus Kalecki/Steindl 
paradigm versus neo-liberal approaches, 
featuring a ‘crowding out’ phenomenon) 
Smart human development -0,196 0,024 
public education expenditure per GNP 
(human capital approaches in the tradition 
of the UNDP versus Kalecki/Steindl 
paradigm versus neo-liberal approaches, 
featuring a ‘crowding out’ phenomenon) 
Smart R&D 0,235 0,010 
UNDP education index (human capital 
approaches in the tradition of the UNDP 
versus Kalecki/Steindl paradigm) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighted 
equally 
0,198 0,036 
UNDP education index (human capital 
approaches in the tradition of the UNDP 
versus Kalecki/Steindl paradigm) 
Smart human development 0,478 0,000 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional centre-periphery models 
about the negative consequences of the 
brain drain versus ‘new migration 
Smart economic growth -0,262 0,002 
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theories’, underlining the positive effects 
of worker remittances on migration 
sending countries) 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional centre-periphery models 
about the negative consequences of the 
brain drain versus ‘new migration 
theories’, underlining the positive effects 
of worker remittances on migration 
sending countries) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighting 
equally the six component 
dimensions 
0,177 0,064 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional centre-periphery models 
about the negative consequences of the 
brain drain versus ‘new migration 
theories’, underlining the positive effects 
of worker remittances on migration 
sending countries) 
overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighted 
equally 
0,208 0,016 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional centre-periphery models 
about the negative consequences of the 
brain drain versus ‘new migration 
theories’, underlining the positive effects 
of worker remittances on migration 
sending countries) 
Smart R&D 0,229 0,017 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional centre-periphery models 
about the negative consequences of the 
brain drain versus ‘new migration 
theories’, underlining the positive effects 
of worker remittances on migration 
sending countries) 
Smart gender justice 0,241 0,007 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional centre-periphery models 
about the negative consequences of the 
brain drain versus ‘new migration 
theories’, underlining the positive effects 
of worker remittances on migration 
sending countries) 
Happy Life Years 0,288 0,002 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional centre-periphery models 
about the negative consequences of the 
brain drain versus ‘new migration 
theories’, underlining the positive effects 
of worker remittances on migration 
sending countries) 
Smart human development 0,352 0,000 
Years of membership in the EU, 2010 
(Amin’s theory about the importance of 
European integration as a counterweight to 
US dominance in the world system) 
Smart democracy 0,183 0,006 
 
 
The following independent variables wield only ‘good’ and positive effects on smart 
development: 
 
 % women in government, all levels (feminist theory; three effects positive; zero 
effects negative) 
 % world population (Amin’s five monopolies of power; three effects positive; zero 
effects negative) 
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 Economic Freedom Score (Amin’s critique of rent-seeking; three effects positive; zero 
effects negative) 
 MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP (Bornschier’s dependency theory; one 
effect positive; zero effects negative) 
 population density (José Carlos Mariategui’s dependency theory; one effect positive; 
zero effects negative) 
 UNDP education index (Steindl/Kalecki-paradigm; two effects positive; zero effects 
negative) 
 Years of membership in the EU (Amin’s theory about the role of integration; one 
effect positive; zero effects negative) 
 
 
The following predictors wielded only negative consequences on smart development: 
 
 
 Absolute latitude (Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘Re-Orient’ model; zero effects positive; one 
effect negative) 
 Annual population growth rate (%) (Paul Israel Singer’s dependency theory; zero 
effects positive; two effects negative) 
 Immigration share of total population (%) (Amin’s theory about the role of migration; 
zero effects positive; one effect negative) 
 military expenditures per GDP (dependency and peace research approaches; zero 
effects positive; four effects negative) 
 military personnel rate (dependency and peace research approaches; zero effects 
positive; one effect negative) 
 Openness-Index (export-share per GDP minus import-share per GDP) (Amin’s 
conception of the role of the peripheries; zero effects positive, three effects negative) 
 
 
The following variables wielded mixed results: 
 
 
 worker remittance inflows as % of GDP (six effects positive; one effect negative) 
 Muslim population shares (one effect positive; one effect negative) 
 public education expenditure per GNP (one effect positive; two effects negative) 
 
 
The power, wielded by the predictors  
 
 
 workers remittances (six positive effects);  
 feminization of power structure (three positive effects) 
 share of world population (three positive effects) 
 economic freedom (three positive effects) 
 world economic openness index (three negative effects),  
 military expenditures (four negative effects);  
 
seems to be overwhelming.  
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Table 9 now summarizes our results from the viewpoint of the theories presented in Chapter 
2. Only the negative effects, wielded by public education expenditure per GNP on smart 
social cohesion and on smart human development cannot be properly explained as yet by 
globalization critical theories, presented above, suggesting rather the existence of strong 
crowding-out effects of public education expenditures on smart redistribution and smart 
human development.  
 
 
Table 9: Results well compatible with a re-formulated globalization critical paradigm 
 
 
Theory Independent Variable dependent 
variable 
Beta error probability 
Andre Gunder 
Frank 
Absolute latitude (Andre Gunder 
Frank’s ‘Re-Orient’ model) 
Smart economic 
growth 
-0,234 0,006 
Andre Gunder 
Frank 
Muslim population share per total 
population (Andre Gunder Frank’s 
‘Re-Orient’ model) 
Smart economic 
growth 
0,313 0,000 
Samir Amin % world population (Amin’s five 
monopolies of power) 
Smart human 
development 
0,152 0,061 
Samir Amin % world population (Amin’s five 
monopolies of power) 
Happy Life Years 0,161 0,060 
Samir Amin % world population (Amin’s five 
monopolies of power) 
Smart economic 
growth 
0,261 0,002 
Samir Amin 2000 Economic Freedom Score 
(Amin’s critique of rent-seeking) 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
26 variables, 
weighted equally 
0,336 0,002 
Samir Amin 2000 Economic Freedom Score 
(Amin’s critique of rent-seeking) 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
26 variables, 
weighting equally 
the six component 
dimensions 
0,402 0,000 
Samir Amin 2000 Economic Freedom Score 
(Amin’s critique of rent-seeking) 
Smart democracy 0,457 0,000 
Samir Amin Immigration - Share of population 
2005 (%) (Amin’s theory about the 
role of migration) 
Smart democracy -0,348 0,000 
Samir Amin Muslim population share per total 
population (Amin’s critique of 
Islamism) 
Smart gender 
justice 
-0,396 0,000 
Samir Amin Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share 
per GDP + import-share per GDP) 
(Amin’s conception of the role of 
the peripheries) 
Smart R&D -0,552 0,000 
Samir Amin Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share 
per GDP + import-share per GDP) 
(Amin’s conception of the role of 
the peripheries) 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
26 variables, 
weighting equally 
the six component 
dimensions 
-0,222 0,019 
Samir Amin Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share 
per GDP + import-share per GDP) 
(Amin’s conception of the role of 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
-0,170 0,048 
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the peripheries) 26 variables, 
weighted equally 
Samir Amin worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP (Amin’s theory about the role 
of migration) 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
26 variables, 
weighting equally 
the six component 
dimensions 
0,177 0,064 
Samir Amin worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP (Amin’s theory about the role 
of migration) 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
26 variables, 
weighted equally 
0,208 0,016 
Samir Amin worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP (Amin’s theory about the role 
of migration) 
Smart R&D 0,229 0,017 
Samir Amin worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP (Amin’s theory about the role 
of migration) 
Smart gender 
justice 
0,241 0,007 
Samir Amin worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP (Amin’s theory about the role 
of migration) 
Happy Life Years 0,288 0,002 
Samir Amin worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP (Amin’s theory about the role 
of migration) 
Smart human 
development 
0,352 0,000 
Samir Amin Years of membership in the EU, 
2010 (Amin’s theory about the role 
of integration) 
Smart democracy 0,183 0,006 
Volker Bornschier MNC outward investments (stock) 
per GDP (Bornschier’s dependency 
theory) 
Smart R&D 0,479 0,000 
brain drain 
theories 
worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP (conventional centre-
periphery models about the negative 
consequences of the brain drain) 
Smart economic 
growth 
-0,262 0,002 
feminism % women in government, all levels 
(feminist theory) 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
26 variables, 
weighted equally 
0,185 0,045 
feminism % women in government, all levels 
(feminist theory) 
Smart democracy 0,196 0,007 
feminism % women in government, all levels 
(feminist theory) 
Smart gender 
justice 
0,300 0,001 
José Carlos 
Mariategui 
population density (José Carlos 
Mariategui’s dependency theory) 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
26 variables, 
weighted equally 
0,214 0,010 
peace research military expenditures per GDP 
(dependency and peace research 
approaches) 
Happy Life Years -0,245 0,004 
peace research military expenditures per GDP 
(dependency and peace research 
approaches) 
Smart gender 
justice 
-0,204 0,018 
peace research military expenditures per GDP 
(dependency and peace research 
approaches) 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
26 variables, 
-0,191 0,021 
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weighted equally 
peace research military expenditures per GDP 
(dependency and peace research 
approaches) 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
26 variables, 
weighting equally 
the six component 
dimensions 
-0,166 0,074 
peace research military personnel rate ln 
(dependency and peace research 
approaches) 
Smart democracy -0,221 0,002 
Paul Israel Singer Annual population growth rate, 
1975-2005 (%) (Paul Israel Singer’s 
dependency theory) 
Smart R&D -0,253 0,007 
Paul Israel Singer Annual population growth rate, 
1975-2005 (%) (Paul Israel Singer’s 
dependency theory) 
Smart social 
cohesion 
-0,248 0,006 
Joseph Steindl public education expenditure per 
GNP (Steindl/Kalecki-paradigm) 
Smart R&D 0,235 0,010 
Joseph Steindl UNDP education index 
(Steindl/Kalecki-paradigm) 
overall smart 
development 
index, based on 
26 variables, 
weighted equally 
0,198 0,036 
Joseph Steindl UNDP education index 
(Steindl/Kalecki-paradigm) 
Smart human 
development 
0,478 0,000 
 
 
In the following, we will present, equation by equation, the results of our research. Table 10 
shows the significant drivers and bottlenecks of Happy Planet performance, i.e. happy life 
years in relationship to the ecological footprint of a society used. The z-standardized residuals 
from Graph 3 are well-explained; our equation is based on 103 countries with complete data. 
Our equation explains 29% of total variance, the F-value for the entire equation is 9.339, and 
the error probability is .000. The constant is -124.628 and is significant. There is a clear 
‘Kuznets’ curve at work (see also Stern, 2004). But the shape of the curve contradicts much of 
the earlier debate on the subject: with rising per capita incomes, problem solving capacities 
first increase and then decrease. The larger states in the world system, having a larger share of 
global population, are much better able to achieve a good happy life years performance at 
relatively low ecological costs, measured in ecological footprints than smaller nations. This 
clearly contradicts the ‘small is beautiful’ philosophy in the tradition of Kohr and 
Schumacher. Military expenditures are a clear additional burden on an ecologically viable 
happy planet performance, while societies, depending on worker remittances, clearly manage 
to perform better on this scale than other societies around the globe.  
 
 
Table 10: the drivers and bottlenecks of Happy Planet performance  
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
B standard error Beta t-value error 
probability 
 
Constant -124.628 42.647  -2.922 0.004 
% world population 0.596 0.313 0.161 1.904 0.060 
ln GDP per capita 26.062 10.069 3.136 2.588 0.011 
ln GDP per capita ^2 -1.309 0.584 -2.731 -2.241 0.027 
military -1.098 0.376 -0.245 -2.922 0.004 
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expenditures per 
GDP 
worker remittance 
inflows as % of GDP 
0.420 0.133 0.288 3.153 0.002 
memorandum item: 
statistical properties 
of the equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
 29.000 102 9.339 .000  
 
 
In a similar fashion, we can establish in Table 11 that in the 101 countries with complete data, 
smart overall development, as defined in Graph 3a of this work, is explained to 37% by our 
model. The F-test for the entire equation is 9.392, the error probability is .000. The constant is 
-2.486 and is significant. The ten countries of the world system, best combining the 
performance on our 26 development indicators and avoiding ecological footprint at the same 
time are the Philippines; Sri Lanka; Costa Rica; Sweden; Jamaica; Dominican Republic; 
Finland; Peru; Netherlands; and Trinidad and Tobago. The ten worst performers on this scale 
are Sudan; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Central African Republic; United Arab Emirates; Niger; 
Kuwait; Chad; Zimbabwe; Burundi; and Hong Kong, China (SAR). Feminism in power, 
economic freedom, population density, the UNDP education index as well as the receipt of 
worker remittances all significantly contribute towards a smart overall development, while 
high military expenditures and a high world economic openness are a bottleneck for ‘smart 
overall development’.  
 
 
Table 11: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart overall development  
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
B standard error Beta t-value error 
probability 
 
Constant -2.486 0.533  -4.666 0.000 
% women in 
government. all 
levels 
0.025 0.012 0.185 2.027 0.045 
2000 Economic 
Freedom Score 
0.031 0.010 0.336 3.239 0.002 
military 
expenditures per 
GDP 
-0.076 0.032 -0.191 -2.345 0.021 
Openness-Index. 
1990 (export-share 
per GDP + import-
share per GDP) 
-0.004 0.002 -0.170 -2.007 0.048 
population density 0.002 0.001 0.214 2.612 0.010 
UNDP education 
index 
0.945 0.445 0.198 2.123 0.036 
worker remittance 
inflows as % of GDP 
0.027 0.011 0.208 2.459 0.016 
memorandum item: 
statistical properties 
of the equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
 37.000 100 9.392 .000  
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Also, it emerges that the results about the drivers of overall smart development 
performance are similar to the ones, reported in Table 11, if we calculate the overall 
development performance by weighting equally its six component indices and only then 
calculating the overall final country performance score, and not, unlike in Table 11, being the 
sum of the equally weighted 26 original component indices (as to the trade-off with ecological 
footprint, see Graph 3b of this work). Economic freedom, and received worker remittances 
per GDP again emerge as the ’drivers’ of smart development (Table 12), while the bottlenecks 
of smart overall development performance are again military expenditures per GDP and world 
economic openness. This time, the adjusted R^2 is 19%, and the equation is based on 102 
countries with complete data. The F-test for the entire equation is 6.908, and the equation is 
significant at the .000-level. The constant is -1.469 and is significant. 
 
 
Table 12: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart overall development, based on an index, 
which weights the six dimensions equally 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
B standard error Beta t-value error 
probability 
 
Constant -1.469 0.536  -2.741 0.007 
2000 Economic 
Freedom Score 
0.035 0.008 0.402 4.158 0.000 
military 
expenditures per 
GDP 
-0.061 0.034 -0.166 -1.808 0.074 
Openness-Index. 
1990 (export-share 
per GDP + import-
share per GDP) 
-0.005 0.002 -0.222 -2.376 0.019 
worker remittance 
inflows as % of GDP 
0.021 0.011 0.177 1.871 0.064 
memorandum item: 
statistical properties 
of the equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
 19.000 101 6.908 .000  
 
 
Table 13 is an invitation to consider the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart democracy’ (see 
also Graph 3c of this work). The ten smartest democracies of our globe are Costa Rica; 
Netherlands; Jamaica; Chile; Sweden; India; Benin; Madagascar; Finland; and Germany; 
these are the countries of the world system, best combining democratic performance and 
avoiding ecological footprint. The worst performers are Sudan; Belarus; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; 
United Arab Emirates; Uzbekistan; Lebanon; Hong Kong, China (SAR); Azerbaijan; and 
Myanmar. The adjusted R^2 of our equation is 48.6%, and the F-value for the entire equation 
is 25.743, and the error p for the equation is .000. It is based on 132 countries with complete 
data. The drivers of smart democracy are feminized structures of government, economic 
freedom, and years of membership in the European Union. The significant bottlenecks of 
smart democracy are high military personnel ratios, and a high share of immigrant population. 
The constant of our equation is -2.037, and it is significant. 
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Table 13: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart democracy 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
B standard error Beta t-value error 
probability 
 
Constant -2.037 0.409  -4.978 0.000 
% women in 
government. all 
levels 
0.029 0.011 0.196 2.753 0.007 
2000 Economic 
Freedom Score 
0.041 0.007 0.457 5.826 0.000 
military personnel 
rate ln (MPR+1) 
-0.334 0.105 -0.221 -3.162 0.002 
Immigration - Share 
of population 2005 
(%) 
-0.031 0.007 -0.348 -4.549 0.000 
Years of 
membership in the 
EU. 2010 
0.014 0.005 0.183 2.806 0.006 
memorandum item: 
statistical properties 
of the equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
 48.600 131 25.743 .000  
 
 
Our next Table, Table 14, analyses the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart economic growth’ 
combing high economic growth with low rates of ecological footprint per capita (see also 
Graph 3d of this work). The IMF data for economic growth in 2010 as well as the Happy 
Planet Organization data on ecological footprint suggest that the 10 best performers were 
China; Azerbaijan; Botswana; Uzbekistan; Congo (Democratic Republic of the); Bhutan; 
Sudan; Mongolia; Ethiopia; and Lebanon; while the worst performers with the worst 
‘cocktail’ of slow economic growth in relation to their ecological footprint per capita were 
Zimbabwe; Moldova; Lithuania; Latvia; Ukraine; Jamaica; Haiti; Armenia; Tajikistan; and 
Madagascar. Our equation about ‘smart growth’ is based on 111 countries with complete data, 
the R^2 is 25.2%, the F-value is 10.243, and the error probability of the entire equation is 
.000. The constant is 0.195, and it is not significant. Population size in relation to the global 
population as well as Muslim population share per total population are the significant drivers 
of smart development in the global system today, while absolute latitude (i.e. countries in the 
far North and South of the world system) as well as nations depending on worker remittances 
are the bottlenecks of ‘smart growth’ today. This again suggests, as we already hinted at in 
our theoretical introduction above about the theory of Andre Gunder Frank, 1999, the tectonic 
shifts in the geographical structures of global growth today, away from the countries of the 
‘North Atlantic arena’ towards the nations of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, which also 
thwart the smart growth efforts of the countries exporting their workforce to the hitherto 
existing centres of the global economy.  
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Table 14: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart economic growth (2010) 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
B standard error Beta t-value error 
probability 
 
Constant 0.195 0.178  1.092 0.277 
% world population 0.099 0.031 0.261 3.149 0.002 
Absolute latitude -0.013 0.005 -0.234 -2.817 0.006 
worker remittance 
inflows as % of GDP 
-0.035 0.011 -0.262 -3.108 0.002 
Muslim population 
share per total 
population 
0.009 0.002 0.313 3.717 0.000 
memorandum item: 
statistical properties 
of the equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
 25.200 110 10.243 .000  
 
 
Table 15 of our study analyses the drivers and bottlenecks of smart gender justice. We are 
comparing the given amount of gender equality in a society with the amount of resources 
(ecological footprint), needed to sustain it (see Graph 3e). The global best performers on this 
equation, how to achieve a maximum of gender justice with a minimum of ecological 
footprint, are the Philippines; South Africa; Finland; Norway; Mozambique; Sweden; Iceland; 
Kyrgyzstan; Sri Lanka; and Uganda. The worst balance sheet on this item of combing ‘lilac’ 
gender policies and ‘green’ issues (minimizing ecological footprint per capita) are Yemen; 
Saudi Arabia; United Arab Emirates; Turkey; Pakistan; Chad; Iran; Kuwait; Korea (Republic 
of); and Egypt. Our equation, based on the 93 countries with complete data, explains 39% of 
total variance, achieves an F-value of 15.712 and an error probability of the entire equation of 
.000. The insignificant constant has the value of -0.034. Women in government and worker 
remittances per GDP are the significant drivers of smart gender justice, while high military 
expenditures and the Muslim population share per total population are the major variables, to 
be interpreted as ‘bottlenecks’ of smart gender justice. 
 
 
Table 15: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart gender justice 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
B standard error Beta t-value error 
probability 
 
Constant -0.034 0.213  -0.161 0.873 
% women in 
government. all 
levels 
0.044 0.013 0.300 3.364 0.001 
military 
expenditures per 
GDP 
-0.087 0.036 -0.204 -2.403 0.018 
worker remittance 
inflows as % of GDP 
0.035 0.013 0.241 2.764 0.007 
Muslim population 
share per total 
-0.010 0.003 -0.396 -4.153 0.000 
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population 
memorandum item: 
statistical properties 
of the equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
 39.000 92 15.712 .000  
 
 
Table 16 looks at the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart human development’. Which are the 
countries best combining the task of a maximum of ‘human development’ with a minimum of 
ecological footprint per capita (see also Graph 3f of this work)? The ten best practice 
countries on this scale are Jamaica; Philippines; Cuba; Sri Lanka; Costa Rica; Vietnam; 
Dominican Republic; Indonesia; Colombia; and Moldova; while all the worst performers are 
located in the African continent, comprising the following countries: Botswana; Namibia; 
Central African Rep,; Burkina Faso; Niger; Sierra Leone; Zimbabwe; Mali; Angola; and 
Chad. Our equation explains 29.9% of the total variance of ‘smart development’ and is based 
on the analysis of the 115 countries with complete data; the F-value is 13.183 and the error p 
of the entire equation is .000. The constant, which is significant, has a value of -1.657. The 
drivers of ‘smart human development’ are the share of a country’s population in world 
population, indicating the relative size of a nation, the UNDP education index, measuring the 
levels of education in a given country, and worker remittance inflows as % of GDP. The 
bottleneck of ‘smart human development’ is constituted by the crowding-out effect of public 
education expenditures on human development.  
 
 
Table 16: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart human development 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
B standard error Beta t-value error 
probability 
 
Constant -1.657 0.348  -4.760 0.000 
% world population 0.055 0.029 0.152 1.894 0.061 
public education 
expenditure per GNP 
-0.097 0.042 -0.196 -2.283 0.024 
UNDP education 
index 
2.437 0.430 0.478 5.666 0.000 
worker remittance 
inflows as % of GDP 
0.044 0.010 0.352 4.461 0.000 
memorandum item: 
statistical properties 
of the equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
 29.900 114 13.183 .000  
 
 
Table 17 analyses the drivers and bottlenecks of smart R&D performance. The equation is 
based on 93 countries with complete data, the R^2 is 33%, the F-value is 10.058, and the error 
probability of the entire equation is .000. The constant, which is not significant, is 0.326. The 
drivers of smart R&D performance, combining the R&D record with a minimum of 
ecological footprint (see also Graph 3g of this work), are the dominant position of a country 
on the global markets, expressed in the indicator multinational corporation outward 
investments per GDP, the public education expenditure, and worker remittance inflows as a % 
of GDP. The significant bottlenecks against a smart R&D performance are population 
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pressure (the annual population growth rate) and world economic openness. According to our 
indicator, the best performing countries are the United States (because of its overwhelming 
performance in tertiary education and research, its high ecological footprint notwithstanding); 
Sweden; New Zealand; Finland; Israel; United Kingdom; Netherlands; Norway; Switzerland; 
and Kyrgyzstan. The worst performers are: United Arab Emirates; Luxembourg; Kuwait; 
Namibia; Botswana; Cyprus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Macedonia; Uruguay; and the Czech 
Republic. 
 
 
Table 17: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart R&D 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
B standard error Beta t-value error 
probability 
 
Constant 0.326 0.327  0.998 0.321 
Annual population 
growth rate. 1975-
2005 (%) 
-0.248 0.089 -0.253 -2.782 0.007 
MNC outward 
investments (stock) 
per GDP 
0.043 0.009 0.479 4.731 0.000 
Openness-Index. 
1990 (export-share 
per GDP + import-
share per GDP) 
-0.014 0.002 -0.552 -5.473 0.000 
public education 
expenditure per GNP 
0.136 0.051 0.235 2.646 0.010 
worker remittance 
inflows as % of GDP 
0.050 0.021 0.229 2.438 0.017 
memorandum item: 
statistical properties 
of the equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
 33.000 92 10.058 .000  
 
 
Our last result is presented in Table 18. It features on the preconditions of ‘smart social 
cohesion’, combining a relatively high social cohesion with a relatively low ecological 
footprint (see also Graph 3h). Our equation is based on an analysis of 120 countries with 
complete data, the adjusted R^2 is just 8.7%, and the F-value is 6.771; and the error 
probability of the entire equation is .002. The constant is 0.824 and is significant. There are 
two significant bottlenecks and no positive drivers of smart social cohesion – annual 
population growth (population pressure) and the crowding-out effects of public education 
expenditures per GDP. The best results on our indicator are achieved by several less 
developed and or (former) communist or left wing regime countries as well as nations with a 
known record of relatively egalitarian development policies (South Korea), with the entire 
group comprising: Chad; Uzbekistan; Rwanda; Belarus; Laos; Cuba; Benin; Tajikistan; Korea 
(Republic of); and Thailand. The worst record of combing social cohesion with low 
ecological footprints was found in Djibouti; Namibia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Central 
African Republic; Sierra Leone; Botswana; Macedonia; Bolivia; South Africa; and Colombia. 
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Table 18: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart social cohesion 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
B standard error Beta t-value error 
probability 
 
Constant 0.824 0.206  4.009 0.000 
Annual population 
growth rate. 1975-
2005 (%) 
-0.152 0.055 -0.248 -2.775 0.006 
public education 
expenditure per GNP 
-0.102 0.034 -0.270 -3.013 0.003 
memorandum item: 
statistical properties 
of the equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
 8.700 119 6.771 .002  
 
 
 
5. Discussion of the results so far 
 
 
Knight and Rosa, 2011 compared the ecological footprint per capita and average life 
satisfaction (as a measure of subjective well-being). Based on maximum likelihood 
estimations, they tested the effects of climate, political, economic, and social factors on 
EWEB with a sample of 105 countries. Knight and Rosa found a negative quadratic effect of 
economic development on EWEB, a negative effect of income inequality, and a positive 
effect of social capital (based on social trust data, contained in the World Values Survey)32.  
 
Our residuals-based reformulation of smart development realistically captures the trade-off 
between Global Ecological Footprint per capita and development performance and offers to 
us a better idea about smart development performance at different stages of socio-economic 
development. Our results show that traditional indicators of economic globalization and also 
inequality have little influence on smart development performance, but that hitherto neglected 
elements of dependency and world systems theory gain in importance. This is especially 
relevant for the socio-economic theory of Samir Amin, but it is also true of the contributions 
by feminism, peace research, and by other various approaches in the globalization critical 
tradition, perhaps hitherto neglected here and there, and now summarized in Table 9 of this 
work. Efficiency tends to increase and then to decrease with rising development levels. Big 
countries with large population resources perform better on our scales, and military 
expenditures/personnel rates are a significant block against smart development performance. 
In a sense, our results also contradict the logic inherent in the ‘beautiful’, but unfortunately 
wrong ‘small is beautiful’ analysis, proposed by Schumacher, 1973a: not the small countries, 
but the big countries find it easier to have a satisfactory smart development performance in 
comparison to the ecological footprint, consumed by them. Our research also shows the 
beneficial effects of migration on the sending countries. Worker remittances have a significant 
positive effect on the HPI and a host of other smart development indicators. Migration 
sending countries, as to be expected from Samir Amin’s dependency theory, reap substantial 
benefits from receiving worker remittances, while other indicators of globalization hardly 
                                                          
32 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/  
 70 
affect the smart development performance. Table 19 now shows the significant standardized 
regression coefficients, as they emerged from Tables 10 – 18 of this work, again linked to the 
theories presented in this work: 
 
Table 19: testing of the theories 
 
 
Independent Variable dependent variable Beta 
Feminism: % women in government, all 
levels (feminist theory, stressing the need 
to feminize structures of government) 
overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
0,185 
 Smart democracy 0,196 
 Smart gender justice 0,300 
% world population (Amin’s five 
monopolies of power) 
Smart human development 0,152 
 Happy Life Years 0,161 
 Smart economic growth 0,261 
2000 Economic Freedom Score (its 
absence is explained either by Amin’s 
critique of rent-seeking seeking in the 
periphery versus conventional neo-
liberal theories of economic growth) 
overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
0,336 
 overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighting equally the six 
component dimensions 
0,402 
 Smart democracy 0,457 
Absolute latitude (Andre Gunder 
Frank’s ‘Re-Orient’ model) 
Smart economic growth -0,234 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-
2005 (%) (Paul Israel Singer’s 
dependency theory) 
Smart R&D -0,253 
 Smart social cohesion -0,248 
Immigration - Share of population 2005 
(%) (Amin’s theory about the role of 
migration) 
Smart democracy -0,348 
military expenditures per GDP 
(quantitative dependency and peace 
research approaches) 
Happy Life Years -0,245 
 Smart gender justice -0,204 
 overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
-0,191 
 overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighting equally the six 
component dimensions 
-0,166 
military personnel rate ln (quantitative 
dependency and peace research 
approaches) 
Smart democracy -0,221 
MNC outward investments (stock) per 
GDP (Bornschier’s dependency theory, 
stressing the importance of MNC 
headquarter status in international 
society) 
Smart R&D 0,479 
Muslim population share per total 
population (Amin’s critique of Islamism, 
implicitly expecting a negative trade-off 
with development performance versus 
Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘Re-Orient’ 
model, expecting a transfer of growth 
Smart gender justice -0,396 
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and productive activities to the global 
East and South) 
 Smart economic growth 0,313 
Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per 
GDP + import-share per GDP) (Amin’s 
conception of the role of the peripheries) 
Smart R&D -0,552 
 overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighting equally the six 
component dimensions 
-0,222 
 overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
-0,170 
population density (José Carlos 
Mariategui’s dependency theory) 
overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
0,214 
public education expenditure per GNP 
(human capital approaches in the 
tradition of the UNDP versus 
Kalecki/Steindl paradigm versus neo-
liberal approaches, featuring a 
‘crowding out’ phenomenon) 
Smart social cohesion -0,270 
 Smart human development -0,196 
 Smart R&D 0,235 
UNDP education index (human capital 
approaches in the tradition of the UNDP 
versus Kalecki/Steindl paradigm) 
overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
0,198 
 Smart human development 0,478 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional centre-periphery models 
about the negative consequences of the 
brain drain versus ‘new migration 
theories’, underlining the positive effects 
of worker remittances on migration 
sending countries) 
Smart economic growth -0,262 
 overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighting equally the six 
component dimensions 
0,177 
 overall smart development index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
0,208 
 Smart R&D 0,229 
 Smart gender justice 0,241 
 Happy Life Years 0,288 
 Smart human development 0,352 
Years of membership in the EU, 2010 
(Amin’s theory about the importance of 
European integration as a counterweight 
to US dominance in the world system) 
Smart democracy 0,183 
 
 
Only the following significant effects highlight the necessity to further develop the paradigm, 
developed here: the negative, crowding out effects public education expenditures per GDP on 
smart social cohesion and smart human development, and the negative effects, worker 
remittance inflows as % of GDP wield on smart economic growth. The impressive list of 
tests, speaking in favour of the globalization critical paradigm, presented in this work, would 
suggest to further developing this research approach to questions of ‘smart development’.  
 
First of all, the dependency and world systems paradigm by Samir Amin comes to my 
mind. As correctly predicted by Samir Amin, the big countries with huge population resources 
today are favoured in their smart economic growth, their Happy Life Years, and their smart 
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human development. As correctly expected by Amin, peripheral rent seeking is a burden and 
its absence, measured by economic freedom, is an asset among the forces, shaping 
international development today, especially for smart democracy, and the overall smart 
development index (both formulations, used in this essay). In addition, Amin correctly 
stresses the necessity for European integration – and the positive effects of years of EU 
membership on smart democracy confirm is Euro-optimism. He correctly analyses the 
enormous transfer of resources from the centre to the periphery, brought about by migration, 
with the huge statistical observed effects of received worker remittances on smart human 
development, Happy Life Years, smart gender justice, smart R&D, and both formulations of 
the smart development index justifying his assumption. Amin’s dependency theory correctly 
predicts the very negative effects of world economic openness on smart development. The 
huge statistical negative and very uniform effects, to be observed, cannot be simply and easily 
rejected out of hand: smart R&D and overall smart development (both formulations) are 
affected negatively by world economic openness. Among the major four founding figures of 
the ‘world systems approach’ (Amin, Arrighi, Frank and Wallerstein, 1982) he is the only one 
to have come up, in addition, with a consistent and far-reaching critique of Islamism, 
confirmed by the very negative trade-off between Muslim population share and smart gender 
empowerment.  
 
But in some ways, Amin’s paradigm has to be expanded and refined: Feminism is an 
important driver of smart gender justice, smart democracy, and the overall smart development 
index, based on 26 variables, weighted equally. Feminist approaches, in principle, would be 
well compatible with Amin’s original approach. The Kalecki/Steindl paradigm also can be 
merged with Amin’s theory, and it has three significant results to its favour – the positive 
determination of smart R&D by public education expenditures, and the positive effects of the 
UNDP education index on smart human development and on overall smart development 
index, based on 26 variables, weighted equally. Several further strains of dependency/world 
systems research are confirmed in this essay: Bornschier’s dependency theory and the 
importance it attaches to multinational corporation headquarter status, which is confirmed by 
the positive effect of this variable on smart R&D; and the effect of population density, 
predicted in José Carlos Mariategui’s dependency theory on the overall smart development 
index, based on 26 variables, weighted equally.  Paul Israel Singer’s approach to 
dependency and population dynamics is confirmed by the significant negative effects of 
annual population growth rates on smart R&D and smart social cohesion. The following 
empirical results could be interpreted to be expressions of Andre Gunder Frank’s Re-
Orient hypothesis, 1999 about a fundamental shift in the global production dynamics away 
from the old centres towards the countries of the Indian and the Pacific Ocean: the significant 
positive effect of Muslim population share per total population on smart economic growth, 
and the significant negative effects of absolute latitude on smart economic growth, of 
immigration - share of population in 2005 on smart democracy (the biggest migration 
recipients are the countries of the global ‘North’), and worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP on smart economic growth. 
 
For some other processes, the empirical Amin’s five monopolies of power include two 
elements of military might, the monopoly of technology, supported by military expenditures 
of the dominant nations, and the monopoly of the military means of mass destruction. But the 
significant negative effects of military expenditures (on Happy Life Years, smart gender 
justice, the two formulations of the overall smart development index) or military personnel 
rates (smart democracy) on smart development rather support the arguments of quantitative 
peace research during the last decades with its apprehensions against very high military 
spending rates (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1999; Heo, 1998; Mintz and Stevenson, 1995).  
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As we stated, the real differences with the theories presented here are to be found in the 
negative effects of public education expenditures on public education expenditures per 
GDP on smart social cohesion and smart human development. In this case, our response can 
only be to draw the global research community to the essays published by Blankenau and 
Simpson, 2004 and Sylwester, 2000, written from the perspective of established economic 
theory. Blankenau and Simpson, 2004, because, as we already stated, they investigated the 
public education expenditure-growth relationship in the context of an endogenous growth 
model in which private and public investment are inputs to human capital accumulation. They 
could show that the positive direct effect of public education spending on growth can be 
diminished or even negated when other determinants of growth are negatively affected by 
general equilibrium adjustments. Blankenau and Simpson showed that the response of growth 
to public education expenditures may be nonmonotonic. The relationship depends on the level 
of government spending, the tax structure and the parameters of production technologies. 
Sylwester, 2000, for his part could demonstrate that although public education expenditures 
are positively associated with future economic growth, the contemporaneous effect upon 
growth is negative. 
 
 
6. Inequality and smart public health development 
 
 
In the following, we take up a very hotly debated issue, which has been very prominent in 
recent global public health debate. Following the path-breaking articles by RG Wilkinson, 
1992, 1997; and Wilkinson and Picket, 2006, income inequality has a very detrimental effect 
on life quality. But life quality also depends in a non-linear fashion from environmental data. 
Already in Graph 2 above we portrayed this trade-off, stating that the non-linear tradeoffs 
between ‘energy consumption and/or environmental strain’ and ‘life quality’ were first 
portrayed in Goldstein, 1985. We already hinted at the fact that social science literature 
widely uses non-linear functions to depict the trade-off (see Afxentiou, 1990a, 1990b; Anand 
and Ravillion, 1993; Anson, 1988, 1991; Cheng, 1989; Dixon, 1987; Dixon and Moon, 1986, 
1989; Fosu, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Kakwani, 1993, 1995; Khan, 1991; King, 1998; 
Knight and Rosa, 2011; Mazumdar, 1996, 2000; Moon and Dixon, 1992; Newman and 
Thomson, 1989; Rudra, 2009; Tausch and Prager, 1993). Following the public health debate 
contribution in Tausch, 2010 and the social scientific approaches in Fain, et al. 1997; Mostafa, 
2010a and 2010b; Mostafa and Nataraajan, 2009; Shandra, 2007a, 2007b, Shandra, Leckband, 
McKinney and London, 2009, we now portray in Graph 4a-4c the trade-off between 
ecological footprint and life quality: 
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Graph 4a: life expectancy and ecological footprint 
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Graph 4b: female survival rate and ecological footprint 
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Graph 4c: female survival rate and ecological footprint 
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Table 20 portrays the mathematical properties of this trade-off: 
 
 
 
 76 
 
Table 20: the trade-off between ecological footprint and life quality 
 
 
life quality 
indicator 
(dependent 
variable) 
Independent variables Regression 
coefficient B 
Standard 
error 
Beta T Error 
probability 
life expectancy Constant 51,057 1,802  28,330 0,000 
 footprint per capita 8,493 1,054 1,623 8,061 0,000 
 footprint per capita^2 -0,609 0,118 -1,041 -5,173 0,000 
 statistical parameters of the equation adj R^2 0.488    
  n = 140,000    
  F = 67,222    
  error p =  .000    
female survival Constant 45,541 3,091  14,735 0,000 
 footprint per capita 14,346 1,810 1,643 7,926 0,000 
 footprint per capita^2 -1,065 0,202 -1,091 -5,263 0,000 
 statistical parameters of the equation adj R^2 0.463    
  n = 139,000    
  F = 60,508    
  error p =  .000    
infant mortality Constant 100,458 6,395  15,709 0,000 
 footprint per capita -31,745 3,752 -1,721 -8,461 0,000 
 footprint per capita^2 2,401 0,418 1,167 5,740 0,000 
 statistical parameters of the equation adj R^2 0.485    
  n = 138,000    
  F = 65,634    
  error p =  .000    
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Our calculations show that inequality, as correctly predicted by R. G. Wilkinson and his 
school of public health research, has a detrimental effect on life expectancy (smart life 
expectancy) and on female survival (smart female survival), but that the effect on smart infant 
mortality reduction does not materialize, once we properly control for the other intervening 
variables. Let us look first at the statistical results of our research: 
 
 
Table 21: explaining the z-standardized residuals from ecological footprint and life 
expectancy (ecologically efficient life expectancy; smart life expectancy) 
 
 
 
 Regression 
coefficient 
B 
Standard 
error 
Beta T Error 
probability 
Constant -1,305 0,521  -2,503 0,014 
Membership in the Islamic 
Conference 
-1,606 0,598 -0,735 -2,686 0,009 
military expenditures per 
GDP 
-0,084 0,039 -0,194 -2,125 0,037 
public education 
expenditure per GNP 
-0,124 0,049 -0,244 -2,554 0,013 
UNDP education index 2,529 0,568 0,483 4,450 0,000 
worker remittance inflows 
as % of GDP 
0,039 0,014 0,263 2,811 0,006 
Muslim population share 
per total population 
0,025 0,007 0,960 3,367 0,001 
quintile share income 
difference between richest 
and poorest 20% 
-0,018 0,010 -0,156 -1,710 0,091 
 
 
adj. R^2 = 0.364; n = 88; F = 8.108; error p = .000 
 
 
Table 22: explaining the z-standardized residuals from ecological footprint and female 
survival rate (ecologically efficient female survival rate, smart female survival) 
 
 
 Regression 
coefficient 
B 
Standard 
error 
Beta T Error 
probability 
Constant -1,289 0,512  -2,519 0,014 
Membership in the Islamic 
Conference 
-1,573 0,587 -0,714 -2,679 0,009 
military expenditures per 
GDP 
-0,075 0,039 -0,174 -1,953 0,054 
public education 
expenditure per GNP 
-0,141 0,048 -0,276 -2,960 0,004 
UNDP education index 2,582 0,558 0,490 4,627 0,000 
worker remittance inflows 
as % of GDP 
0,036 0,014 0,237 2,599 0,011 
Muslim population share 
per total population 
0,026 0,007 0,999 3,596 0,001 
quintile share income -0,022 0,010 -0,187 -2,114 0,038 
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difference between richest 
and poorest 20% 
 
 
adj. R^2 = 0.396; n = 88; F = 9.157; error p = .000 
 
 
Table 23: explaining the z-standardized residuals from ecological footprint and infant 
mortality  
 
 
 Regression 
coefficient 
B 
Standard 
error 
Beta T Error 
probability 
Constant 1,420 0,498  2,851 0,006 
Membership in the Islamic 
Conference 
0,863 0,571 0,444 1,511 0,135 
military expenditures per 
GDP 
0,044 0,038 0,116 1,180 0,241 
public education 
expenditure per GNP 
0,080 0,046 0,177 1,724 0,089 
UNDP education index -2,266 0,543 -0,487 -4,175 0,000 
worker remittance inflows 
as % of GDP 
-0,043 0,013 -0,327 -3,255 0,002 
Muslim population share 
per total population 
-0,012 0,007 -0,506 -1,653 0,102 
quintile share income 
difference between richest 
and poorest 20% 
0,004 0,010 0,036 0,369 0,713 
 
 
adj. R^2 = 0.267; n = 88; F = 5.522; error p = .000 
 
 
The significant negative results of inequality on the female survival rate (ecologically 
efficient female survival rate, smart female survival, beta weight -0,187) and on life 
expectancy (ecologically efficient life expectancy; smart life expectancy, beta weight -0,156) 
have to be re-iterated. However, we must also observe that Membership in the Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation has a significant negative effect on life expectancy (ecologically 
efficient life expectancy; smart life expectancy) and on the female survival rate (ecologically 
efficient female survival rate, smart female survival). This results reflects the existing 
deficiencies of ‘real existing’ Muslim countries in the world today, while Muslim societies as 
such (share of Muslim population per total population) have a significant and positive 
effect on life expectancy (ecologically efficient life expectancy; smart life expectancy) and on 
the female survival rate (ecologically efficient female survival rate, smart female survival).  
 
The effects of public education expenditure rates again confirm their crowding-out effects 
on life quality, already described in this work (beta weights): 
 
 
female survival rate (ecologically efficient female survival rate, smart female 
survival) 
-0,276 
life expectancy (ecologically efficient life expectancy; smart life expectancy) -0,244 
infant mortality considering ecological footprint 0,177 
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Similar crowding-out effects are to be observed for military expenditures per GDP: 
 
 
life expectancy (ecologically efficient life expectancy; smart life expectancy) -0,194 
female survival rate (ecologically efficient female survival rate, smart female 
survival) 
-0,174 
 
 
The UNDP education index, as to be expected from the other results of this work, has the 
following very beneficial significant beta-weights on our smart development indicators: 
 
 
life expectancy (ecologically efficient life expectancy; smart life expectancy) 0,483 
female survival rate (ecologically efficient female survival rate, smart female 
survival) 
0,490 
infant mortality considering ecological footprint -0,487 
 
 
Last, but not least, the effects of worker remittances per GDP are the following: 
 
 
infant mortality considering ecological footprint -0,327 
life expectancy (ecologically efficient life expectancy; smart life expectancy) 0,263 
female survival rate (ecologically efficient female survival rate, smart female 
survival) 
0,237 
 
 
Thus, the Wilkinson research agenda finds its proper place also in debates about ‘smart 
development’, but certainly, the weight of other variables, such as  
 
 Membership in the Islamic Conference 
 military expenditures per GDP 
 Muslim population share per total population 
 public education expenditure per GNP 
 UNDP education index 
 worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
 
also has to be properly taken into account. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 
Since all existing major comparative empirical studies on drivers and bottlenecks of 
environmental quality only touched upon different dependent variables, and not the smart 
development, this our first international comparative study seems to suggest cautiously that 
future research efforts in comparative environmental science would be well advised to take 
the major predictor variables of the present study as well as the environmental plateau curve 
into account (see also Weede and Kampf, 2002; de Haan, Lundstrom and Sturm, 2006; and 
Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe, 1999).  
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It emerges that the absence of ‘rent seeking’, economic freedom and a free price mechanism, 
and worker remittances are the most important drivers of ‘smart development’. Most of the 
‘small is beautiful’ assumptions of Schumacherian economics by contrast do not stand the 
test of cross-national development accounting and are squarely contradicted by our 
empirical results; with population density and population size always being among the 
drivers, and not the bottlenecks of ‘smart development’.  
 
As correctly predicted by Samir Amin, the big countries with huge population resources 
today are favoured in their smart economic growth, their Happy Life Years, and their smart 
human development. As correctly expected by Amin, peripheral rent seeking is a burden and 
its absence, measured by economic freedom, is an asset among the forces, shaping 
international development today, especially for smart democracy, and the overall smart 
development index (both formulations, used in this essay). In addition, Amin correctly 
stressed the necessity for European integration – and the positive effects of years of EU 
membership on smart democracy confirm is Euro-optimism. He correctly analysed the 
enormous transfer of resources from the centre to the periphery, brought about by migration, 
with the huge statistical observed effects of received worker remittances on smart human 
development, Happy Life Years, smart gender justice, smart R&D, and both formulations of 
the smart development index justifying his assumption. Amin’s dependency theory correctly 
predicted the very negative effects of world economic openness on smart development. 
The huge statistical negative and very uniform effects, to be observed, cannot be simply easily 
rejected out of hand: smart R&D, and overall smart development (both formulations) are 
affected negatively by world economic openness. Among the major four founding figures of 
the ‘world systems approach’ (Amin, Arrighi, Frank and Wallerstein, 1982) he is the only one 
to have come up, in addition, with a consistent and far-reaching critique of Islamism, 
confirmed by the very negative trade-off between Muslim population share and smart gender 
empowerment.  
 
We could also show in this book the importance of Feminism, the Kalecki/Steindl paradigm, 
the multinational corporation headquarter status, population density, population dynamics, 
Muslim population share per total population, absolute latitude, and migration on ‘smart 
development’. We also investigated the negative effects of public education expenditures on 
public education expenditures per GDP on smart development.  
 
We are aware that our answers, raised to the questions in this book, are incomplete. But we 
hope to have provided at least some preliminary guiding posts for further research on this 
important subject.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix Table 1: The dependent variables 
 
democracy 1 Combined Failed States Index 
democracy 2 Civil and Political Liberties violations 
democracy 3 Corruption avoidance measure 
democracy 4 Democracy measure 
democracy 5 Global tolerance index 
democracy 6 Rule of law 
economic growth 7 Crisis Performance Factor 
economic growth 8 economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2009 
economic growth 9 economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2010 
economic growth 10 economic growth in real terms pc. per annum, 1990-2005 
gender 11 closing economic gender gap 
gender 12 closing educational gender gap 
gender 13 closing health and survivial gender gap 
gender 14 closing of global gender gap overall score 2009 
gender 15 closing political gender gap 
gender 16 gender empowerment index value 
human development 17 Infant mortality 2005 
human development 18 female survival probability of surviving to age 65 female 
human development 19 Human development index (HDI) value 
2004 
human development 20 Life Expectancy (years) 
human development 21 Life Satisfaction (0-10) 
R&D 22 Country share in top world 500 Universities 
R&D 23 per capita world class universities 
R&D 24 tertiary enrollment 
social cohesion 25 quintile share income difference between richest and poorest 
20% 
social cohesion 26 unemployment rate 
nonparametric_26 
equal weights 
27 overall 26 development index 
nonparametric, 
weighting each 
dimension equally 
28 overall 26 development index, based on six dimensions 
 29 component UNDP-type index for overall democracy-
performance 
 30 component UNDP-type index for overall economic growth-
performance 
 31 component UNDP-type index for overall gender-
performance 
 32 component UNDP-type index for overall human 
development-performance 
 33 component UNDP-type index for overall R&D-performance 
 34 component UNDP-type index for overall social cohesion-
performance 
 35 % women in government, all levels 
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 36 % world population 
 37 2000 Economic Freedom Score 
 38 Absolute latitude 
 39 Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
 40 comparative price levels (US=1.00) 
 41 foreign savings rate 
 42 FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of total 
population 
 43 ln GDP per capita 
 44 ln GDP per capita ^2 
 45 Membership in the Islamic Conference 
 46 military expenditures per GDP 
 47 military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) 
 48 MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 
 49 MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP 
 50 MNC PEN: DYN MNC PEN 1995-2005 
 51 Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per GDP + import-
share per GDP) 
 52 population density 
 53 public education expenditure per GNP 
 54 UNDP education index 
 55 worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
 56 Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) 
 57 Muslim population share per total population 
 58 net international migration rate, 2005-2010 
 59 Years of membership in the EU, 2010 
 60 years of membership in EMU, 2010 
 61 social security expenditure per GDP average 1990s (ILO) 
 62 ecological footprint (g ha /cap) 
 63 ecological footprint (g ha /cap)^2 
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Appendix Table 2: Global smart development 
 
 z_res_overal
l 26 
development 
index 
z_res_overal
l 26 
development 
index, based 
on six 
dimensions 
z_res_comp
onent UNDP 
democracy 
z_res_comp
onent UNDP 
economic 
growth 
z_res_comp
onent UNDP 
gender 
z_res_comp
onent UNDP 
human 
development 
z_res_comp
onent UNDP 
R&D 
z_res_comp
onent UNDP 
social 
cohesion 
Sudan -2,512 -3,117 -2,788 1,650  -1,516 -0,941  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-2,381 -2,858 -1,304 -1,251  -0,270 -1,536 -3,805 
Kuwait -1,887 -2,552 -2,290 0,693 -1,717 -0,328 -2,514  
Djibouti -0,705 -2,500 0,185 0,478  -0,853 -0,437 -5,940 
Namibia -1,185 -2,428 -0,260 0,362 -0,013 -2,457 -1,797 -4,061 
Central 
African 
Republic, 
-2,214 -2,410 -0,565 -0,190  -2,382 -0,480 -2,692 
Macedonia -1,396 -1,853 -1,499 0,047 -0,839 -0,760 -1,529 -2,020 
Togo -0,979 -1,830 0,075 -1,201  -0,423 0,255  
Congo 
(Democratic 
Republic of 
the) 
-0,850 -1,756 -0,657 1,822  -1,249 0,315  
Lebanon -1,299 -1,731 -1,842 1,470  -0,339 0,015  
United Arab 
Emirates 
-1,970 -1,725 -2,260 0,211 -2,158 -0,003 -2,816 -0,310 
Botswana -1,075 -1,684 0,524 2,091 -0,787 -3,052 -1,789 -2,127 
Sierra Leone -1,400 -1,617 0,271 0,007  -2,032 0,241 -2,645 
Angola -0,669 -1,543 -0,511 0,053 0,423 -1,811 0,057  
Congo  -0,481 -1,488 0,125 -0,376  -0,242 0,380  
Zimbabwe -1,750 -1,264 -1,035 -2,819 -0,314 -1,956 -0,004 0,268 
Niger -1,888 -1,257 -0,500 0,306  -2,104 -0,537 -0,029 
Chad -1,827 -1,084 -1,350 0,144 -1,876 -1,749 -0,614 1,071 
Estonia -1,303 -0,972 -0,788 -0,956 -0,319 -1,091 -0,850 0,258 
Turkey -1,134 -0,946 -0,744 -0,902 -2,091 0,100 -0,729 -0,004 
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Iran -1,021 -0,934 -1,376 1,002 -1,785 -0,012 -1,341 -0,111 
Hong Kong, 
China 
(SAR) 
-1,528 -0,921 -1,728 0,077  -0,106 -0,400 0,236 
Kazakhstan -1,327 -0,882 -2,334 0,008 0,365 -0,797 -0,614 0,384 
Paraguay -0,519 -0,849 -1,164 0,016 0,195 -0,014 -1,339 -0,894 
Burkina 
Faso 
-1,312 -0,817 -0,556 0,784 -1,033 -2,120 -0,850 0,800 
Mauritania -0,643 -0,758 -0,737 0,513 -0,557 -0,733 -0,663 -0,782 
Saudi 
Arabia 
-1,064 -0,701 -1,522 -0,096 -2,211 0,718 -0,443 0,271 
Cameroon -1,097 -0,699 -1,098 -0,343 -0,571 -1,220 -0,095 0,221 
Russia -1,324 -0,681 -1,631 -1,070 -0,230 -0,645 0,546 0,399 
Haiti -0,765 -0,632 -0,423 -1,672  0,349 0,388 -0,970 
Burundi -1,598 -0,624 -0,360 -0,660  -1,480 0,142 0,738 
Nigeria -1,092 -0,610 -0,907 -0,198 -0,341 -1,463 -0,181 0,430 
Uruguay -0,508 -0,591 -0,227 1,197 -0,628 -0,574 -1,420 -0,176 
Mali -0,687 -0,559 0,751 0,724 -1,239 -1,889 -0,508 -0,127 
Guinea -1,292 -0,557 -0,553 0,120  -1,047 -0,243 0,603 
Belarus -1,445 -0,537 -2,546 -0,141 0,419 -0,489 0,097 0,960 
Greece -0,612 -0,494 -0,430 0,604 -0,904 -0,273 -0,834 0,113 
Syria -0,427 -0,494 -1,629 0,454 -0,790 0,798 -0,705 -0,384 
Czech 
Republic 
-0,564 -0,485 -0,195 0,019 -0,643 -0,337 -1,381 0,602 
Malta -0,404 -0,401 -0,643 0,267 -0,868 0,470 -1,227 0,234 
Singapore -0,643 -0,401 -0,722 -1,257 -1,033 0,386 0,131 0,399 
Luxembourg -0,010 -0,394 0,308 -0,634 0,016 0,713 -2,801 -0,709 
Yemen -0,705 -0,356 -0,401 0,943 -2,996 0,145 0,038 0,020 
Mexico -0,288 -0,297 -0,358 -0,468 -0,564 0,407 -0,983 0,322 
Korea 
(Republic 
of) 
-0,390 -0,293 -0,157 0,164 -1,589 0,376 -1,217 0,833 
Azerbaijan -0,923 -0,260 -1,699 2,893 -1,237 -0,152 -0,129 -0,057 
Venezuela -0,302 -0,240 -0,720 -1,194 0,023 0,484 -0,349 0,155 
Ukraine -0,571 -0,213 -0,542 -2,114 -0,004 0,043 0,314 0,579 
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Bolivia 0,200 -0,201 0,273 0,332 -0,293 0,037 0,431 -1,748 
Ethiopia -0,626 -0,198 -0,120 1,498 -0,950 -1,593 -0,297 0,701 
Cyprus -0,122 -0,191 0,314 1,022 -1,037 0,214 -1,654 0,345 
Egypt -0,294 -0,158 -0,946 0,463 -1,556 1,053 -0,609 0,174 
Mongolia -0,051 -0,150 0,373 1,579 0,022 -1,043 -0,594 -0,337 
Myanmar -0,799 -0,150 -1,636 1,165  0,274 0,305 0,228 
Rwanda -1,105 -0,129 -0,270 0,548  -1,277 0,202 1,012 
Zambia -0,226 -0,110 0,731 -0,100 -0,162 -1,545 0,254 -0,228 
Algeria -0,151 -0,098 -0,941 0,245 -0,643 0,840 -0,028 -0,461 
Albania 0,172 -0,074 -0,216 0,404 -0,661 0,870 -0,465 -0,724 
Belize 0,466 -0,052 0,301 0,296 -0,222 0,732 -1,286 -0,543 
Guyana 0,372 -0,033 0,100 1,092 0,854 -0,297 -0,967 -0,707 
South Africa 0,682 -0,013 1,216 -0,472 2,001 -1,156 -0,086 -1,625 
Kenya -0,287 -0,009 -0,220 -0,158 0,245 -0,966 0,006 0,473 
Romania -0,091 0,009 0,012 -1,035 -0,143 0,274 -0,436 0,607 
Croatia 0,105 0,050 -0,057 -0,553 0,128 0,480 -0,614 0,279 
Ecuador 0,597 0,055 -0,065 -0,886 0,833 0,874 -1,027 -0,363 
Latvia -0,218 0,069 0,132 -2,330 0,740 -0,094 0,585 0,464 
Brazil 0,547 0,076 0,432 -0,351 -0,061 0,783 -0,342 -0,860 
Portugal 0,183 0,135 0,926 -0,428 -0,197 -0,088 -0,175 0,162 
Pakistan -0,224 0,146 0,154 -0,359 -2,079 0,567 0,118 0,669 
Italy -0,010 0,183 0,262 -0,481 -0,658 0,173 0,714 0,392 
Uganda -0,127 0,204 -0,740 1,444 1,261 -1,262 -0,261 0,598 
Malaysia 0,099 0,205 0,031 -0,596 -0,679 0,853 -0,088 0,365 
Laos -0,435 0,209 -1,066 0,788  0,519 -0,091 0,939 
Armenia 0,034 0,216 0,095 -1,643 -0,964 1,129 0,362 0,253 
Lithuania 0,059 0,224 0,564 -2,577 0,517 0,229 0,343 0,670 
Slovakia 0,332 0,226 0,432 0,161 -0,037 0,312 -0,587 0,247 
Spain 0,204 0,240 0,323 0,058 0,226 0,029 0,130 0,143 
Iceland 0,389 0,248 0,837 -1,138 1,598 0,024 -1,379 0,392 
Uzbekistan 0,046 0,310 -1,931 1,830 0,796 0,315 -0,727 1,055 
Tanzania 0,222 0,311 0,508 0,890 0,606 -1,455 -0,153 0,592 
Colombia 0,880 0,347 0,058 -0,755 0,612 1,404 0,198 -1,137 
Poland 0,233 0,349 0,255 0,733 -0,040 0,058 0,236 0,191 
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Benin 0,010 0,351 1,383 -0,079 -1,054 -0,921 0,081 0,896 
Ireland 0,417 0,381 0,618 -0,794 0,489 -0,044 0,564 0,333 
Japan 0,104 0,384 0,889 -0,609 -0,705 0,193 0,462 0,744 
Panama 0,765 0,396 0,492 1,456 0,194 0,555 -0,346 -0,720 
Cambodia 0,228 0,398 0,045 -0,337 0,067 -0,117 0,109 0,752 
Slovenia 0,174 0,410 0,606 0,430 -0,392 0,138 -0,018 0,671 
Hungary 0,280 0,410 0,986 -0,467 -0,172 0,015 0,137 0,575 
Bulgaria 0,375 0,422 0,376 -0,981 0,498 0,398 0,201 0,397 
Jordan 0,232 0,425 -0,467 0,519 -0,558 1,033 0,474 -0,023 
Ghana 0,559 0,437 1,006 0,865 0,285 -0,560 -0,342 0,033 
Guatemala 0,694 0,471 0,392 -0,538 -0,123 1,204 -0,154 -0,171 
Tunisia 0,584 0,497 -0,027 0,798 -0,555 1,143 0,156 -0,249 
Israel 0,218 0,528 -0,155 0,204 -0,416 0,135 2,179 0,211 
Senegal 0,476 0,537 1,064 0,113 0,099 -0,378 -0,219 0,581 
Honduras 0,847 0,577 0,376 -0,359 0,604 0,866 -0,128 -0,040 
Madagascar 0,638 0,595 1,378 -1,269 1,024 -0,445 -0,038 0,412 
Georgia 0,433 0,602 0,207 -0,708 -0,702 1,162 1,240 -0,226 
Nicaragua 0,728 0,611 0,338 -0,396 0,850 0,756 -0,471 0,433 
China 0,438 0,626 -1,255 3,239 -0,380 0,893 -0,093 0,391 
Morocco 0,581 0,632 0,119 0,450 -0,688 1,164 0,238 0,093 
Nepal 0,689 0,649 0,922 -0,174 -0,539 0,583 0,344 0,026 
France 0,650 0,662 0,812 0,060 0,492 0,132 0,711 0,271 
El Salvador 1,137 0,681 0,834 -0,908 0,751 1,180 0,108 -0,531 
Canada 0,610 0,682 0,682 0,632 0,179 -0,066 1,140 0,109 
Australia 0,598 0,698 0,542 0,689 0,276 0,025 1,080 0,013 
Belgium 0,692 0,730 0,793 -0,063 0,369 0,119 1,217 0,293 
Mozambiqu
e 
0,591 0,737 0,934 0,580 1,791 -1,545 0,032 0,732 
Argentina 0,998 0,764 0,509 -0,684 1,020 1,084 0,743 -0,462 
Denmark 0,792 0,821 0,865 0,059 0,736 -0,085 1,162 0,135 
Malawi 0,932 0,848 1,309 0,696 0,773 -0,646 0,448 -0,080 
Chile 1,240 0,866 1,678 0,826 -0,038 0,697 0,062 -0,295 
Bhutan 0,608 0,879 0,295 1,677  0,619 -0,037 0,710 
Thailand 0,732 0,879 0,894 -0,825 0,348 0,670 0,406 0,831 
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United 
Kingdom 
0,777 0,881 0,918 -0,120 0,361 -0,017 1,832 0,364 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1,385 0,943 1,122 0,241 1,232 0,750 -0,729 0,304 
Austria 0,835 0,982 1,041 0,053 0,151 0,242 1,441 0,669 
Tajikistan 0,749 0,988 -0,185 -1,399 1,076 1,110 0,769 0,839 
Cuba 0,940 0,990 -1,333 0,374 1,230 1,707 0,256 0,910 
Germany 1,164 1,009 1,357 -0,981 0,883 0,385 1,387 0,338 
Dominican 
Republic 
1,560 1,014 1,149 -0,228 1,015 1,488 0,429 -1,009 
Moldova 1,020 1,030 0,781 -2,607 1,223 1,211 0,843 0,630 
Kyrgyzstan 0,639 1,058 -0,330 -0,930 1,586 0,789 1,482 0,436 
Bangladesh 0,867 1,076 0,518 0,562 -0,344 0,846 0,598 0,711 
India 0,976 1,082 1,581 0,962 -1,535 0,754 0,501 0,635 
Indonesia 1,047 1,102 0,183 -0,154 0,594 1,480 0,569 0,293 
Peru 1,426 1,135 0,885 0,713 0,756 1,105 0,595 -0,383 
Vietnam 0,931 1,137 -0,595 0,853 0,678 1,650 0,100 0,830 
Switzerland 1,236 1,156 1,309 -0,241 0,636 0,288 1,606 0,595 
New 
Zealand 
1,037 1,158 0,681 0,509 1,070 -0,114 2,343 0,052 
United 
States 
1,069 1,294 0,516 -0,123 0,583 0,281 3,722 -0,595 
Norway 1,264 1,356 0,706 0,658 1,884 0,001 1,613 0,570 
Netherlands 1,409 1,369 1,748 -0,627 0,837 0,439 1,688 0,680 
Costa Rica 1,949 1,377 1,930 -0,075 1,024 1,670 -0,460 0,084 
Jamaica 1,687 1,401 1,703 -2,057 1,210 1,780 0,516 0,191 
Finland 1,544 1,509 1,364 -0,531 1,911 0,196 2,312 0,433 
Sri Lanka 2,083 1,709 1,261 0,095 1,474 1,699 0,127 0,549 
Sweden 1,817 1,838 1,616 -0,120 1,656 0,273 3,077 0,519 
Philippines 2,452 1,871 1,324 -1,188 2,119 1,745 1,295 0,239 
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Appendix Table 3: Partial correlations of smart development – development level constant. Results ordered by dependent variable 
 
 
dependent variable variable partial 
correlation 
Significance Degrees of 
freedom 
ecological footprint per capita net international migration rate, 2005-2010 0,573 0,000 133 
ecological footprint per capita population density -0,302 0,000 133 
ecological footprint per capita Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) 0,463 0,000 133 
ecological footprint per capita military expenditures per GDP 0,321 0,001 111 
ecological footprint per capita comparative price levels (US=1.00) 0,203 0,019 131 
ecological footprint per capita years of membership in EMU, 2010 -0,188 0,029 133 
Smart anti-corruption 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,254 0,003 131 
Smart anti-corruption population density 0,240 0,005 133 
Smart anti-corruption UNDP education index -0,235 0,006 133 
Smart anti-corruption MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 0,245 0,011 104 
Smart anti-corruption MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP 0,187 0,030 133 
Smart anti-corruption military expenditures per GDP -0,187 0,048 111 
Smart avoiding high income differences Absolute latitude 0,290 0,002 106 
Smart avoiding high income differences 2000 Economic Freedom Score -0,294 0,002 111 
Smart avoiding high income differences social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,305 0,004 85 
Smart avoiding high income differences Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,245 0,009 112 
Smart avoiding high income differences % women in government, all levels -0,214 0,023 111 
Smart avoiding high income differences MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP -0,203 0,029 113 
Smart avoiding high income differences Muslim population share per total 
population 
0,200 0,033 111 
Smart avoiding Infant mortality worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,389 0,000 116 
Smart avoiding Infant mortality UNDP education index 0,387 0,000 133 
Smart avoiding Infant mortality Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,179 0,037 133 
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Smart avoiding to be a failed state military expenditures per GDP -0,396 0,000 111 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,323 0,000 133 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,290 0,001 132 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,246 0,004 132 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state % women in government, all levels 0,244 0,004 132 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,242 0,005 132 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,234 0,006 133 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP 0,200 0,020 133 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,193 0,026 131 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 0,194 0,046 104 
Smart avoiding unemployment Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,299 0,001 118 
Smart avoiding unemployment foreign savings rate -0,204 0,025 118 
Smart avoiding unemployment military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,201 0,028 118 
Smart avoiding unemployment public education expenditure per GNP -0,204 0,029 113 
Smart civil and political liberties Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,386 0,000 132 
Smart civil and political liberties Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,405 0,000 131 
Smart civil and political liberties military expenditures per GDP -0,387 0,000 111 
Smart civil and political liberties military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,479 0,000 131 
Smart civil and political liberties Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,380 0,000 132 
Smart civil and political liberties 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,380 0,000 130 
Smart civil and political liberties % women in government, all levels 0,447 0,000 131 
Smart civil and political liberties net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,263 0,002 132 
Smart civil and political liberties Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,242 0,005 131 
Smart closing economic gender gap Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,415 0,000 117 
Smart closing economic gender gap Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,529 0,000 115 
 90 
Smart closing economic gender gap Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,442 0,000 116 
Smart closing economic gender gap military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,316 0,000 117 
Smart closing economic gender gap % women in government, all levels 0,408 0,000 116 
Smart closing economic gender gap UNDP education index 0,446 0,000 117 
Smart closing economic gender gap social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,273 0,008 90 
Smart closing economic gender gap MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 0,225 0,025 97 
Smart closing economic gender gap military expenditures per GDP -0,213 0,030 102 
Smart closing economic gender gap net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,197 0,031 117 
Smart closing economic gender gap public education expenditure per GNP 0,184 0,048 114 
Smart closing educational gender gap Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,336 0,000 117 
Smart closing educational gender gap UNDP education index 0,679 0,000 117 
Smart closing educational gender gap worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,306 0,001 105 
Smart closing educational gender gap Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,270 0,003 115 
Smart closing health and survivial gender gap % world population -0,370 0,000 117 
Smart closing health and survivial gender gap population density -0,250 0,006 117 
Smart closing health and survivial gender gap % women in government, all levels 0,214 0,020 116 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,449 0,000 117 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,515 0,000 115 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,354 0,000 116 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,363 0,000 117 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
% women in government, all levels 0,416 0,000 116 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
UNDP education index 0,481 0,000 117 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
military expenditures per GDP -0,333 0,001 102 
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Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,338 0,001 90 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,254 0,005 117 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
public education expenditure per GNP 0,209 0,024 114 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,200 0,029 117 
Smart closing political gender gap military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,329 0,000 117 
Smart closing political gender gap military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,329 0,000 117 
Smart closing political gender gap social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,344 0,001 90 
Smart closing political gender gap Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,307 0,001 117 
Smart closing political gender gap % women in government, all levels 0,298 0,001 116 
Smart closing political gender gap social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,344 0,001 90 
Smart closing political gender gap Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,307 0,001 117 
Smart closing political gender gap % women in government, all levels 0,298 0,001 116 
Smart closing political gender gap military expenditures per GDP -0,291 0,003 102 
Smart closing political gender gap military expenditures per GDP -0,291 0,003 102 
Smart closing political gender gap Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,264 0,004 115 
Smart closing political gender gap Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,264 0,004 115 
Smart closing political gender gap Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,213 0,020 117 
Smart closing political gender gap Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,213 0,020 117 
Smart democracy measure Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,450 0,000 127 
Smart democracy measure Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,452 0,000 127 
Smart democracy measure military expenditures per GDP -0,362 0,000 106 
Smart democracy measure military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,395 0,000 126 
Smart democracy measure Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,388 0,000 127 
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Smart democracy measure 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,361 0,000 125 
Smart democracy measure % women in government, all levels 0,400 0,000 126 
Smart democracy measure net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,289 0,001 127 
Smart democracy measure Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,257 0,003 126 
Smart democracy measure Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per 
GDP + import-share per GDP) 
-0,197 0,026 125 
Smart economic growth IMF  2010 worker remittance inflows as % of GDP -0,272 0,003 115 
Smart economic growth IMF  2010 Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
0,233 0,007 129 
Smart economic growth IMF  2010 Muslim population share per total 
population 
0,180 0,040 129 
Smart economic growth IMF  2010 net international migration rate, 2005-2010 0,178 0,041 131 
Smart economic growth in real terms pc. per 
annum, 1990-2005 
% world population 0,311 0,000 131 
Smart economic growth in real terms pc. per 
annum, 1990-2005 
public education expenditure per GNP -0,305 0,001 122 
Smart economic growth in real terms pc. per 
annum, 1990-2005 
social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
-0,291 0,004 94 
Smart economic growth in real terms pc. per 
annum, 1990-2005 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP -0,231 0,013 114 
Smart economic growth in real terms pc. per 
annum, 1990-2005 
MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP 0,179 0,039 131 
Smart female survival probability of surviving 
to age 65 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,401 0,000 116 
Smart female survival probability of surviving 
to age 65 
public education expenditure per GNP -0,271 0,002 124 
Smart female survival probability of surviving 
to age 65 
MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP -0,173 0,044 133 
Smart female survival probability of surviving 
to age 65 
Muslim population share per total 
population 
0,174 0,046 131 
Smart gender empowerment Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,493 0,000 71 
Smart gender empowerment Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,490 0,000 69 
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Smart gender empowerment military expenditures per GDP -0,501 0,000 61 
Smart gender empowerment military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,520 0,000 71 
Smart gender empowerment % women in government, all levels 0,427 0,000 69 
Smart gender empowerment Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,344 0,003 70 
Smart gender empowerment Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,327 0,005 71 
Smart gender empowerment social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,349 0,006 58 
Smart gender empowerment UNDP education index 0,279 0,017 71 
Smart global tolerance social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,502 0,000 52 
Smart global tolerance military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,495 0,000 66 
Smart global tolerance Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,329 0,006 66 
Smart global tolerance Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,319 0,008 66 
Smart global tolerance MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 0,302 0,021 56 
Smart global tolerance public education expenditure per GNP 0,256 0,036 65 
Smart happy life years worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,333 0,000 116 
Smart happy life years military expenditures per GDP -0,204 0,030 111 
Smart Human development index worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,409 0,000 116 
Smart Human development index UNDP education index 0,504 0,000 133 
Smart Human development index Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,214 0,013 132 
Smart Human development index net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,188 0,029 133 
Smart Human development index Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,178 0,039 133 
Smart life expectancy (years) worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,411 0,000 116 
Smart life expectancy (years) public education expenditure per GNP -0,236 0,008 124 
Smart life expectancy (years) UNDP education index 0,198 0,021 133 
Smart life satisfaction worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,281 0,002 116 
Smart life satisfaction military expenditures per GDP -0,196 0,038 111 
smart overall development index Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,346 0,000 133 
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smart overall development index Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,326 0,000 132 
smart overall development index military expenditures per GDP -0,389 0,000 111 
smart overall development index Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,336 0,000 133 
smart overall development index military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,284 0,001 132 
smart overall development index UNDP education index 0,276 0,001 133 
smart overall development index % women in government, all levels 0,268 0,002 132 
smart overall development index Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,256 0,003 132 
smart overall development index worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,244 0,008 116 
smart overall development index net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,215 0,012 133 
smart overall development index 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,200 0,021 131 
Smart per capita world class universities social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,351 0,000 96 
Smart per capita world class universities MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 0,359 0,000 104 
Smart per capita world class universities Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per 
GDP + import-share per GDP) 
-0,234 0,007 131 
Smart per capita world class universities FPZ (free production zones) employment as 
% of total population 
-0,200 0,020 133 
Smart per capita world class universities public education expenditure per GNP 0,202 0,024 124 
Smart per capita world class universities % women in government, all levels 0,187 0,030 132 
Smart rule of law 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,325 0,000 131 
Smart tertiary enrollment Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,439 0,000 119 
Smart tertiary enrollment social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,379 0,000 90 
Smart tertiary enrollment Absolute latitude 0,385 0,000 114 
Smart tertiary enrollment UNDP education index 0,439 0,000 120 
Smart tertiary enrollment net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,221 0,014 120 
Smart tertiary enrollment worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,235 0,015 106 
Smart tertiary enrollment military expenditures per GDP -0,203 0,037 104 
Smart tertiary enrollment Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per -0,190 0,037 118 
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GDP + import-share per GDP) 
Smart tertiary enrollment Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,188 0,038 120 
Smart tertiary enrollment FPZ (free production zones) employment as 
% of total population 
-0,182 0,045 120 
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Appendix Table 4: Partial correlations of smart development – development level constant. Results ordered by independent variable 
 
 
dependent variable variable partial 
correlation 
Significance Degrees of 
freedom 
Smart civil and political liberties % women in government, all levels 0,447 0,000 131 
Smart closing economic gender gap % women in government, all levels 0,408 0,000 116 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
% women in government, all levels 0,416 0,000 116 
Smart democracy measure % women in government, all levels 0,400 0,000 126 
Smart gender empowerment % women in government, all levels 0,427 0,000 69 
Smart closing political gender gap % women in government, all levels 0,298 0,001 116 
smart overall development index % women in government, all levels 0,268 0,002 132 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state % women in government, all levels 0,244 0,004 132 
Smart closing health and survivial gender gap % women in government, all levels 0,214 0,020 116 
Smart avoiding high income differences % women in government, all levels -0,214 0,023 111 
Smart per capita world class universities % women in government, all levels 0,187 0,030 132 
Smart closing health and survivial gender gap % world population -0,370 0,000 117 
Smart economic growth in real terms pc. per 
annum, 1990-2005 
% world population 0,311 0,000 131 
Smart civil and political liberties 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,380 0,000 130 
Smart democracy measure 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,361 0,000 125 
Smart rule of law 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,325 0,000 131 
Smart avoiding high income differences 2000 Economic Freedom Score -0,294 0,002 111 
Smart anti-corruption 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,254 0,003 131 
smart overall development index 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,200 0,021 131 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state 2000 Economic Freedom Score 0,193 0,026 131 
Smart tertiary enrollment Absolute latitude 0,385 0,000 114 
Smart avoiding high income differences Absolute latitude 0,290 0,002 106 
Smart closing economic gender gap Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 -0,442 0,000 116 
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(%) 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,354 0,000 116 
Smart tertiary enrollment Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,439 0,000 119 
Smart democracy measure Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,257 0,003 126 
Smart gender empowerment Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,344 0,003 70 
smart overall development index Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,256 0,003 132 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,242 0,005 132 
Smart civil and political liberties Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,242 0,005 131 
Smart economic growth IMF  2010 Annual population growth rate, 1975-
2005 (%) 
0,233 0,007 129 
Smart avoiding high income differences Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,245 0,009 112 
Smart Human development index Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0,214 0,013 132 
ecological footprint per capita comparative price levels (US=1.00) 0,203 0,019 131 
Smart avoiding unemployment foreign savings rate -0,204 0,025 118 
Smart per capita world class universities FPZ (free production zones) employment as 
% of total population 
-0,200 0,020 133 
Smart tertiary enrollment FPZ (free production zones) employment as 
% of total population 
-0,182 0,045 120 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,323 0,000 133 
Smart civil and political liberties Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,380 0,000 132 
Smart democracy measure Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,388 0,000 127 
smart overall development index Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,336 0,000 133 
ecological footprint per capita Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) 0,463 0,000 133 
Smart closing political gender gap Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,307 0,001 117 
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Smart closing political gender gap Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,307 0,001 117 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,254 0,005 117 
Smart gender empowerment Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0,327 0,005 71 
Smart civil and political liberties Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,386 0,000 132 
Smart closing economic gender gap Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,415 0,000 117 
Smart closing educational gender gap Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,336 0,000 117 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,449 0,000 117 
Smart democracy measure Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,450 0,000 127 
Smart gender empowerment Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,493 0,000 71 
smart overall development index Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,346 0,000 133 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,234 0,006 133 
Smart global tolerance Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,319 0,008 66 
Smart closing political gender gap Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,213 0,020 117 
Smart closing political gender gap Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,213 0,020 117 
Smart avoiding Infant mortality Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,179 0,037 133 
Smart tertiary enrollment Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,188 0,038 120 
Smart Human development index Membership in the Islamic Conference -0,178 0,039 133 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state military expenditures per GDP -0,396 0,000 111 
Smart civil and political liberties military expenditures per GDP -0,387 0,000 111 
Smart democracy measure military expenditures per GDP -0,362 0,000 106 
Smart gender empowerment military expenditures per GDP -0,501 0,000 61 
smart overall development index military expenditures per GDP -0,389 0,000 111 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
military expenditures per GDP -0,333 0,001 102 
ecological footprint per capita military expenditures per GDP 0,321 0,001 111 
Smart closing political gender gap military expenditures per GDP -0,291 0,003 102 
Smart closing economic gender gap military expenditures per GDP -0,213 0,030 102 
Smart happy life years military expenditures per GDP -0,204 0,030 111 
Smart tertiary enrollment military expenditures per GDP -0,203 0,037 104 
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Smart life satisfaction military expenditures per GDP -0,196 0,038 111 
Smart anti-corruption military expenditures per GDP -0,187 0,048 111 
Smart civil and political liberties military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,479 0,000 131 
Smart closing economic gender gap military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,316 0,000 117 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,363 0,000 117 
Smart closing political gender gap military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,329 0,000 117 
Smart closing political gender gap military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,329 0,000 117 
Smart democracy measure military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,395 0,000 126 
Smart gender empowerment military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,520 0,000 71 
Smart global tolerance military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,495 0,000 66 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,290 0,001 132 
smart overall development index military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,284 0,001 132 
Smart avoiding unemployment military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -0,201 0,028 118 
Smart per capita world class universities MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 0,359 0,000 104 
Smart anti-corruption MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 0,245 0,011 104 
Smart global tolerance MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 0,302 0,021 56 
Smart closing economic gender gap MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 0,225 0,025 97 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 0,194 0,046 104 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per 
GDP 
0,200 0,020 133 
Smart avoiding high income differences MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP -0,203 0,029 113 
Smart anti-corruption MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per 
GDP 
0,187 0,030 133 
Smart economic growth in real terms pc. 
per annum, 1990-2005 
MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per 
GDP 
0,179 0,039 131 
Smart female survival probability of surviving 
to age 65 
MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP -0,173 0,044 133 
Smart civil and political liberties Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,405 0,000 131 
Smart closing economic gender gap Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,529 0,000 115 
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Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,515 0,000 115 
Smart democracy measure Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,452 0,000 127 
Smart gender empowerment Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,490 0,000 69 
smart overall development index Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,326 0,000 132 
Smart avoiding unemployment Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,299 0,001 118 
Smart closing educational gender gap Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,270 0,003 115 
Smart avoiding to be a failed state Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,246 0,004 132 
Smart closing political gender gap Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,264 0,004 115 
Smart closing political gender gap Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,264 0,004 115 
Smart global tolerance Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,329 0,006 66 
Smart avoiding high income differences Muslim population share per total 
population 
0,200 0,033 111 
Smart economic growth IMF  2010 Muslim population share per total 
population 
0,180 0,040 129 
Smart female survival probability of surviving 
to age 65 
Muslim population share per total 
population 
0,174 0,046 131 
ecological footprint per capita net international migration rate, 2005-2010 0,573 0,000 133 
Smart democracy measure net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,289 0,001 127 
Smart civil and political liberties net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,263 0,002 132 
smart overall development index net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,215 0,012 133 
Smart tertiary enrollment net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,221 0,014 120 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,200 0,029 117 
Smart Human development index net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,188 0,029 133 
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Smart closing economic gender gap net international migration rate, 2005-2010 -0,197 0,031 117 
Smart economic growth IMF  2010 net international migration rate, 2005-
2010 
0,178 0,041 131 
Smart per capita world class universities Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per 
GDP + import-share per GDP) 
-0,234 0,007 131 
Smart democracy measure Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per 
GDP + import-share per GDP) 
-0,197 0,026 125 
Smart tertiary enrollment Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per 
GDP + import-share per GDP) 
-0,190 0,037 118 
ecological footprint per capita population density -0,302 0,000 133 
Smart anti-corruption population density 0,240 0,005 133 
Smart closing health and survivial gender gap population density -0,250 0,006 117 
Smart economic growth in real terms pc. 
per annum, 1990-2005 
public education expenditure per GNP -0,305 0,001 122 
Smart female survival probability of 
surviving to age 65 
public education expenditure per GNP -0,271 0,002 124 
Smart life expectancy (years) public education expenditure per GNP -0,236 0,008 124 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
public education expenditure per GNP 0,209 0,024 114 
Smart per capita world class universities public education expenditure per GNP 0,202 0,024 124 
Smart avoiding unemployment public education expenditure per GNP -0,204 0,029 113 
Smart global tolerance public education expenditure per GNP 0,256 0,036 65 
Smart closing economic gender gap public education expenditure per GNP 0,184 0,048 114 
Smart global tolerance social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,502 0,000 52 
Smart per capita world class universities social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,351 0,000 96 
Smart tertiary enrollment social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,379 0,000 90 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,338 0,001 90 
Smart closing political gender gap social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,344 0,001 90 
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Smart closing political gender gap social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,344 0,001 90 
Smart economic growth in real terms pc. per 
annum, 1990-2005 
social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
-0,291 0,004 94 
Smart avoiding high income differences social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,305 0,004 85 
Smart gender empowerment social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,349 0,006 58 
Smart closing economic gender gap social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
0,273 0,008 90 
Smart closing economic gender gap UNDP education index 0,446 0,000 117 
Smart closing educational gender gap UNDP education index 0,679 0,000 117 
Smart closing of global gender gap overall 
score 
UNDP education index 0,481 0,000 117 
Smart Human development index UNDP education index 0,504 0,000 133 
Smart avoiding Infant mortality UNDP education index 0,387 0,000 133 
Smart tertiary enrollment UNDP education index 0,439 0,000 120 
smart overall development index UNDP education index 0,276 0,001 133 
Smart anti-corruption UNDP education index -0,235 0,006 133 
Smart gender empowerment UNDP education index 0,279 0,017 71 
Smart life expectancy (years) UNDP education index 0,198 0,021 133 
Smart female survival probability of surviving 
to age 65 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,401 0,000 116 
Smart happy life years worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,333 0,000 116 
Smart Human development index worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,409 0,000 116 
Smart avoiding Infant mortality worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,389 0,000 116 
Smart life expectancy (years) worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,411 0,000 116 
Smart closing educational gender gap worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,306 0,001 105 
Smart life satisfaction worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,281 0,002 116 
Smart economic growth IMF  2010 worker remittance inflows as % of GDP -0,272 0,003 115 
smart overall development index worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,244 0,008 116 
Smart economic growth in real terms pc. per worker remittance inflows as % of GDP -0,231 0,013 114 
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annum, 1990-2005 
Smart tertiary enrollment worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0,235 0,015 106 
ecological footprint per capita years of membership in EMU, 2010 -0,188 0,029 133 
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Appendix Map 1 z_res_overall 26 development index  
 
-2,51
-1,89
-1,27
-0,65
-0,03
0,59
1,21
1,83
2,45
3,07
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 105 
 
Appendix Map 2 z_res_overall 26 development index, based on six dimensions  
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Appendix Map 3 z_res_component UNDP democracy  
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Appendix Map 4 z_res_component UNDP economic growth  
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Appendix Map 5 z_res_component UNDP gender  
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Appendix Map 6 z_res_component UNDP human development  
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Appendix Map 7 z_res_component UNDP R&D  
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3,72
4,54
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Appendix Map 8 z_res_component UNDP social cohesion  
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Appendix Map 9 global rank z_res_component UNDP social cohesion: social justice for footprint 
 
-2,13
14,63
31,40
48,17
64,93
81,70
98,47
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132,00
148,77
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Appendix Map 10 how much footprint for social justice? inverted global rank z_res_component UNDP social cohesion: little social 
justice for lots of footprint. “red sinners” and blue best practice models 
 
1,00
18,13
35,25
52,38
69,50
86,63
103,75
120,88
138,00
155,13
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Appendix Table 5: Rankings: global smart development 
 
 
 
 smart smart smart smart smart smart smart smart 
 26 
development 
index 
26 
development 
index, based 
on six 
dimensions 
democracy economic 
growth 
gender human 
development 
R&D social 
cohesion 
Philippines 1 1 11 126 1 2 13 69 
Sri Lanka 2 3 14 63 9 4 60 37 
Costa Rica 3 6 1 76 18 5 101 85 
Sweden 4 2 5 81 6 61 2 38 
Jamaica 5 5 3 135 14 1 30 75 
Dominican 
Republic 
6 19 16 89 20 7 36 123 
Finland 7 4 9 103 3 65 4 42 
Peru 8 13 28 29 28 18 25 108 
Netherland
s 
9 7 2 108 24 48 7 20 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
10 24 17 55 11 34 116 59 
Norway 11 8 37 33 4 81 8 36 
Chile 12 28 4 23 66 38 67 104 
Switzerland 13 11 12 90 33 57 9 31 
Germany 14 20 10 122 21 52 12 56 
El Salvador 15 36 31 118 29 12 63 112 
United 
States 
16 9 46 82 38 58 1 114 
Indonesia 17 14 68 84 37 8 27 61 
New 
Zealand 
18 10 39 41 16 92 3 86 
Moldova 19 18 34 139 13 10 19 26 
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Argentina 20 31 47 111 19 19 21 111 
India 21 15 6 18 112 33 31 25 
Cuba 22 21 124 48 12 3 46 6 
Malawi 23 29 13 30 27 109 34 96 
Vietnam 24 12 106 22 32 6 64 11 
Colombia 25 60 76 113 34 9 54 124 
Bangladesh 26 16 45 37 80 27 24 17 
Honduras 27 44 53 95 36 25 83 94 
Austria 28 23 19 69 56 62 11 23 
Denmark 29 30 29 66 31 88 16 81 
United 
Kingdom 
30 25 25 80 47 85 6 54 
Panama 31 55 49 11 54 43 95 117 
Tajikistan 32 22 86 132 15 17 20 8 
Thailand 33 26 26 115 48 39 37 10 
Nicaragua 34 41 56 97 23 32 103 43 
Guatemala 35 48 52 104 69 11 86 99 
Belgium 36 33 33 75 45 72 15 60 
Nepal 37 38 24 86 84 41 41 88 
South Africa 38 80 15 101 2 119 78 125 
France 39 37 32 65 41 71 23 63 
Kyrgyzstan 40 17 93 119 8 30 10 41 
Madagascar 41 43 8 131 17 104 77 45 
Canada 42 35 38 34 55 87 17 83 
Bhutan 43 27 61 6  40 76 18 
Australia 44 34 43 32 50 78 18 90 
Ecuador 45 76 82 116 25 23 124 107 
Mozambiqu
e 
46 32 22 36 5 128 70 16 
Tunisia 47 47 80 24 85 15 55 103 
Morocco 48 39 72 45 96 13 50 84 
Ghana 49 49 20 21 49 106 94 87 
Brazil 50 74 50 93 68 31 93 120 
Senegal 51 45 18 62 58 102 89 33 
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Belize 52 82 60 52 74 35 127 113 
China 53 40 122 1 81 22 81 51 
Georgia 54 42 66 112 97 14 14 101 
Ireland 55 57 40 114 42 86 28 57 
Iceland 56 63 30 125 7 79 130 49 
Bulgaria 57 51 54 121 40 50 53 48 
Guyana 58 81 73 15 22 98 122 115 
Slovakia 59 65 51 59 65 56 107 68 
Hungary 60 52 21 99 72 80 57 35 
Poland 61 59 65 27 67 74 51 76 
Jordan 62 50 99 39 87 21 32 92 
Cambodia 63 54 77 91 59 93 62 13 
Tanzania 64 61 48 20 35 124 85 32 
Israel 65 46 84 57 83 70 5 74 
Spain 66 64 57 67 52 77 59 80 
Bolivia 67 92 62 50 76 76 35 126 
Portugal 68 73 23 98 73 89 87 78 
Slovenia 69 53 41 46 82 69 74 21 
Albania 70 83 88 47 94 24 102 118 
Croatia 71 77 81 105 57 46 110 62 
Japan 72 56 27 107 98 66 33 14 
Malaysia 73 69 78 106 95 26 79 53 
Lithuania 74 66 42 138 39 63 42 22 
Uzbekistan 75 62 135 4 26 55 115 2 
Armenia 76 67 74 133 105 16 40 67 
Benin 77 58 7 77 109 114 66 7 
Italy 78 71 64 102 93 67 22 50 
Luxembour
g 
79 99 59 109 62 37 139 116 
Mongolia 80 88 55 8 61 116 108 106 
Romania 81 78 79 123 70 59 98 27 
Cyprus 82 90 58 16 108 64 135 55 
Uganda 83 70 112 12 10 122 91 30 
Algeria 84 84 116 54 92 28 75 110 
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Latvia 85 75 70 137 30 90 26 40 
Pakistan 86 72 69 94 118 42 61 24 
Zambia 87 85 36 79 71 129 48 102 
Kenya 88 79 89 85 51 115 72 39 
Mexico 89 97 94 100 88 49 123 58 
Egypt 90 89 117 43 113 20 109 77 
Venezuela 91 94 109 127 60 45 96 79 
Korea 
(Republic 
of) 
92 96 85 58 114 53 125 9 
Malta 93 101 107 53 102 47 126 71 
Syria 94 103 129 44 100 29 114 109 
Laos 95 68 119 25  44 80 5 
Congo  96 126 71 96  95 39  
Uruguay 97 108 90 13 90 107 132 100 
Paraguay 98 117 121 72 53 84 128 121 
Czech 
Republic 
99 102 87 71 91 100 131 29 
Ukraine 100 93 102 136 63 75 44 34 
Greece 101 104 98 35 103 97 118 82 
Ethiopia 102 91 83 9 104 130 92 19 
Singapore 103 100 110 130 107 51 58 47 
Mauritania 104 115 111 40 86 110 113 119 
Angola 105 127 101 68 43 132 68  
Mali 106 107 35 28 111 133 105 98 
Djibouti 107 137 67 42  113 99 133 
Yemen 108 98 96 19 122 68 69 89 
Haiti 109 111 97 134  54 38 122 
Myanmar 110 87 131 14  60 45 72 
Congo 
(Democratic 
Republic of 
the) 
111 132 108 5  121 43  
Azerbaijan 112 95 132 2 110 94 84 95 
Togo 113 133 75 128  103 47  
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Iran 114 120 126 17 116 83 129 97 
Saudi 
Arabia 
115 114 128 78 121 36 100 64 
Botswana 116 129 44 3 99 140 136 128 
Nigeria 117 109 115 88 79 125 88 44 
Cameroon 118 113 120 92 89 120 82 73 
Rwanda 119 86 92 38  123 52 3 
Turkey 120 121 113 117 119 73 117 91 
Namibia 121 136 91 49 64 139 137 132 
Guinea 122 106 103 61  117 90 28 
Lebanon 123 131 134 10  101 71  
Estonia 124 122 114 120 78 118 119 66 
Burkina 
Faso 
125 116 104 26 106 137 120 12 
Russia 126 112 130 124 75 108 29 46 
Kazakhstan 127 118 138 73 46 112 111 52 
Macedonia 128 134 127 70 101 111 133 127 
Sierra Leone 129 128 63 74  135 49 129 
Belarus 130 105 139 83 44 105 65 4 
Hong Kong, 
China 
(SAR) 
131 119 133 64  91 97 70 
Burundi 132 110 95 110  126 56 15 
Zimbabwe 133 125 118 140 77 134 73 65 
Chad 134 123 125 60 117 131 112 1 
Kuwait 135 138 137 31 115 99 138  
Niger 136 124 100 51  136 106 93 
United Arab 
Emirates 
137 130 136 56 120 82 140 105 
Central 
African 
Republic, 
138 135 105 87  138 104 130 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
139 139 123 129  96 134 131 
Sudan 140 140 140 7  127 121  
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Appendix Map 11 Smart avoiding to be a failed state 
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Appendix Map 12 Smart civil and political liberties 
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Appendix Map 13 Smart closing economic gender gap 
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Appendix Map 14 Smart closing educational gender gap 
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Appendix Map 15 Smart closing health and survivial gender gap 
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Appendix Map 16 Smart closing of global gender gap overall score 
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Appendix Map 17 Smart closing political gender gap 
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Appendix Map 18 Smart anti-corruption 
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Appendix Map 19 Smart democracy measure 
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Appendix Map  20 Smart economic growth IMF  2010 
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Appendix Map 21 Smart economic growth in real terms pc. per annum, 1990-2005 
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Appendix Map 22 Smart female survival probability of surviving to age 65 
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Appendix Map 23 Smart gender empowerment 
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Appendix Map 24 Smart global tolerance 
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Appendix Map 25 Smart happy life years 
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Appendix Map 26 Smart Human development index 
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Appendix Map 27 Smart avoiding Infant mortality 
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Appendix Map 28 Smart life expectancy (years) 
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Appendix Map 29 Smart life satisfaction 
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Appendix Map 30 Smart per capita world class universities 
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Appendix Map 31 Smart avoiding high income differences 
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Appendix Map 32 Smart rule of law 
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Appendix Map 33 Smart tertiary enrollment 
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Appendix Map 34 Smart avoiding unemployment 
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Appendix Map 35 smart overall development index 
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Appendix Map 36 ecological footprint per capita 
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Appendix Table 4: data sources 
 
All the original variables are contained in: 
 
http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2017 
 
and 
 
http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2383#more-2383 
 
This data set combines the most up-to-date data on the social, economic, political, and environmental effects of globalization. The dataset in EXCEL format is freely available 
and draws on the following sources: 
 
 
 Variable Label Source 
1 Combined Failed States Index http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=452&Itemid=900 
2 Civil and political liberty violations ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
3 Closing economic gender gap World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/in
dex.htm  
4 Closing educational gender gap World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/in
dex.htm  
5 Closing health and survivial gender gap World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/in
dex.htm  
6 Closing of global gender gap overall score 
2009 
World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/in
dex.htm  
7 Closing political gender gap World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/in
dex.htm  
8 Corruption avoidance measure ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
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9 Country share in top world 500 Universities University of Shanghai http://www.arwu.org/ 
10 Crisis Performance Factor calculated from IMF and UNDP. IMF prognosis April 2009 
11 Democracy measure ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
12 Ecological footprint (gha per capita) Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html 
13 Economic growth IMF prediction growth 
rate in 2009 
IMF http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php  
14 Economic growth IMF prediction growth 
rate in 2010 
IMF http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php  
15 Economic growth in real terms per capita, 
per annum, 1990-2005 
UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
16 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) EPI Yale Columbia Index http://epi.yale.edu/Home  
17 ESI-Index Environment Sustainability 
Index (Yale Columbia) 
Yale/Columbia ESI Index website http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/ 
18 Female survival - probability of surviving 
to age 65 
calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
19 Gender empowerment index value UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
20 Global tolerance index calculated from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
21 Happy life years rs) Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html 
22 Happy Planet Index, HPI Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html 
23 Human development index (HDI) value 
2004 
UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
24 Infant mortality 2005 UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
25 Labour force participation rate of migrants 
(both sexes) 
UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
26 Life expectancy (years) Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html 
27 Life satisfaction (0-10) Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html 
28 Net exports of ecological footprint gha per 
person 
Global footprint network at http://www.footprintnetwork.org/images/uploads/Ecological_Footprint_Atlas_2009.pdf 
29 Per capita world class universities Calculated from the data of this work 
30 Quintile share income difference between 
richest and poorest 20% 
UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
31 Rule of law Yale/Columbia ESI Index website 
32 Tertiary enrollment Nationmaster Sydney http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php  
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33 Total unemployment rate of immigrants  
(both sexes)  
UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
34 Unemployment rate United Nations Statistics http://unstats.un.org/unsd/Demographic/Products/socind/unemployment.htm  
35 Cyclones - average number of tropical 
cyclones per year 
http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm 
36 ln (number of people per million 
inhabitants 1980-2000 killed by natural 
disasters per year+1) 
http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm 
37 Tertiary emigration rate UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
38 Droughts - average number of droughts per 
year 
http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm 
39 Earthquakes - average number of 
earthquakes per year 
http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm 
40 Carbon emissions per million US dollars 
GDP 
ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
41 Carbon emissions per capita ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
42 % women in government, all levels UNDP HDR 2000 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
43 % world population calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
44 2000 Economic Freedom Score Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org/Index/  
45 Absolute latitude Easterly, William, New York University – Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, May 2000 “The 
Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2346, 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=630718. Data in EXCEL-format still retrievable best 
from a “google” search, entering the words “easterly POLRIGHTS98” at the site of the http://www.cgdev.org/. The 
address of the site is given as www.cgdev.org/doc/…/easterly/easterly_consensusdata.xls. Alternatively, a “google 
search” using the search profile words “easterly_consensusdata.xls” also yields the data set  
--46 Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
47 Comparative price levels (US=1.00) calculated from UNDP (GDP curr/GDP PPP) UNDP Human Development Report Office 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
48 Foreign savings rate UNDP HDR 2000 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
49 FPZ (free production zones) employment as 
% of total population 
calculated from ILO http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/themes/epz/epz-db.pdf 
50 ln GDP per capita UNDP HDR 2000 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
51 ln GDP per capita ^2 UNDP HDR 2000 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
52 Membership in the Islamic Conference OIC http://www.oic-oci.org/  
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53 Military expenditure per GDP UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
54 Military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) US CIA https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html 
55 MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP UNCTAD http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. In addition: 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. Furthermore 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. In addition 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1 and 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf and 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1  
56 MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP UNCTAD http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. In addition: 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. Furthermore 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. In addition 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1 and 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf and 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1  
57 MNC PEN: DYN MNC PEN 1995-2005 UNCTAD http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. In addition: 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. Furthermore 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. In addition 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1 and 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf and 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1  
58 Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per 
GDP + import-share per GDP) 
calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
59 Population density https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
60 Public education expenditure per GNP UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
61 UNDP education index UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
62 Worker remittance inflows as % of GDP UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
63 Immigration - Share of population 2005 
(%) 
UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
64 Muslim population share per total 
population 
Nationmaster Sydney http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php  
65 Net international migration rate, 2005-2010 UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
66 Years of membership in the EU, 2010 Website European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm and EU Scadplus 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index.htm, as well as http://www.state.gov/  
67 Years of membership in EMU, 2010 Website European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm and EU Scadplus 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index.htm, as well as http://www.state.gov/  
68 Social security expenditure per GDP ILO http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/protection/socfas/research/stat/table14.htm  
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average 1990s (ILO) 
69 Overall 30 variable development index calculated from this work 
70 Overall 35 variable development index calculated from this work 
71 Overall 35 variable development index, 
based on 7 dimensions 
calculated from this work 
72 Avoiding net trade of ecological footprint 
gha per person 
calculated from this work 
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